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This enquiry first establishes both the importance and 
the general meaning of the notions of happiness in 
Rousseau's corpus. Both private and public happiness are 
seen as the overarching intent of his life as a thinker. 
The possibility of a tertiary notion of happiness— between 
private and public— is presented with the introduction of 
the subject work Julie: or The New Heloise.
Themes considered at some length are passion/virtue, 
happiness/duty, love/friendship, as well as the notions of 
Platonic and courtly love— not to mention the dichotomy 
motion/rest.
At the end of Part One of the novel, the lovers are 
forcibly separated, and the tasks of reconciling the above 
dichotomies must be accomplished in other than physical 
terms. Parts Two and Three are portrayed as a classic 
example of the passion myth playing itself out until the 
symbolic deaths of the lovers— he goes to sea and she 
marries at her father's demand.
The remainder of the story chronicles the reign of 
morality and extreme sublimation. Passion and virtue are 
eventually reconciled in the death of the heroine Julie, but 





Julie; or The New Heloise is a political novel in that 
it deals with mores that govern human passions. One might 
even presume that the work formulates an ethic of love. 
Besides, one can assume that anything a philosopher creates 
also partakes of philosophic discovery. And so it is with 
the Julie: an interplay of the poet and the philosopher.
And, yes, there are conflicts. I would say that, in the 
Julie, philosophy formulates the question— that of the 
possible reconciliation of passion and virtue— and poetry 
dares a resolution.
Much of this study reads like a commentary, for it was 
judged that such a form of analysis was best suited to a 
philosophical novel, where there was both story and 
argument. Also, a novel of letters, as this one is, does 
not include an all-seeing or synthesizing first or third 
person; the commentator fills that role as best he can.
This study divides the novel into three parts: 1) the
love affair itself (Part I); 2) the period of forced 
separation of the lovers (Parts II and III); and 3) the 
lovers' reunion and attempt to salvage love on other than 
physical terms (Parts IV, V, and VI).
It is my contention that love and virtue are reconciled 
only incidentally within the novel itself, but that 
Rousseau, through his paradigmatic personage of Julie,
1
offers a vision of how that reconciliation night be 
effected. In offering his answer to this age-old question 
of the private and the public, Rousseau borrows, at least in 
part, from past ages, as the title of his work would 
indicate.
This study does not pretend to be a comprehensive 
treatment of the Julie: rather, its essential concern is how 
happiness is viewed and pursued by Rousseau's characters 
and, by interpolation, by Rousseau himself. And, of course, 
within the confines of a love story, as this one is, the 
question of happiness becomes the question of love. In 
fact, whereas the Julie is not meant to be a comprehensive 
statement on happiness, it might rather be a comprehensive 
statement on love and happiness; for it shows how happiness 
might be attained within the context of love. And that 
doorway turns out to be rather narrow. It is so narrow— so 
tenuous— that its attainment is offered only as a vision.
CHAPTER 2
BETWEEN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC HAPPINESS 
It will prove both useful and necessary to situate the 
question of happiness within the confines of Rousseauean 
works other than The New Heloise. Such an investigation 
serves not only to accentuate the importance of the subject 
for Rousseau, but also to determine if it is given different 
meaning and weight in different works. To be examined 
within this chapter are On the Social Contract. Emile. The 
Confessions, and The Reveries of the Solitary Walker.
In the study of any political philosopher— in the study 
of any philosopher or, for that matter, of any person of 
letters— one should be able to question the overarching 
intent of the work and receive from the text at least a 
thoughtful attempt at an answer. When one asks this 
ultimate question of Rousseau'sjcorpus, the most ubiquitous 
and logically necessary intention seems to be that of 
defining and promoting both private and public happiness.
In a more than superficial sense, Rousseau returns us 
to Aristotle and the ancient eudaemonistic understanding of 
human behavior. To his question "What is the fascination 
with Rousseau?" Arthur M. Melzer ultimately has a concise 
answer: "In a word, he boldly insists on pushing beyond the
tame, manageable issue of comfortable self-preservation to
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confront the whole, messy, complex question of happiness.1,1 
This kinship between Aristotle and Rousseau holds true 
surely if we define eudaemonism as that ethical theory which 
upholds the highest ethical good to be happiness. If we add 
to this bare bones definition of eudaemonism the requirement 
that reason be the essential element in the pursuit of 
happiness, then the kinship becomes almost purely heuristic: 
for Aristotle, humankind is essentially rational; for 
Rousseau, humankind is essentially free.
One might foresee conflicts, or at least tensions, 
between the private and the public notions of happiness in 
whoever thinks seriously about the good of man. These 
tensions exist in a fundamental way in both Aristotle and 
Rousseau, and, perhaps, that is the source and substance of 
their kinship. For example, one might ask: Does the same
thing render a private individual and a (public) citizen 
happy? Is it possible for a citizen to be both rational and 
free, or either one of the two? Aristotle resorts to a sort 
of dualism— the differentiation of moral and intellectual 
virtue or perfection. And Rousseau will unearth what he 
sees as the ultimate conflict between truth and life itself; 
he may be seen as a sort of naturalist who, at the end of
‘Arthur M. Melzer, The Natural Goodness of Man: On the
System of Rousseau/s Thought (Chicago: The University Press
of Chicago, 1990), p. ix.
day, has only happiness and its phenomenological elements as 
his guide.
The position that happiness is, in fact, Rousseau's
ultimate occupation needs some textual justification,
although a general meditation on just about any of his
writings would yield just such a conclusion. I shall,
first, demonstrate that Rousseau's expressed intent in
writing was, in fact, individual and collective happiness.
I shall then briefly explicate the notion of happiness as it
appears in the above mentioned works. Such a procedure will
provide for the reader of the Julie a context in which to
situate Rousseau's treatment of happiness in that novel.
Happiness as the Intent
At the heading of his first publication, The First
Discourse. Rousseau, simultaneously, humbles reason and
enthrones happiness as the goal of his deliberations.
Here is one of the greatest and noblest questions 
ever debated [Has the restoration of the sciences 
and arts tended to purify or corrupt morals?].
This discourse is not concerned with those 
metaphysical subtleties that have prevailed in 
all parts of learning and from which the 
announcements of Academic competitions are not 
always exempt; rather, it is a matter of one of 
those truths that concern the happiness of mankind.2
The logic of the above statement would make the question of 
happiness itself an even greater and nobler question than
2 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The First Discoursef 
Translated by Roger D. Masters and Judith R. Masters (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964), p. 33.
the one posed for the competition, which in itself, is "one 
of the greatest and noblest questions ever debated."
The intention of Rousseau— his philosophic and poetic 
focus— remained constant throughout the course of his 
writings. Twelve years later, in the Preface of Emile, he 
identifies himself and his philosophizing with the very 
notion of happiness. Rousseau is saying that he believes 
that he has an obligation to propose his ideas to the 
public,
for the maxims concerning which I am of an 
opinion different from that of others are not 
matters of indifference. They are among those 
whose truth or falsehood is important to know and 
which make the happiness or the unhappiness of 
mankind.3
In that same year, 1762, Rousseau published On the 
Social Contract, wherein, it may be argued, he strongly 
intimated that the end or objective of his masterpiece of 
political philosophy was none other than happiness. This 
contention that the explicit intention of On the Social 
Contract is the furtherance of public happiness should be 
viewed within Rousseau's general critique of Hobbesian 
philosophy: Rousseau believes that individuals and
societies have some capacity for happiness (after all, 
humans are by nature good); whereas Hobbes sees only a
3 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile: or. On Educationr
Translated and Prefaced by Allan Bloom. (New York: Basic
Books, 1979), p. 34.
diminution of pain and a delaying of death as the ultimate 
political successes. Rousseau's primitive innocent is 
capable of greater heights than Hobbes's cunning and 
bellicose natural man. But how does Rousseau inform us that 
the intent of On the Social Contract is the happiness of the 
citizens living under such a regime?
In the Introduction to Book I, Rousseau tells us that 
his goal is "legitimate and reliable rule"— taking men and 
their interests as they are and laws and right as they can 
be. A harmony of "justice and utility" seems to be his 
ultimate goal. Immediately, however, after defining what 
seem to be his ultimate goals, he advances the issue one 
step further toward a more encompassing perspective. First, 
he writes: "I start in without proving the importance of my
subject."4 If the balancing of "justice and utility" be not 
proof of the importance of his book, then what is? The 
proof must be in demonstrating the importance of the effects 
of the balancing of "justice and utility." I contend that 
the intended effect of the harmony of justice and utility is 
happiness of the citizen. No wonder he does not prove the 
importance of his subject— his subject is a foundational 
principle (as Aristotle would say, it is the end and never 
a means).
4 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, On the Social Contractr 
Translated by Judith R. Masters (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1978), p. 46.
Almost immediately after stating that he has not proven 
the importance of reconciling justice and utility, Rousseau 
begins to muse about being "born a citizen of a free State" 
and how the right to vote there imposes public duties. He 
concludes this meditation by saying: "And I am happy,
everytime I meditate about government, always to find in my 
research new reasons to love that of my country!"5 In other 
words, Rousseau has been made happy, as a citizen, by a 
state that resembles, at least in the essential of giving a 
political voice and vote to its people, that state which he 
is recommending in On the Social Contract. Rousseau, it 
seems, wishes to play the role of none other than the 
legislator who would bring happiness to humankind by means 
of a new ethos, as well as new institutions.
In the last months of his life— some fifteen years 
after On the Social Contract— Rousseau boldly states in the 
Sixth Walk of The Reveries of the Solitary Walker that, if 
he had been given the proverbial ring of Gyges, "Only the 
sight of public felicity could have affected my heart with 
a permanent feeling, and the ardent desire to contribute to 
it would have been my most constant passion."6 Here is a
5 On the Social Contract, p.46.
6 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Reveries of the Solitary 
Walker. Translated and Interpretation by Charles E. 
Butterworth (New York: New York University Press, 1979), p. 82.
prince who can only be a prince if he has the capability of 
living his passion: contributing to public happiness.
Rousseau's Thoughts on Happiness
For Rousseau, man is naturally good, and his 
experiences of true happiness are linked to love and 
goodness.7 Although Rousseau agrees with Hobbes on the non- 
teleological understanding of life and the self, he 
disagrees with Hobbes that "felicity is a continual progress 
of the desire, from one object to another."8 For Hobbes, 
taking as model the anxiety-ridden urban man, life is 
opposition— a continuous flight from evil; for Rousseau, 
taking as model peasants, savages, and even lower animals, 
life is attraction to a "delicious idleness," but also 
attraction to a "positive affection for oneself and for 
simply being."9 Rousseau, critiquing Hobbes's myopic view 
of human nature, saw that man was an unfortunate product of 
history and that it might be possible to return— not to some 
point of idyllic and unchanging human nature, for such a 
nature, in the Aristotelian sense of nature, never existed, 
but to an earlier period when man was more in tune with 
himself and less at odds with his world.10
7 Melzer, p. 32.
8 Melzer, p. 37, quoting Thomas Hobbes, De Homine XI- 15:54.
9 Melzer, p. 38.
10 Melzer, p. 51 n. 3.
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Despite insistent "Kantian" interpretations of 
Rousseau, Melzer contends, as mentioned above, that Rousseau 
held to the "traditional view that the good is prior to the 
right" and that "justice must ultimately be judged before 
the bar of happiness.1,11 This represents the essential 
element of eudaemonism— the primacy of happiness as the 
justification of moral acts. Even Ernst Cassirer, who 
ultimately views Rousseau as a non-eudaemonist, must 
conclude: "From the outset, [Rousseau's] whole thought was
moved by the problem of happiness: its aim was to find a
harmonious union of virtue and happiness."12 But it is less 
the unjust or immoral man than it is the disunified man who 
presents the more tragically fundamental picture of 
unhappiness:
Always in contradiction with himself, always 
floating between his inclination and his duties 
[happiness and virtue], he will never be either 
man or citizen. He will be good neither for 
himself nor for others. He will be one of these 
men of our days: A Frenchman, an Englishman, a
bourgeois. He will be nothing.13
Strictly speaking, there are two opposing resolutions for
the above described vacillation: a resolute public person
(a good citizen) or a resolute private person (a dreamer).
It is in On the Social Contract that Rousseau offers his
11 Melzer, p. 62.
12Ernst Cassirer, The Question of Jean-Jaccrues Rousseau
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954), p. 70.
13 Emile. I 40.
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political solution, which, in great part, is an explicit and
implicit description of what a true citizen would be.
It is in The Reveries, however, that Rousseau offers
the (mutually exclusive?) private solution:
A simple and permanent state . . . where the soul 
finds a base sufficiently solid on which to rest 
entirely and to gather there all its being, 
without the need to recall the past or encroach 
on the future; where time is nothing for it, 
where the present lasts forever without even 
marking its duration and without any trace of 
succession, without any other sentiment of 
privation or of enjoyment, of pleasure or of 
pain, of desire or fear, but alone of our 
existence, which sentiment is able to fill the 
soul entirely.14
Though hardly compatible with civil society, this private 
solution would seem, according to Melzer, to. be of value as 
a point de reoere for less radically private resolutions. 
But one senses something unique and peculiarly new about 
what Rousseau sees and how he proposes to correct it. For 
one, nature is good; it was (is) man who corrupts man, of 
course, with the complicity of historical accidents. One 
would then think that the way to repair man would be to 
return simply to his original nature. The problem there is 
that man has no changeless nature and no telos. He is 
infinitely malleable, or theoretically so. What then is 
Rousseau's advice for the restoration of man's authenticity? 
Melzer explains:
14 Melzer, p. 66.
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Any way of life of reasonable extent is good, 
regardless of content, provided only that it is 
internally consistent. Rousseau is the first 
thinker thus to complete man's liberation from 
God and nature: to abandon all substantive
standards, natural or divine, and to replace them 
with the formal standard of psychic unity or non­
contradiction .15
The two paths to wholeness actually proposed by Rousseau 
were complete selfishness (reveries) or complete 
selflessness (the community); extreme individualism or 
extreme collectivism. These were his ways of eliminating 
personal dependence and returning to unity— the ultimate 
human problem and its resolution.16
15Melzer, p. 90.
16J. L. Talmon is quick to say that Rousseau never 
decided if it was better or worse to be alone. "The only 
salvation for this agony [of "wavering between his 
inclinations and duties"], if a return to the untroubled 
state of nature was impossible, was either a complete self- 
abandonment to the elemental impulses or to "denature 
(denaturer) man" altogether." The Origins of Totalitarian 
Democracy (London: Seeker and Warburg, 1955), pp. 38-39.
Talmon speaks of Rousseau's question as if it were his 
conclusion, or even his prescription. In answer to one horn 
of the dilemma, Ronald Grimsley writes I Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau— A Study in Self-Awareness (Cardiff: University of 
Wales Press, 1969): "It may be said at once that [Rousseau]
does not attempt to solve the problem of frustrated passion 
through development of some kind of anarchic individualism. 
On the contrary, Saint-Preux/Rousseau tends to suggest the 
spiritualization of his attitude through the elaboration of 
a Platonic outlook which sets very definite limits to any 
excessively individualistic attitude." (p. 130) And, on the 
other hand, the Social Contract, though "denaturing" to 
Talmonl, is viewed by Grimsley as fulfilled and protected 
"participation in a social life based on the ultimate truth 
and integrity of the 'law'." (p. 322)
The work of Rousseau is charged, in fact, with 
antitheses: solitude/community, idleness/activity,
naturalism/self-conquest and so on. These dichotomies are 
not the result of confusion on Rousseau's part, but rather 
"the logical consequence of his analysis of society's 
contradictions and indeed a testament to the rigorous and 
unflinching consistency of his thought."17
What is common to both poles of these antitheses is 
"freedom." Individualism is characterized by "natural 
freedom"; the political solution is characterized by "civil 
and moral freedom." For Rousseau, freedom was the essential 
condition of the good life. Thus, all restorations of 
wholeness and unity of humankind must account for 
freedom.18 Rousseau blends liberal (or modern) and 
classical thought to arrive at a radical humanism: "he will
bring true unity and happiness to men not by uplifting them 
to some divine or transcendent standard, but by preventing 
them from using and ruining each other."19
But, finally, Rousseau radicalized the argument beyond 
the domain of modern and ancient premises by belittling the 
rational and social principles which formed the bases of 
Hobbesian thought and by doubting the highest of the high—
17 Melzer, p. 91.
18 Melzer, 91.
19 Melzer, p. 112.
i.e., religion or ultimate happiness— and by placing the 
revival of unity and happiness in the care of man's animal 
goodness (the bodily, the animal, the instinctive, the 
sentimental, the passionate).M The attainment of unity and 
happiness would appear a simple matter— just maintain an 
original animality. But the preservation of a natural 
goodness proves "to require as much wisdom and to be as rare 
and difficult as the perfection of the soul had formerly 
been thought to be." This is the irony of Rousseau's 
project and, as Melzer bleakly concludes, it is "a study in 
the pessimistic consequences of humanism. "2I The New 
Heloise. I contend, offers a resolution, though not a 
universal one and not a facile one.
On the Social Contract
Having touched on the importance of the concept of 
happiness for Rousseau, this investigation will now focus on 
a study of happiness in four of his major works: On the
Social Contract. Emile. The Confessions, and The Reveries of 
the Solitary Walker. Two of these works are
autobiographical and two are more or less political in 
nature; the latter two works were intended to be of use to 
humankind in a public way. Of the two non-autobiographical 
works, On the Social Contract claims to demonstrate how to
20 Melzer, p. 286.
21 Melzer, p. 287.
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make men, as citizens, happy; and Emile attempts to educate
not necessarily a citizen or a philosopher but someone
capable of maintaining a sort of goodness and happiness even
while living within (a corrupt) society.
According to Charles Butterworth, Rousseau's non-
autobiographical works were "intended for the common good of
his fellow men."
In these writings, Rousseau addressed himself to 
the problems that beset man in general. . . .All 
of these works had the same basic goal: to
destroy the prejudices which gave rise to the 
vices and misfortunes besetting men or, 
differently stated, to persuade men to stop 
admiring the arts and sciences which enslave them 
and to stop scorning the useful virtues which 
could bring them happiness.22
On the Social Contract is an answer to the situation 
and its historical genesis described in the two discourses. 
History had dumbly conspired to bring humankind to a state 
of general slavery, alienation, and unhappiness; On the 
Social Contract would describe the only way over the 
impasse.
Rousseau looks to the past for his ideal of "man's 
happy freedom" and to the future for the establishment of a 
regime in accord with the nature of man, a nature replete 
with contradictions: primarily expressed in the dichotomy
“ Charles E. Butterworth, "Interpretive Essay" to The 
Reveries of the Solitary Walker (Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing, 1992), p. 152.
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of political society and the state of nature.23 Whereas 
Hobbes considers only the condition of happiness— life, 
Rousseau goes further in an attempt to discover what would 
make men happy, or: What is the good life?
In his pursuit of happiness, Rousseau challenges the 
whole of the Enlightenment— not only do the sciences and 
arts not improve morality, they corrupt it and contribute to 
the unhappiness of man. Sparta is presented as the refuge 
of real men— a city founded on civic virtue. But "Rousseau 
is a republican; he is a republican because he believes men 
are naturally free and equal" and, therefore, that only a 
republic could make men happy.24
Because civic virtue is the core of the republican 
regime, moral education— not enlightenment from the 
sciences— is "the prerequisite of sound civil society." 
Rousseau praises ancient deeds and practice, specifically 
the perceived necessity of civic virtue. But he joins the 
moderns in denying man's political nature and, for that 
matter, he denies that man has any nature in the ancient or 
teleological sense of the word. The state is artifice- 
originating in the desire for self-preservation. At
” Allan Bloom, "Jean-Jacques Rousseau" in History of 
Political Philosophy, ed. Strauss/Cropsey (Chicago: Rand
McNally, 1963), pp. 514-33.
^Bloom, "Jean-Jacques Rousseau," p. 516.
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present, societies merely protect existing privileges and 
inequalities.
So what is man in this state of nature? He is not what 
Hobbes describes. In fact, unlike Hobbes's natural man, 
Rousseau's is apolitical and asocial.25
It is in the Second Discourse that Rousseau attempted 
an explanation of just how humankind came to be as they 
were. To find natural man what is needed is a history of 
the species: Rousseau employs (or rather creates the
discipline called) anthropology, but he especially relies on 
"introspection" to uncover the first and most simple 
movements of the human soul: 1) Emerging from pre-civil
life into civil society, man took on simultaneously his 
sociality, his speech, and his reason; 2) This early man 
had no foresight or imagination, and thus could have no 
fear of death; 3) He was not naturally hostile, but would 
defend his life; 4) He was idle and saw no need to fight 
(after all, he was living in a world of abundance); 5) He 
senses "the sweetness of his own existence"— and 
consequently views life as a good thing; 6) His two 
greatest passions were self-preservation and pity for his 
species; 7) He was not moral, for there was no need for 
virtue, but he possessed a sort of primitive "goodness"; 8)
25 For us to "reach" Rousseau's pre-civil man, we must 
do something like what Freud did in order to "discover" the 
unconscious: We must imagine what must have been in orderto explain what is.
He saw no one as having a natural right to rule over anyone 
else; 9) His only virtues were equality and freedom. As 
the human emerges into his nature, or rather "second 
nature," he is already equipped to distinguish himself from 
the other animals: especially, by freedom and equality.
Han was, and is, almost infinitely perfectible; he is pure 
potentiality, and this is his curse and also the source of 
his mastery. It was a series of historical accidents, 
Rousseau speculates, that allowed and encouraged pre-civil 
man to develop. For example, accidents threw pre-civil man 
into close proximity; and this led to the notion of private 
property. The management of the crops of that private 
property encouraged forethought, as well as inequalities, 
which in turn led to wars between the haves and the have- 
nots. Man now lives with and for others, and he is 
constantly comparing himself to others; and this vanity 
(amour-propre) is at the root of everything that causes man 
unhappiness— wars included. Vanity (amour-propre) takes the 
place of "amour de soi"(love of self). Once man begins to 
live his life on the outside, he cannot help but become a 
slave to his own vanity. Knowing at least the basics of how 
Rousseau envisioned pre-civil man and his movements to 
civilization will aid in the understanding of his ethics. 
One thing seems clear: The development of these terrible
passions requires, in order to counteract them, the most 
severe moral education, if men are to live together happily.
19
But there is no natural right in Rousseau's world: morality 
must be created by an act of will, intelligence, and 
sentiment. Rousseau's answer was On the Social Contract: 
an amalgam of self-interest and duty. The goal of this 
document was to restore wholeness to civil life— a life 
based on convention.
But man's "capacity to make conventions is the sign of 
[man's] freedom; his will is not limited by nature."26 
Thus, the trick is to avoid the arbitrary character of 
conventions, and conventions become the fulfillment of man's 
nature and worthy of his respect and obedience. As Rousseau 
writes in the Introduction to Book I of On the Social 
Contract. he will attempt to reconcile right and interest, 
justice and utility— and we might add, virtue and happiness, 
and duty and interest.
How does the social contract lessen the agony of the 
alienated citizen and, at the same time, make it more 
difficult to succumb to the vainglory of the amour-propre? 
The answer is as follows: "The law is produced by the will
of each thinking in terms of all. The primary function of 
the social contract is to constitute a regime which can 
express the general will."27 In obeying all an individual 
obeys only himself. He, thus, remains free and capable of
26 Bloom, "Jean-Jacques Rousseau," p. 523.
27 Bloom, "Jean-Jacques Rousseau," p. 523.
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happiness, for "Willing is, as such, independent of what is 
willed." The general will, to allow nan freedom and 
happiness, must remain an empty notion— it is "pure will."28
In an ironic sense, freedom is not the enemy of, but 
the "sole source of morality." Rousseau pulls down the last 
vestiges of natural law, for "The will of the people is the 
only law." Each individual is both lawgiver and subject. 
It must never be forgotten when thinking of Rousseau's 
politics that the general will functions in an atmosphere of 
self-imposed and severe moral conditions, even if "virtue is 
not itself the end" and only a means to freedom. Freedom, 
we should add, is in turn the means to happiness, if it is 
not happiness herself.
As Allan Bloom reminds us, "Rousseau began his critique 
of modern thought from the point of view of human 
happiness."29 The question of course becomes whether the 
solution of the social contract works for all men, 
especially whether the best men can find complete 
satisfaction (or happiness) within any civil society. Such 
a question is drawn from Rousseau's own writings. Baldly 
stated, Is civil society in conformity with man's nature?
28 One might be reminded of the poet Robert Lowell who, 
in "Jonathan Edwards in Western Massachusetts," comes to 
realize that "hope lives in doubt. / Faith is trying to do 
without / faith."
29 Bloom, "Jean-Jacques Rousseau," pp. 531ff.
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"Virtue is necessary for civil society, but it is unclear 
whether it is good in itself."30 Where in civil society is 
there room for a life of the "sentiments"? What happens to 
the good man, as opposed to the moral man? It is enough to 
remind ourselves that Rousseau ended his life— not totally 
voluntarily— as a solitary dreamer beyond the walls of the 
city, so to speak. As we shall continue to observe, there 
is a fundamental tension within Rousseau's understanding of 
humankind. Rousseau gave each of the generic vitae its due: 
citizen and dreamer.
Emile
The Emile, according to Melzer, may be interpreted as 
using natural law based on individual conscience in order to 
liberate Emile from priests and philosophers; and On the 
Social Contract may be interpreted as rejecting natural law 
in favor of the general will in order, also, to liberate 
citizens from priests and philosophers. Melzer concludes 
that Rousseau contends that "Men cannot be made virtuous or 
secure by doctrines but only by living under the absolute 
rule of law."31 We might add that the rule of law, which is 
the expression of the general will, is also the only way to 
render public men happy. For the citizen, virtue amounts to 
happiness.
30 Bloom, "Jean-Jacques Rousseau," p. 533.
31 Melzer, p. 148.
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On the Social Contract is an attempt to create an
environment of public happiness; Emile attempts the
formation of an individual capable of living happily, even
within a regime which falls short of the standards of On the
Social Contract. As Allan Bloom summarizes in his
conclusion to the Introduction of Emile; "Emile stands
somewhere between the citizen of the Social Contract and the
solitary of the Reveries. lacking something of each."32
In this analysis of happiness, it might be profitable
to consider, as Bloom states, that "only in nature or
according to nature is man's happiness to be found," because
only there exists "a perfect equilibrium" between man's
desires and his capacity to satisfy them.33 If man were by
nature political, as Aristotle maintains, then the solution
would be a matter of moderating or perfecting desires. But
there are even greater contrasts to be made on this issue of
the ultimate disagreement between Rousseau and Aristotle.
Bloom defines the contest;
An older moral philosophy, which goes back to 
Aristotle, taught that desires are by nature 
infinite and that man possesses the faculty of 
will, guided by reason, which can control desires 
for the sake of the good. The language of this 
philosophy was that of virtue and vice. Virtue 
was in this older view understood to be natural 
and the control exercised by it to be productive
32 Allan Bloom, "Introduction" to Emile: or On Education 
(New York; Basic Books, 1979), p. 28.
33 Allan Bloom, Love and Friendship (New York; Simon and Schuster, 1993), pp. 43-44.
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of at least one part of happiness. Virtue is 
happiness according to Socrates' formula. 
Courage controls man's fear of pain; moderation 
his love of pleasure. This control of pleasure, 
a willed harmony in tension, was itself 
understood by this tradition to be a pleasure.
The existence of such virtues and their 
pleasurable character— except perhaps for the 
vain pleasure of superiority over others— is 
flatly denied by Rousseau. In particular, it is the virtue of moderation, which governs the 
desires connected with food and sex, that 
concerns him so much. To Rousseau, man is 
naturally moderate. Society inflames his 
desires, and the control exercised over them is 
not that of virtue but that of fear, of external 
command, of what we now call repression. . . .  
Healing, rather than appeals to morality, is what 
is needed in order to attain the bit of happiness 
possible for social man.34
Emile then is not exactly an attempt at reconciling
virtue and happiness; rather
Emile is an experiment in restoring harmony to 
the [incoherent] world by reordering the 
emergence of man's acquisitions in such a way as 
to avoid the imbalances created by them while 
allowing the full actualization of man's potential.35
The intent of Rousseau is to restore to man his original 
wholeness or *: lity— thus allowing for his rediscovery of a 
degree of happiness. The contemporary manifestation of the 
diversion from possible happiness is represented by the 
bourgeois, whose profundity of soul is defined solely by 
fear of violent death.
34 Bloom, Love, p. 44.
35 Bloom, Intro. Emiler p. 3.
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The first part of Emile is devoted to rearing an autonomous 
civilized savage, and the second part attempts to bring that 
"atomic individual into human society and into a condition 
of moral responsibility on the basis of his inclinations and 
his generosity."36
One reading of Plato's Republic is that the best regime 
is only possible "in word"— that there is no political 
salvation, so to speak, and no true happiness for the 
citizen qua citizen. The message that Rousseau offers with 
Emile is that "The right kind of education, once independent 
of society, can put a child into direct contact with nature 
without the intermixture of opinion."37 Of course, Rousseau 
here denies the ultimate duality of desire and reason. But, 
even independent of society, the process of growth of the 
child must be controlled. For example, the tutor must 
impede the appearance of both the fear of death and amour- 
propre until such time as Emile is capable of dealing with 
them— that is, until such time as he has developed strong 
countervailing traits of character.
The net result of Emile's education is that "His will 
to affirm never exceeds his capacity to prove." He lives 
only by the laws of necessity, and he "has not unlearned how
36 Bloom, Intro. Emile, p. 7.
37 Bloom, Intro. Emile, p. 9.
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to die, harms no one, and knows how to be ignorant, 
possesses a large share of the Socratic wisdom."38
Important to remember is that Emile has not been taught 
to master his passions; rather, he has been reared such that 
his passions do not come into conflict with each other, or 
with the necessities of the external world. Sublimated sex, 
not repressed sex, becomes the link between the individual 
and the disinterested respect for law. Sublimation, a 
Rousseauean notion, is making the higher from the lower. 
And the last two books of Emile "undertake in a detailed way 
the problematic task of showing how the higher might be 
derived from the lower without being reduced to it." And, 
as Bloom points out, everything in those last two books is 
related to sex.39
One example of the divided nature of man— a result of 
his historical development— is the disparity between natural 
puberty (15 years of age) and civil puberty (mid-twenties): 
a tension between natural desire and civil duty. Rousseau 
unifies these two puberties by "establishing successively 
two passions in Emile, which are sublimations of sexual 
desire"— and they are compassion and love. Without entering 
the details of the psychological mechanism of this lesson, 
suffice it to say that "Rousseau studies the passions and
38 Bloom, Intro. Emilef p. 15.
39 Bloom, Intro. Emile, p. 16.
26
finds a way of balancing them one against the other rather 
than trying to develop the virtues which govern them."40 
Emile, thus, moves from nature to society without his being 
denatured and without succumbing to a morality of 
selfishness. In fact, in his education, the conflict 
between inclination and duty has been supplanted by 
inclination and ideal. And, if it may be said that Emile's 
love for Sophie is ideal and thus illusory, it must also be 
said that "the deeds which those illusions produce are 
real. "41
If controlling pleasures is not in itself pleasant, as
we mentioned at the outset when outlining Rousseau's
position, Emile— as a husband and future father— must be
moral (as opposed to merely "good"). But what understanding
of morality does Rousseau give him? Bloom addresses this
question directly:
Virtue, he tells him, is not the perfection of 
desire, but rather the overcoming of desire. 
Virtue is strength, the strength, to put it 
paradoxically, to want to do what one does not 
want to do. Where do we get the strength to look 
at persons and things we love most and at the 
same time to be aware of and unmoved by their 
vulnerability? The incapacity to face the 
mortality of those we love is partially explained 
by the weakness of modern man, attributed by 
Rousseau to the conflict between nature and society.42
40 Bloom, Intro. Emile, p. 20.
41 Bloom, Intro. Emile, p. 21.
42 Bloom, Love, p. 137.
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It is the absence of conflict in his desires that gives 
Emile such strength of soul— such power. He would probably 
regard the Aristotelian man of virtue as divided in soul, 
and the Roman Stoic as suppressed. Emile is "good," though 
he does not know he is good and does not know what goodness 
might be. He has been reared to be— not to think! He has 
been reared to a common happiness.
The Confessions
Whereas On the Social Contract provided for the 
happiness of a sort for the citizen, and whereas Emile 
reared the happy "good" man, The Confessions. an 
autobiography, concerns itself primarily with the happiness 
of the radical individual— but more: the individual, as
Rousseau describes himself in the opening paragraph: "I am
unlike any one I have ever met." Thus, we can expect 
Rousseau of The Confessions to be more interested in private 
than in public happiness. In fact, The Confessions should 
be read as the history of one man's search for happiness— a 
man who, through the fortuitous authenticity of his unique 
character, was able to present posterity with an 
autobiography of at least heuristic value. Since no one 
knows to ask the question "What is happiness?" until he has 
experienced it, this search is in large measure, but not 
totally, retrospective. Rousseau will engage in
reminiscence in order to identify the happy times of his
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younger years, but his glance back is as steely cold as it 
is nostalgic.
In Emile. Rousseau rears his pupil to be a natural man, 
who, because of a quiet imagination, can maintain his 
wholeness and independence indefinitely. But Rousseau 
himself— the subject and the object of The Confessions— is 
a civilized human and "must find wholeness by participating 
in a community.1,43 The question remains the same: How can
we return to a state of even quasi-wholeness and 
independence?
In Book VI of The Confessions. Rousseau attempts to 
attest to, if not describe, "the short happiness of my 
life." Four or five years were spent at Les Charmettes with 
his benefactrice Mme de Warens. And it was there that 
Rousseau suffered an illness which convinced him that he was 
about to die. Christopher Kelly begins his analysis of Book 
VI by questioning the nature of Rousseau's brush with death 
and his perceived access to happiness. "The major, question 
raised by Book VI is how the prospect of imminent death can 
serve as the foundation of happiness.1,44
During his illness, Rousseau harbored a fear of 
imminent death— all of which caused him to reflect on
43 Christopher Kelly, Rousseau's Exemplary Life; The 
Confessions as Political Philosophy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell 
University Press, 1987), p. 147.
44 Kelly, Exemplary, p. 149.
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religious natters. He does not, however, agree (with
Hobbes) .that fear of death is natural, for pre-civil man 1)
is not possessed of the faculty of foresight, and 2) he
sees no way of preventing death. In sum, fear of death and
fear of Hell are both unnatural, and they are two great
causes contributing to the unhappiness of man.
The happiness of the pure state of nature 
consists largely in the avoidance of tormenting 
hopes and fears. The same is true of the 
happiness of the young Emile. Book VI of the 
Confessions shows that Jean-Jacques's happiness 
is founded in the resignation toward death caused 
by his acceptance of illness. This resignation 
temporarily cures him of the civilized desires 
that torment him, although fears of death and Hell occasionally trouble his calm. He is happy 
in so far as he is free of these fears.45
Living with the conviction of imminent death kills the
imagination and offers the experience of necessity: thus,
allowing for the experience of undisturbed happiness. There
is no fear, there is no hope. But, unlike the natural man,
Jean-Jacques's happiness is both an absence of pain and "a
still sweeter awareness of this absence." Imagination and
power, desires and abilities, are in equilibrium; Rousseau
imagines no great projects. "He lives entirely in the
present."46 And that is another way of defining happiness,
a way out of civilized corruption and the debilitating games
of amour-propre (self-love).
45 Kelly, Exemplaryf p. 154.
46 Kelly, Exemplary, pp. 156-57.
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Is this sort of return to nature a viable way for 
civilized humans to find happiness? Christopher Kelly
concludes in the negative: This sort of return to nature
and happiness "must be inflicted from outside; it is an 
accident."47 Even Jean-Jacques cannot hold a steady course 
after his experience of imminent death. Is the imagination, 
then, stronger than the reason? It seems so, for as the 
acceptance of the inevitability of death and its nearness 
fade, the imagination takes control again.
A second period of elusive happiness comes in Book XII, 
the last Book of The Confessions. Rousseau is now living on 
Saint Peter's Island, in Lake Bienne. There, the external 
"accident," precipitating feelings of the possibility of 
natural wholeness and happiness, is the so-called conspiracy 
against Rousseau and his works. According to Rousseau, his 
former friends had totally isolated and degraded him and 
were conspiring to alter his works. The results of the 
conspiracy were so effective (or were believed to be by 
Rousseau) that, in the equation of happiness, this
conspiracy plays the same role in Rousseau's life as did
severe illness in Book VI. That is to say, the conspiracy 
robbed Rousseau of the hope of ever fulfilling imaginary 
projects. In other words, the conspiracy played the role of 
"necessity." During this period, Rousseau, due to the
47 Kelly, Exemplary, p. 158.
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deaths of a chain of friends, is even cured of the desire
for friendship.
There are both similarities and dissimilarities between
Rousseau's life at Les Charmettes and on Saint Peter's
Island. At the former, Rousseau was engaged in industrious
study of various disciplines; on the island, he lives an
idle life of botany, long walks, and contemplation. He even
allows his imagination to enliven his botanical pursuits and
to take him back in his memory to happy times (the danger
with the imagination is precisely when it takes you into the
future). At Les Charmettes, he began his day with a prayer;
on the island, his prayer has become purely contemplative—
asking nothing of God.
Rousseau seems to be self-sufficient and whole on Saint
Peter's, but the only flaw is his anxious fear that the
authorities will not allow him to live out his life on the
island. His happiness is in jeopardy, for his life is not
founded in necessity and certainty. Rousseau still has
hopes and fears. Also, after being expelled from the
island, Rousseau gave serious consideration to drafting
legislation for Corsica. Kelly writes of this undying need
for glory; Rousseau
makes it clear that while his experience has
succeeded in curing him of his sexual passions 
and petty vanity and has even been able to impose 
some limits on his imagination, it has not
succeeded in ending his attachment to justice and
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glory. The return to wholeness is revealed as 
partial and temporary.48
The salient features of Rousseau's meditations on happiness
in the Confessions involve a stripping away of artifice to
an almost buddhistic nudity. It is a hope out of doubt,
which never abandons the doubt.
The Reveries of the solitary Walker
There are approximately eight years separating the
Confessions and the Reveries, the latter of which was
apparently incomplete at the time of Rousseau's death in
1778. Our subject is still happiness, and we shall look to
Rousseau's last (written) words in order to discover how he
then regarded (the notion of) happiness. The title of the
work describes and depicts the nature of Rousseau's search
for happiness: One must dream alone— which seems a far cry
from the rigors of the regime in On the Social Contract.
There seems to be a regression from concern with public
happiness and a movement inward toward individual happiness.
"I am now alone on earth," begins the First Walk. In
such a condition of solitude, "What am I?' asks Rousseau—
and thus defines the task of the Reveries. Ironically, it
is the conspiracy against Rousseau that has forced him into
this solitude and has, in turn, given him the unique
opportunity of examining himself as if in a philosophical
state of nature. He has died to the world:
48 Kelly, Exemplary, p. 235.
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And here I am, tranquil at the bottom of the
abyss, a poor unfortunate mortal, but
unperturbed, like God himself.49
Rousseau claims to be writing the Reveries only for his own 
benefit— for "the sweetness of conversing with my soul"— and 
not as an apologetic, as in the Confessions and the 
Dialogues.
There seems to be a strong strand of Platonism in this 
small work. Rousseau writes of the growth of his soul's 
moral life "with the death of every earthly and temporal 
interest. My body is no longer anything to me but an 
encumbrance, an obstacle, and I disengage myself from it 
beforehand as much as I can."50
Together with all this talk of death, or at least of 
talk about death to the world, the preceding citation might 
allow us to feel that we are engaged in another Phaedo. Is 
Rousseau not offering the picture of his soul as an 
alternative to Socrates's? But the new Socrates might well 
be an individual of feelings as opposed to a person of 
thoughts. Whatever, his happiness, like Socrates's, might 
turn out to be of a "purely personal value."51
Because of the universal and infallible nature of the 
conspiracy against him, Rousseau was forced upon his own
49 Reveries. p. 5.
50 Reveries. p. 7.
51 Butterworth, "Interpretative Essay" to Reveries. p.
154.
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resources, to the extent that he thanks his persecutors for 
his new found spiritual and emotional independence or self- 
sufficiency.
This resource [i.e., feeding his heart with its own substance], which I thought of too late, 
became so fruitful that it soon sufficed to 
compensate for everything. The habit of turning 
within eventually made me stop feeling and almost 
stop remembering my ills. By my own experience,
I thus learned that the source of true happiness 
is within us and that it is not within the power 
of men to make anyone who can will to be happy 
truly miserable.52
To his enemies, Rousseau, as if a Stoic once-removed,
professes to owe his experience of rapture and ecstacy.
Whether these experiences can be described as
"contemplation" or "reverie" is difficult to discern, and
might just depend on definitions; Rousseau uses both terms,
it seems at times, interchangeably. Whatever the case,
reverie (as the path to happiness) does not presuppose
philosophic understanding. Rousseau, even when speaking of
the highest things, is profoundly egalitarian. By the close
of the Third Walk, wherein Rousseau speaks of his God and
the tenuous nature of all arguments about the divine,
Butterworth maintains that Rousseau is not anxiously
awaiting some sort of future compensation, but rather shows
52 Reveriesf p. 13.
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a confidence "rooted in his enjoyment of reverie, not in 
hope beyond his control."53
The Fifth Walk deals explicitly with the subject of 
this investigation: happiness. Rousseau states that he was 
most happy, in his lifetime, during his two-month refuge on 
Saint Peter's Island, which is "pleasant and singularly 
placed for the happiness of a man who likes to cut himself 
off."54 There he committed himself to idleness, as if to a 
religion:
While [the others] were still at the table, I 
would slip away and go throw myself alone into a 
boat that I rowed to the middle of the lake when 
the water was calm; and there, stretching myself 
out full-length in the boat, my eyes turned to 
heaven, I let myself slowly drift back and forth 
with the water, sometimes for several hours, 
plunged in a thousand confused, but delightful, 
reveries which, even without having any well- 
determined or constant object, were in my opinion 
a hundred times preferable to the sweetest things 
I had found in what are called the pleasures of 
life.55
And, when the weather was too rough, he would retire to the 
lake shore to watch and listen to the waves— which had 
similar effects to his boating on the lake. The happiness 
he feels is, he says, not at all of the momentary nature of 
delirium or passion; "rather a simple and permanent state 
which has nothing intense in itself but whose duration
53 Butterworth, "Interpretative Essay" to Reveriesr p.
180.
54 Reveriesf p. 62.
55 Reveries, p. 66.
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increases its charm to the point that I finally find supreme 
felicity in it."56
In the next paragraph, Rousseau seems to negate the 
validity of his comments about "permanent" happiness: He
raises the notion of the continual flux and transitory 
nature of all things— including happiness. And, then, as if 
playing the devil's advocate, he proposes an acid test to 
determine if what is felt is in fact happiness: "I would
like this instant to last forever."57 Rousseau expounds 
that if anyone can find happiness, then it is because he is 
able to live totally in the present— with no need of 
recalling either past or future. Yet, Rousseau stops short 
of recommending his life of reverie to those engaged in the 
active life, and justifies his idleness in a thoroughly ad 
hoc manner:
But an unfortunate person who has been cut off 
from human society and who can no longer do 
anything here-below useful and good for another 
or for himself can find compensations for all the 
human felicities in this state, compensations 
which fortune and men could not take from him.58
Rousseau briefly describes the environmental prerequisites
for such experiences; and the person himself must be at
peace and must have "a cheerful imagination" which comes
naturally "to those whom Heaven has favored." And, again in
56 Reveries. p. 68.
57 Reveries, p. 68
58 Reveries, p. 69.
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fine Stoic fashion, he claims that "this kind of reverie," 
would have sustained him even to the dark dungeon of the 
Bastille.
Rousseau concludes this Fifth Walk extolling his past 
life on the island— assuring himself that imaginative 
recollection is a good, if not better than the original 
experiences, then concluding with a reminder of the failing 
powers of the aged. "Alas!" he concludes in a Platonic 
manner, "it is when we begin to leave our skin that it 
hinders us the most. "S9 "The whole tone of the Walk is that 
Rousseau's truest happiness is a perfectly solitary 
happiness.1,60 But such a happiness is apparently attainable 
by all, for "such a feeling is the sentiment of one's own 
existence." This passive and purely sensual moment is by no 
means, concludes Butterworth, "contemplative."
The episode of Saint Peter's Island is described first 
by Rousseau in the Confessions, some seven or so years 
before the Reveries. Butterworth61 summarizes what has 
changed from one version to the other: 1) In the
Confessions. Rousseau was still concerned about convention, 
and spoke of some acts as those of worship; 2) In the
59 Reveries. p. 71.
60 Butterworth, "Interpretative Essay" to Reveries. p.
193.
61 Butterworth, "Interpretative Essay" to Reveries. pp. 
197-99.
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Reveries. his explanation of the meaning of happiness took 
the place of that worship; and 3) In the Reveries. his new 
view of happiness as a sentiment is likened to "the sense of 
self-sufficiency God, too, must feel." Those are the major 
differences between the two works, but there is one more of 
a purely political nature: The dreamer was not only no help 
to the little community on the island, but was, in fact, a 
threat, because his states of reverie represented withdrawal 
from the political— to the point of an "imitation of death": 
a dying to the political life per se. as well as a dying to 
the world itself.
This tension between the city and philosophy is, once 
again, raised and resolved in a sort of ad hoc way: I have
never been suited for civil society; but I have never been 
a pernicious citizen (rather, I have been a "good" man) . 
But, of course, the more specific question for the present 
investigation is "whether Rousseau's substitution of 
sentiment for reason and of solitary happiness as described 
in the Fifth Walk for ultimate happiness as contemplation is 
defensible. "62
Whatever ultimate happiness might be, Rousseau speaks 
unequivocally of "truest happiness": "I know and feel that
to do good is the truest happiness the human heart can
62 Butterworth, "Interpretative Essay" to Reveries. p,
207.
savor."63 He commits himself to the "public felicity" in 
the event he ever comes into possession of the ring of 
Gyges. But Rousseau even here implies that he will keep the 
common good in mind only as long as he is allowed to act 
from pleasure, as opposed to duty and constraint. Rousseau 
himself and his model human are nothing if they are not 
free. This, of course, means that true happiness must have 
as the essential element the quality of freedom (and, I 
venture, equality). But with the ring of Gyges there would 
be no problem, for he would be above constraint.
By now it appears that (private) happiness is 
tantamount to achieving the state of reverie, which is, at 
the least, living in the eternal present.. But what of the 
relation between reverie and thinking, meditating, and 
contemplating? At this point in my investigation, I can 
only ask if there is a question to ask. That is to say, 
does Rousseau sufficiently and consciously differentiate 
these three "mental" processes? I am not sure that he does.
Whatever the case, Rousseau draws a sharp line between 
thought (reason) and reverie: "I have sometimes thought
rather deeply, but rarely with pleasure. . . . Reverie
relaxes and amuses me; reflection tires and saddens me. . .
. Sometimes my reveries end in meditation, but more often my
63 Reveries. p. 75
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meditations end in reverie."64 And regarding contemplation,
Rousseau advises that "The more sensitive a soul a
contemplator has, the more he gives himself up to the
ecstacies this harmony arouses in him." Then Rousseau
proceeds to offer a sort of pantheistic description of that
reverie that issues from contemplation:
A sweet and deep reverie takes possession of his 
senses then, and through a delicious intoxication 
he loses himself in the immensity of this 
beautiful system with which he feels himself one.
Then, all particular objects elude him; he sees 
and feels nothing except in the whole. Some 
particular circumstance must focus his ideas and 
close off his imagination for him to be able to 
observe the parts of the universe he was 
straining to embrace.65
It seems then that contemplation is used as a sort of
psychic exercise to bring the dream to the all-embracing
experience of reverie.66 Rousseau sometimes seems to employ
reverie, contemplation, and meditation interchangeably.
Again, in the Seventh Walk, he gives a description of
reverie (and meditation?), all the while defending his sole
pursuit of private happiness.
No, nothing personal, nothing which concerns my 
body can truly occupy my soul. I never meditate,
I never dream more deliciously than when I forget 
myself. I feel ecstacies and inexpressible
64 Reveries. p. 91.
65 Reveries. p. 92.
66 Cf. Butterworth, "Interpretative Essay" to Reveries. 
p. 210. Butterworth sees Rousseau's expressed distaste for 
reasoning as a denial of Aristotle's teaching that reason is 
essential to man and his happiness.
41
raptures in blending, so to speak, into the 
system of beings and in making myself one with 
the whole of nature. As long as men were my 
brothers, I made plans of earthly felicity for 
myself. These plans always being relative to the 
whole, I could be happy only through public 
felicity; and the idea of private happiness never 
touched my heart until I saw my brothers seeking 
theirs only in my misery. Then it became 
necessary to flee them so as not to hate them.
Then, seeking refuge in mother nature, I sought 
in her arms to escape the attacks of her 
children. I have become solitary or, as they 
say, unsociable and misanthropic, because to me 
the most desolate solitude seems preferable to 
the society of wicked men which is nourished only 
by betrayals and hatred.67
Rousseau seems to be saying that the pursuit of private
happiness must be justified in each case, for it is, as a
theory (or as a religion), possibly detrimental to public
well-being. He also seems to be saying, in the above
citation, that public felicity was the more natural concern,
because it involves man "relative to the whole." One can
only say in this confusion that private happiness, not
public happiness, has as object "the whole of nature."68
There is irony within the apologia: Rousseau is putting the
noose around his own neck.
Not having found happiness in the world of materiality,
Rousseau nonetheless succeeded in finding peace and
happiness— the key to which was having "learned to bear the
67 Reveries. p. 95.
68 Reveries. p. 95.
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yoke of necessity without a murmur."69 (Where there is a
Rousseauean happiness, there seems also to be the force of
necessity.) This attainment of tranquility and happiness is
often expressed within the context of a Platonic/Stoic view
of ethics: Whether he is submitting to necessity (Stoic) or
thrusting off the "old wrapping" of the soul (Platonic), the
reader might be lulled by a familiarity with Rousseau's
language. But Rousseau is not only not a disciple of any
school of thought, he is the cornerstone of a new one.70 He
borrows what he feels truthful from other "schools."
The corollary to the solitary happiness of the Fifth
Walk is uniquely Rousseauean:
By withdrawing into my soul . . .  by renouncing 
comparisons and preferences . . .  I again found 
peace of soul and almost felicity. In whatever 
situation we find ourselves, it is only because 
of self-love that we are constantly unhappy.71
This recipe for happiness— eradicate "amour-propre" (self-
love)— seems simple enough, but becomes highly complex when
the individual so reared must, like Emile, enter society, as
opposed to living the life of a recluse. Of course, self-
love is the first acquisition of natural man moving into
69 Reveries. p. 113.
70 For an appraisal of the profundity of Rousseau's 
romanticism, see Samuel S. B. Taylor, "Rousseau's 
Romanticism" in Reappraisals of Rousseaur Simon Harvey et
al., eds. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1980), 
pp. 2-23.
71 Reveries. p. 116.
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civil society. Thus, Rousseau's recipe for happiness calls
for a world-historical revolution, which, it seems, can only
be carried on in the households, schools, and churches of a
society. Butterworth defines the issue well:
[T]o the extent that the argument here proves the 
necessity of solitary life for achieving that 
natural state, it strengthens Rousseau's
contention that ultimate happiness is solitary
and points to the fundamental problem of civil 
society, that is, the tension between what is 
required of the citizen so that the regime and 
all other citizens may survive and what is 
necessary so that the individual may enjoy 
complete happiness without regard for the demands 
of the regime.72
The life of the solitary is not the way to happiness 
for most people. "Solitude is a viable solution only for 
those who, like Rousseau, are able to bring this passion 
[i.e., self-love] back under control."73 But this self­
purification does appear like the "way" of Aristotle— that 
is, self-mastery over the passions and to virtue. But, as 
Butterworth distinguishes: "[Rousseau] adheres to no
morality of self-control or of the mean. . . . Instead, he
72 Butterworth, "Interpretative Essay" to Reveries. p.215.
73 Butterworth, "Interpretative Essay" to Reveries. p.
220.
44
permits his senses to have their full play. He can afford 
this luxury, he contends, because his natural temperament is 
good.1,74
The compelling question, then, is this: How does one
control self-love in the vast majority who see no cause to 
control themselves? Their way to happiness must be as 
distinctive as their way to virtue. A more than casual 
reading of Rousseau will yield the notion of the few and the 
many, but, for Rousseau— egalitarian and primitivist— this 
dichotomy does not necessarily define superior and inferior. 
One might say, on Rousseau's behalf, that the members of the 
human species exist on a horizontal continuum with those at 
the extremes of ignorance and wisdom possessing the greatest 
chances for happiness. The most "ignorant" and isolated are 
more likely not to have developed a strong self-love; the 
most wise and also isolated have had the wherewithal to 
purify their souls of self-love.
So, how is the middle group, the vast majority, to b£ 
reared and civilized? The answer, for what value it might 
have, seems to be in On the Social Contract. In short, this 
middle group is to be raised by the laws, by the general 
will of the body politic.
Having raised those political questions in the Eighth 
Walk, Rousseau makes a broad sweep in the opening sentence
74 Butterworth, "Interpretative Essay" to Reveries, p.
220.
of the Ninth Walk: "Happiness is a permanent condition
which does not seem to be made for man here-below. 
Everything on earth is in constant flux, which permits 
nothing to take on a constant form."75 If people cannot be 
happy, they can, Rousseau maintains, be "content." Whereas 
"Happiness has no exterior sign," contentment can be 
recognized. This duality is just another of the divisions 
among men. Now that Rousseau has drawn a division that many 
will find problematic, he introduces two new notions in this 
Walk: contentment (briefly mentioned above) and
compensation. He seems to be speaking to his world of 
readers, despite his claim to be writing for himself alone; 
and he is speaking of the many, for whom the happiness of 
reveries will probably never materialize.
It is ironic that Rousseau, after stating that "There 
is compensation for everything," places himself forward as 
the one who is compensated for his few pleasures by the 
opportunity of appreciating more deeply the few that he has. 
There is no more talk of true happiness or of the 
pretensions of Jean-Jacques's achievement of it: as if he
felt a political need to make a silent but substantial 
statement of salutary import.
The apparently unfinished Tenth Walk seems, in part at 
least, to be a grand acknowledgement of Mme de Warens, who
75 Reveries. p. 122.
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played such a central role in the formation of Rousseau's 
soul. There are definitely, however, in these two pages, 
conflicting ideas about determinism and free will. The very 
moment he met Mme. de Warens "determined my whole life and 
by an inevitable chain of events shaped the destiny of the 
rest of my days." At the same time, he claims that four or 
five years with Mme de Warens allowed him to be himself, 
"fully, without admixture and without obstacle, and when I 
can truly say that I lived." He was free to be who he was 
and to do what he wanted. Perhaps there is no 
contradiction— only another instance of a benevolent 
conspiracy of fate.
It was then that his soul was formed— that his affinity 
for solitude, contemplation, and feelings developed and 
sustained him the rest of his life. Perhaps, the only debt 
he dies owning is to "the best of women." She had given him 
five years of "pure and full happiness" which, he might have 
said, compensated for "everything dreadful in my present 
lot."
A Counter-Conclusion
Rousseau's ethics (if, in fact, he has one) is based in 
developmental psychology. Proper upbringing, somewhat like 
what is found in Aristotle's ethics, is essential to the 
attainment of happiness. But Aristotle's ethics, at least 
in large part, is more attached to civic and political 
virtue than to the individual (Of course, Book X of the
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Nicomachean Ethics is the glaring exception.) Rousseau's 
upbringing is meant to clear away all obstacles from his 
pupil's path, so that the pupil can simply be himself in his 
educational confrontations with nature. Rousseau does not 
have a blind faith in civil man; rather, he has an informed 
faith in "natural man."
Whereas Kant seemed to say: If something is difficult
to do, then it is probably the right thing to do; Rousseau 
seems to say: If it is truly difficult to do, then it is
probably opposed to you, and you should not do it. In fact, 
as we have seen, Rousseau claims to be most happy when he is 
most idle, as on Saint Peter's Island. Idleness best allows 
for the experience of one's own existence and, thus, for 
happiness.
Nonetheless, self-mastery is important for Rousseau, 
because it is the only way (short of the experience of 
approaching death, external constraint, fate, or mass 
conversions to the Emile) to attain happiness. But not 
because self-restraint is rational (as with Aristotle), but 
because self-restraint controls the imagination, which, for 
Rousseau, plays the role of Aristotle's irrational element 
in the soul. The imagination is destabilizing and will take 
us into an illusory future, if it is not restrained by 
either the will or necessity or law. It is only when 
grounded in necessity that one can allow the imagination to
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soar at will without fear of losing one's settled state of 
happiness.
Rousseau's ultimate happiness seems a radically private 
state of the soul, rather than an Aristotelian activity of 
the soul. For Rousseau, ultimate happiness is the sweet 
sentiment of one's own existence, but this state, unlike the 
independent Stoic soul, is formed in part by accidents of 
fate. This leads one to realize that Rousseau views the 
world as divided between the few and the many, and the 
corresponding notions of happiness. Can one imagine there 
being enough fortuitous "accidents" occurring to enough 
humans in order to form a civil society of these lucky 
unlucky individuals? Thus, fate helps shape the few such 
that they will experience happiness of the reverie; while 
the many (lucky in a sense) are formed by the good laws of 
the city. Thus, for political purposes, Rousseau has the 
air of a eudaemonist who relies on reason as his guide to 
civic welfare. For private purposes, he is a contemplative 
whose contemplations often become reveries— perhaps because 
his total isolation renders his thoughts useless.
Rousseau's private happiness seems, at times, a 
composition of an Epicureanism and a sort of earthly 
mysticism of existence. He purges himself of fear and hope 
(of the gods, that is), just as Lucretius would have his 
reader do, and then absorbs himself in reveries that imitate 
the mystics. More precisely, he sublimates the lower into
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the higher. As Allan Bloom puts it, "Rousseau's intention 
is to create longing in the soul of man. Natural man does 
not long."76 And the way of sublimation is to "enrich 
desires before they are satisfied." One might say that 
sublimation is distinctly human, for it is ultimately an 
exercise of freedom (someone's freedom, any way).
Rousseau's understanding of ethics and happiness 
receive their distinction from his foundational notion of 
man and nature. He begins with his own kind of modern 
premises, but— like the alchemist trying to turn stone into 
gold— he, through a series of sublimations, returns to 
humankind the legacy of freedom and nobility.
So, finally: Why study Rousseau today? Because his
thinking represents an alternative to both the ancient and 
the typically modern approaches to the good life, or 
happiness. Better than any other modern, I think, Rousseau 
spells out not only the horizon of the political, but also 
its limits. The primary limit of the political would be its 
inability to answer the claims of both the solitary and the 
passionate natures— neither of whom can find complete 
earthly happiness within the collective order. He did for 
eighteenth-century Europe what Plato did for the Athens of
76 Bloom, Love, p. 62.
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his day77; except that, for Rousseau, nan is an accident of 
fate, and, once man, so is his happiness essentially 
accident. That constitutes the limits. It is as if one's 
access to happiness only comes with a sort of grace of 
nature.
The major distinction between The New Heloise— within 
the context of the problem of happiness— and the works of 
Rousseau we have just reviewed is that the above works deal 
either with the happiness of one or with the happiness of 
many. The New Heloise grapples with the problem of limited 
associations— the couple, if you will— and the added element 
of sexual and romantic love. At the outset of a study of 
happiness in The New Heloise. one must ask: How does the
happiness of a couple in love relate to the happiness of the 
citizen or of the solitary? And does that work offer ground 
for synthesis or further fragmentation?
Rousseau portrays extensively, in the Julie, friendship 
and domestic economy— both elements of any political order. 
Thus, one might conclude, the possibilities and limitations 
of these relationships— and their possible contributions to 
happiness— could tell us something about the political. 
Irving Singer seems to find a simple mapping of the Julie 
onto Rousseau's more expressly politica? thought.
^"Rousseau undertook to reintroduce eroticism in the 
context of Enlightenment materialism. Plato's Socrates 
performs the role that Rousseau played in response to this condition." Bloom, Love and Friendship, p. 433.
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The goal of Rousseau's political philosophy thus 
becomes the reorganization of society in a way 
that purifies passionate love between individuals 
and curtails the search for sensuous pleasure—  
each of these being products of the unnatural 
circumstances that man has forced upon himself.
They must be subordinated to, and partly replaced 
by, the nonlibidinal love of one's fellow human 
beings within a civic-minded community.78
We must determine if Singer is correct and, if so, exactly
how so. That is to say, we must determine if Rousseau was
a true romantic or if he was only a disillusioned but
ultimately unfulfilled man of the Enlightenment— or of
Antiquity. And we must not dismiss Rousseau too lightly
when he says that he is "like no one in the world."79
78Irving Singer, The Nature of Love. Vol. II (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 335.
79Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Confessions. J. M. Cohen, 
tr. (London: Penguin Books, 1953), p. 17. Also, see Bloom,
Love, p. 63, for a discussion of Rousseau and the new Adam.
CHAPTER 3 
CIRCUMSCRIPTION OF THE STORY
Julie; or The New Heloise might be called a
philosophical romance consisting of exchanges of letters
between its principal characters who are as follows:
Julie d'Etange, a beautiful young girl
Baron d'Etange, her father
Saint-Preux, her tutor
Claire, her cousin
Lord Edward Bomston, Saint-Preux's benefactor
Monsieur de Wolmar, Julie's husband
First published in 1760, the novel has for a setting early
eighteenth century Switzerland. Beyond the love affair and
its immediate aftermath,
Rousseau finds the occasion to broach all the 
subjects which interest him: God and religion
without a doubt, but also opera, duelling, 
suicide, Parisians, conversation, domestic and 
political economy, gastronomy, the art of 
gardening, relations between servants and 
masters, education of children, the use of 
leisure time. . . .  In conclusion, novel, poem,
The New Heloise figures in Rousseau's history, 
certainly not as an interlude— not even as a 
"partage de midi," but the place where all the 
powers of his thought and all the marvels of his 
art are assembled and exalted.1
The novel is divided into six parts, with Part III 
ending with Saint-Preux's voyage around the world; Part IV 
begins several years later with Saint-Preux's return. For
Raymond Queneau, Histoire des Litteratures III. 




Julie, the before-and-after centers on her marriage in Part 
III to Monsieur de Wolmar. Ironically enough, the actual 
physical love affair of this cornerstone of European 
romanticism begins and ends with Part I. All the parts are 
of comparable length, though the number of letters 
comprising each part varies greatly.
Writing of the Julie. Allan Bloom puts the novel's 
importance in perspective: "Although it appears now to be
a bore and a pain, it was one of the most popular books ever 
written and took the whole of Europe by storm."2 "No novel 
was so popular," says Lester G. Crocker; seventy-two 
editions before 1800 were counted by Daniel Mornet. "The 
lending libraries were besieged; some doubled their fees and 
limited borrowers to an hour per volume. Readers snatched 
it from friends fortunate enough to possess a copy."3 Even 
sixty years later, Lamartine would cry, "I do not understand 
how its pages do not catch fire!" In fact, it is the Julie 
that allows Rousseau to be recognized as the progenitor of 
the romantic movement, if he was too much rooted in the 
eighteenth century to be considered a romantic himself.
The Julie is a bourgeois novel in the sense that 
"Rousseau believed that the religious and political passions
2Allan Bloom, Love and Friendship (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1993), pp. 140-41.
3Lester G. Crocker, Jean-Jaccrues Rousseau. Vol. II (New 
York: Macmillan, 1973), pp. 52-53.
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had cooled and that the appeal to love and the intimate 
interiors of individuals and families was all that 
remained."4 But it is just because of this privatization of 
life that Rousseau attempts, in the Julie, the socialization 
of the individual— or, more specifically, the partial 
socialization of love— the subject matter of the present 
project.
That Rousseau was intending to prescribe social mores
was not lost on his enemies.
Foreseeing that a successful French Revolution5 
would lead to more than just a readjustment of 
governmental authority, [Edmund] Burke feared 
that the baneful innovations of the Revolution 
would have to extend themselves into the furthest 
reaches of human experience, into values, 
attitudes, and manners. He did not, therefore, 
consider a political pamphlet an inappropriate 
medium for discussion of Julie and St. Preux's 
fictional passion.6
M. B. Ellis, in her 1949 work entitled Julie or La 
Nouvelle Heloise. A Synthesis of Rousseau/s Thought (1749- 
1759) argues that the Julie represents a synthesis of 
Rousseau's previous work. Though not addressing this 
question in any formal manner, my inquiry demonstrates that 
the Julie is in fact an extension of Rousseau's previous 
ideas: it is an attempt to rehabilitate humankind from one
4Bloom, Love and Friendshipr p. 141.
5Rousseau had been named philosopher of the Revolution by the French Assembly.
fiEdward Duffy, Rousseau in England (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1979), p. 39.
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form of alienation: obstructed love. On the Social
Contract and Emile, both of which immediately follow upon 
the publication of the Julie, are even further and 
differentiated attempts at rehabilitation. Dr. Ellis also 
finds ominous and ill intent in the character of Saint- 
Preux, something I prefer to view as innocent desire (which, 
at times, might admittedly look like evil).
To see Saint-Preux as the embodiment of perverted 
nature and Julie as purely virtuous nature would gainsay 
what Rousseau wrote in the Second Preface about Saint-Preux: 
"a young upright and sensitive man, full of weakness and 
beautiful talk." (OC II, p. 12) And seeing Julie as a pure 
paragon of virtue also says more than does Rousseau: "a
young girl offending the virtue that she loves, and led back 
to duty by the horror of a greater crime."
J.-R. Carre offers a more accurate description of the 
gist of the Julie and Rousseau's general intentions as a 
writer: "And we would know the secret of Rousseau, if we
knew what, in his most intimate recesses, he thought 
happiness to consist of."7 Slowly, Carre unveils the 
peaceful and silent nature of Rousseau's happiness— or, as 
Rousseau said, the repose in the silence of the passions. 
Furthermore, it is "sentiment"— not sensation exactly and
7J.-R. Carre, "Le secret de Jean-Jacques Rousseau," Revue d'Histoire litteraire de la Francer Avril-Juin 1949, 
p. 131.
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not rational knowledge exactly— which holds the nature of 
Rousseau's secret; it is, also, that which makes moral 
conscience possible.
He points out that Rousseau, at the age of forty-four, 
left city life never to return. He traces Rousseau's 
peregrinations and sufferings that led him into a sort of 
exile, where he discovers a secret more simple than the 
conscience: simply to exist! to be left alone!8
The problem with Carre's chronological pursuit of 
Rousseau's secret of happiness is that it is necessarily 
fatalistic. One's last struggles with life will always 
appear to be one's metaphysically ultimate answer. In fact, 
Rousseau never recommended the solitary life; he repeatedly 
justified his living in solitude by saying that he had no 
other useful choice, and by saying that he would gladly 
return to the society of men, if he could. Thus, that 
fortune brought Rousseau to a solitary end (which to his 
credit he made the most of) does not annul his earlier work- 
-for example, his formulae for happiness in On the Social 
Contract and in the Julie. Though Rousseau is perhaps 
accused of solipsism, he never saw the world to be some sort 
of identity of his own self. If anything, he saw himself as 
the ••outsider"— not as a model, but as an aberration.
8J.-R. Carre, "Le secret de Jean-Jacques Rousseau," Revue d'Histoire litteraire de la Francer Juillet-Septembre 1949, p. 234.
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In his most insightful treatment of the Julie. Jean 
Starobinski points out that only death can synthesize 
separation and union— the condition of our lovers. But 
Starobinski seems to recognize that, even in death, 
"sensuous existence" is recaptured; as it had first been 
savored, then destroyed, and finally transcended.9 With 
these essentials I am in agreement.
But Starobinski seems to think that Rousseau must have 
been embarrassed by the disagreement between the egalitarian 
Social Contract and the paternalistic community of Clarens 
in the Julie. Such would only be the case if Rousseau were 
portraying Clarens as a political model in competition with 
the Social Contract which he was writing at about the same 
time as the latter books of the Julie. I find it hard to 
believe that Rousseau could have overlooked that possible 
source of embarrassment. I would rather view Clarens 
differently, under not mutually exclusive angles: 1)
Clarens is an alternative— perhaps an impossible 
alternative— to what is created in the Social Contract. 
Specifically, Clarens represents a partial association— a 
sort of self-sufficient extended family. 2) The 
paternalism of Clarens is the best political order possible- 
-that is, prior to the introduction of Rousseau's Social
9Jean Starobinski, Jean-Jaccrues Rousseau— Transparency 
and Obstruction (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1988, first pub. 1971), p. 86.
58
Contract. 3) The community of Clarens is a life-like 
metaphor of the communion of souls— "le menage a trois"—  
that will be envisioned by Julie as the vehicle of the 
reconciliation of passion and virtue.
Starobinski approaches the last interpretation when, he 
describes Clarens as a "collective autarchy"--a sort of 
self-sufficient man writ large.10 And he pierces to the 
core of Rousseau's thought when he maintains that, for 
Rousseau, man is like God not in his knowledge, but in his 
self-sufficiency. But, in the Julie, there is presented— or 
envisioned— a self-sufficiency that is more reminiscent of 
a trinitarian God than of the Unmoved Mover of Aristotle. 
It is the self-sufficiency not of two souls, not of the 
isolated romantic couple, but of the triangle of friendship 
and love that never finds sustained realization within the 
boundaries of the story of The New Heloise.
Commenting on the story's end— on Julie's death—  
Starobinski writes that Rousseau "prefers the absolute of 
personal salvation to the absolute of community."11 I 
contend that Julie's death was the only way she could have 
reconciled passion and virtue; she (and Rousseau) preferred 




night be the tragedy of Romanticism: the necessity of
seeking one's happiness in another world.
Synopsis of the Julie
Part I: This epistolary novel begins with an impassioned
letter from Saint-Preux to his student Julie, in which he 
confesses his ardent love for her. Julie, the lovely and 
only child of the Baron and Baroness d'Etange, lives in the 
Swiss town of Vevey on the shores of Lake Geneva and at the 
foot of the Alpes. Her tutor, hired during the absence of 
the Baron, is Saint-Preux who, as the story begins, is 
twenty-three years of age. Julie is eighteen. It is the 
early eighteenth century. After two more letters from 
Saint-Preux, one in which he threatens to leave forever, 
Julie answers and eventually admits her love for him. 
Claire, Julie's "inseparable" cousin and friend, is informed 
of the budding romance. There is a long correspondence 
which satisfies Julie as to Saint-Preux's feelings and 
intentions; their first embrace is in the groves of Clarens, 
owned by her parents. Julie asks Saint-Preux to, so to 
speak, exile himself to his country of Valais, since Julie's 
father will be returning home. In one of his several 
letters written during this first separation from Julie, he 
writes of the difference between their situation as lovers 
and that of Heloise and Abelard; that is to say, those 
bygone lovers had given in to baser instincts. The Baron is 
pleased with the academic progress of the girls, but
displeased with the fact that the tutor is a commoner, and 
a proud one at that. When her lover proposes that they 
elope, Julie is extremely shaken by her emotions, so much so 
that Claire feels the need to call him out of exile. Saint- 
Preux returns; Claire is absent from Clarens; the Baron 
wishes to marry Julie off to one of his older friends: the
couple consummates their love. Julie immediately expresses 
her remorse and, because of her mother's suspicions, advises 
her friend to leave Clarens, but not without prospects for 
clandestine meetings. When left to stay with her cousin's 
parents, Julie arranges a rendez-vous with Saint-Preux, but, 
at the last moment, she calls on him to help extricate 
Claude Anet from military service so that he can marry 
Fanchon, a servant in the d'Etange household. Julie's 
parents return, and Lord Bomston, an English friend of the 
Baron and also known to Saint-Preux, arrives on the scene. 
Saint-Preux admires Bomston, but, at first, fears him as a 
rival for Julie's hand. Julie proposes that the couple, 
daring even death, meet in her bedchamber. They give 
themselves to each other for the second and last time. 
Saint-Preux challenges Bomston to a duel for having said 
something, while under the influence of wine, that was 
disrespectful of Julie. After Julie's intervention and his 
learning of the plight of the couple, Bomston makes a public 
apology and even tries to persuade the Baron to let the 
couple marry. Julie's father is enraged at the very
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thought, and Julie asks Claire, for the protection of her 
lover, that she see to his exile— this tine to Paris.
Part II: In exile, Saint-Preux is in a state of extreme
anxiety. By letter, he protests to Julie. Bomston offers 
Julie an estate in England for their retirement, but, after 
consulting with Claire, she refuses the offer, even though 
she is aware that a marriage arranged by her father might be 
the only alternative. Bomston, then, resolves to return 
eventually to Paris and to take Saint-Preux with him to 
England. Julie writes to her lover in Paris to advise that 
she will never marry him without the Baron's consent, but, 
also, that she will never marry another without his consent. 
In his study of the French people, Saint-Preux is taken with 
two subjects especially: the difference between speech and
action in the French people; and the more general 
epistemological problems involved in the study of the world. 
Claire marries M. d'Orbe, so Julie must find another 
confidante to whom to entrust her correspondence. 
Consequently, Julie's cache of love letters is discovered by 
her mother!
Part III; Claire writes Saint-Preux of the seriousness of 
Mme d'Etange's illness and encourages him to renounce Julie, 
which he does in a letter to Julie's mother who soon 
afterwards dies. Feeling responsible for her mother's 
death, Julie writes her farewell to her lover. And the 
Baron wrings from Saint-Preux a final renunciation and
release of Julie. In despair, Julie falls seriously ill. 
Clandestinely, Saint-Preux visits her bedside, after which 
he is escorted back to Paris by Bomston. In spite of her 
feelings for her (former) lover, Julie is resolved not to 
disobey her father. She marries M. de Wolmar; she writes a 
letter recapitulating their love affair and the events 
leading to her marriage and her moral-religious conversion. 
In a subsequent letter, she assures Saint-Preux that she is 
happy with her new husband. To Bomston, Saint-Preux 
expresses suicidal despair. Bomston attempts to refute his 
justifications of suicide. Putting himself in Bomston's 
care, Saint-Preux agrees to sign on with a British vessel 
that is scheduled to make a tour of the world.
Part IV; Several years later, Julie is the mother of two 
sons, and Claire, with one daughter, is a widow. In the 
midst of Claire's plans to move to Clarens with Julie, they 
receive news from Saint-Preux announcing his return from 
sea. Wolmar, who is informed of Julie and Saint-Preux's 
past together, invites him to join the happy family at 
Clarens. Saint-Preux writes Bomston detailed letters of the 
idyllic life at Clarens. In the emotionally charged setting 
of the groves of Clarens, Wolmar unites the couple with 
himself in a show of utter confidence and announces that he 
will take a week's journey— leaving them alone together. 
Julie is rightly anxious over their being alone together. 
The couple takes a boating trip that, due to a storm, lands
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them on the opposite shore at Meillerie— the very spot where 
Saint-Preux had entertained romantic fantasies during his 
first exile from Julie. They, led by Julie's restraint, 
resist temptation and return safely to Clarens.
Part V! Bomston chides Saint-Preux for his continued 
lovesickness. But Saint-Preux reassures him of his good 
health and writes of the private life of the Wolmars, 
especially of the role of Julie— mistress of the estate and 
educator of her children. Julie is, however, distressed by 
the religious incredulity of her otherwise perfect husband. 
The final arrival of Claire to Clarens causes an ecstacy of 
happiness. The Baron and Saint-Preux are reconciled at the 
grape harvest festival where the harmonious life of Clarens 
is distinctively portrayed. Bomston arrives at Clarens and 
soon sets off with Saint-Preux for Rome where Saint-Preux 
will attempt to assist Bomston with problems of his love 
life. But, during the voyage, Saint-Preux dreams repeatedly 
of the death of Julie; Bomston takes him back to Clarens 
where he assures himself of Julie's health and safety. 
Saint-Preux serves his friend well in assisting him in 
resolving his amorous difficulties. Claire leaves for 
Lausanne and Geneva, where she receives letters from Julie 
that recognize her increased interest in Saint-Preux and 
that propose a marriage between them.
Part VI; Writing from Lausanne, Claire rejects the idea of 
marrying Saint-Preux. Bomston writes from Rome and informs
Wolmar that his friend is passing the test devised by 
Bomston: that is, he is conducting himself as a man of
thought in his attempts to resolve Bomston's love affair. 
Bomston is in love with a reformed prostitute Lauretta 
Pisana, but he knows that he cannot marry her. Bomston 
pretends to seek Saint-Preux's advice. Creating a dilemma 
for Saint-Preux, Bomston tells him that, if he marries 
Laura, they will settle at Clarens; but, if he does not
marry her, he will return to England to live. Saint-Preux
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is bound to 1) educate the Wolmar children and live at 
Clarens, and 2) serve his benefactor Lord Bomston. Saint- 
Preux passes muster: he convinces Laura to enter a convent.
At which instance, Bomston agrees to retire to Clarens. 
Julie writes Saint-Preux, proposing marriage to Claire; like 
Claire, he declines. Then news arrives that Julie, while 
rescuing her child from drowning, fell ill and, a few days 
later, died. Wolmar writes a detailed account of the six 
days preceding Julie's death. Her death can only be 
compared to that of a saint or even a goddess. Before she 
died, Julie wrote a final message to Saint-Preux, telling 
him in essence that she always loved him and that she still 
loved him and that she took joy in being able to tell him so 
one last time. In the final letter, Claire urges Saint- 
Preux to return to Clarens as he had planned before Julie's 
death. They would live there, so to speak, in the shadow 
and the light of her memory. Finis
CHAPTER 4 
PART ONE OF THE JULIE
The Red Thread of Happiness
An analysis of the notion of happiness in Julie, ou La 
Nouvelle Heloise requires careful attention to how the 
personages speak of happiness, as well as how they attempt 
to live it. Word and deed may well conflict. Some of these 
intricacies are examined in the following commentary on Part 
I of the Julie, which commentary is meant to demonstrate 
that the red thread of the Julie is, in fact, a treatment of 
the notion of happiness, and a treatment of the notion of 
love as it relates to the understanding of happiness. And 
happiness always represents for Rousseau the ultimate 
political, as well as individual, concern.
The Julie begins, in the opening letter of Saint Preux, 
with a demonstration of the unbearable nature of thwarted 
desire. Now in the midst of a passion for Julie, Saint 
Preux pretends to ask advice from her. Should he simply run 
away? He appeals to a promised friendship— so far from what 
he truly feels for her— and places the onus on her by 
asking: "Advise me." In this first paragraph, Saint Preux
is doing what he will do continually through the course of 
the novel: He will defer to Julie; he will place the moral
onus on her. Also, this concise beginning portends the very 
end of the story— with Claire, Julie's cousin, harkening to 
Saint Preux to join the community of friendship at Clarens
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after the death of Julie and united in the spirit of Julie: 
in a higher purpose, so to speak. Will he fly from her? 
And, later, will he join the others in friendship? Does 
Saint Preux, in fact, ever make a decision? And does he 
ever know friendship? These questions, though somewhat 
premature, should be kept in mind through the course of the 
analysis.
In the second paragraph of this brief first letter, 
Saint Preux, after admitting the foolhardiness of his having 
taken on the task of tutoring her, all but propositions 
Julie, while ostensibly deferring to her high morality: "If
I suffer, I at least have the consolation of suffering 
alone, and I would want no happiness that could cost you 
yours." (I,l,31)x The word "happiness," in its first use, 
is, one might say, taken in vain. Saint Preux is, in 
reality, asking Julie if her giving into his desire would 
cost her her happiness. In other words, does she feel for 
him as he feels for her? He is desperate; he must be, 
however, cautious in his boldness.
1 All parenthetical references in the text are to Jean- 
Jacques Rousseau's Julie, ou La Nouvelle Heloise. Oeuvres 
completes, vol. II. Bibliotheaues de la Pleiade. 1969. The 
first Roman numeral will indicate the Part of the novel; the 
second Roman numeral will indicate the number of the letter; 
and Arabic numerals, whether alone or with Roman numerals, 
will indicate page number; a lone Roman numeral indicates a Letter in the Part of the novel under discussion at the 
time. All translations from the Julie are by the author.
After some peregrinations, Saint Preux finally admits 
that he cannot fly from Julie on his own. She must be the 
one to take action to deny him her presence. The portrait 
of a young philosopher without character or self-restraint 
is slowly taking shape by paragraph five of the novel. One 
may predict that, barring a great change of character, Saint 
Preux's pursuit of happiness will be faltering and uneven at 
best. Nonetheless, he insists that he is attracted to Julie 
by her qualities of soul— by charms of the heart and not the 
eye. (1,1,32) We are led to ask if attraction to the 
"sentiments" of another should cause such nervousness and 
lack of self-restraint. Whatever the case, Saint Preux is 
claiming to base his pursuit of happiness on other than 
hedonistic grounds, at least on other than carnal 
satisfaction. No lesser claim could be expected of a young 
man pursuing a young woman. But his passion seems, for all 
its spirituality, uncontrollable. Are there other than 
physical passions that might be uncontrollable?
Are we not already encountering what Allan Bloom calls 
"a fine irony at the lack of self-knowledge of [Rousseau's] 
characters"?2 We are on guard that we cannot rely on the 
self-interpretations of Rousseau's personages. How his 
characters understand themselves is not necessarily the way 
in which Rousseau does, nor the way in which Rousseau's
2 Allan Bloom, Love and Friendship (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1993), 143.
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reader is meant to understand them. This suggests the 
apparently thorny question, to be dealt with in an ad hoc 
way within the analysis, of whether any one character speaks 
for Rousseau.
Saint Preux goes so far as to tell Julie 1) that he 
"dares flatter himself sometimes that Heaven has staged a 
secret conformity between our affections" (1,1,32) and 2) 
that this conformity may be seen in their "natural" and 
unprejudiced tendencies, unimpaired by the world. Thus, 
heaven seems to be blessing this union of two like and 
natural minds. But, as if afraid of tempting fate (or is it 
showing dexterity in courtship?), Saint Preux concludes: 
"the ardor of my desires lends to their object possibility 
which is lacking to it." (1,1,33) In effect, Saint Preux 
has toyed with the possibility of Heaven's blessing his 
(theirI) desires. No doubt, such would be the making of a 
perfect and happy union. The happiness of one would not be 
sacrificed to the happiness of the other. Saint Preux seems 
to be making appeal to the notion of Aristotle's blessed 
man.
But immediately following this hypothetical blessing of 
Heaven, comes Saint Preux's admission that his passion is an 
illness, in spite of the professed purity of his sentiments. 
He asks that Julie not only do him the grace of banishing 
him from her presence, but, more specifically, of somehow 
"drying up the source of the poison which is both nourishing
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him and killing him." (33) It seems that we have not only 
a new Heloise, but also a new Abelard. "I wish only to be 
cured or to die." In this ongoing self-analysis, Saint 
Preux admits that he has lost his reason and he defines, at 
least implicitly, the recovery of reason as the return of 
his heart to himself. Are reason and passion ultimately the 
same? Whatever, happiness must be somehow something 
different from the loss of reason or the loss of one's 
heart. If not, Saint Preux would not now be experiencing 
anxiety ("trouble") in the depths of his soul.
That love is somehow a matter of life and death is 
seemingly innocently and melodramatically expressed by Saint 
Preux when he states that to kiss Julie would cause him to 
die— but to die the happiest of men. Somehow happiness has 
something to do with death. Are we, in effect, dead when we 
have nothing left to pursue? I think that Rousseau poses 
this question on the political as well as on the individual 
level. Or must we somehow die before earning the full 
possibility of happiness? A question akin to Stoic and 
Christian alike.
Such questions take us, I think, beyond the bounds of 
hedonism and into a sort of quasi-religious ethos— into a 
severe and rigorous romanticism, where the wages of 
happiness are great. Saint Preux asks that they cease those 
dangerous parlor games, and then, only a moment later, 
chides Julie for not being civil enough with him when they
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are left alone. Does Saint Preux know what he wants at this 
the outset of the story? Is he a private xnan, a political 
man/ or merely ill-defined? He seems to be in-the-making, 
for, though he can intellectualize the issues of his 
romance, he continues, at the close of this first letter, to 
indulge in his childlike though not simply ingenuous verbal 
pursuit of Julie.
Much might be surmised of the character of Saint Preux 
from this first brief letter, but, briefly stated, he seems 
a young, sensitive "philosopher" of dubious fortitude, who, 
in his attempt to win a woman (even if the woman), dares 
recourse to Heaven! But, beyond what it teaches us about 
Saint Preux, this letter initiates the discussion of love 
and happiness: What is the basis of love (and,
consequently, happiness)— desire or Heaven, or something in- 
between, or some combination thereof? And what is the 
nature of reason that it may be lost in the pursuit of 
happiness? Saint Preux is a confused philosopher, with a 
confusing set of shifting priorities. He is "in love." The 
first personage to appear on the stage of this long novel 
represents the swirling beehive-like compactness of some of 
the essential themes of love and happiness:
1. "I must fly from you."
2. "refuse me your presence."
3. "Why then is it a crime to . . . love one whom I 
must necessarily honor?"
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4. "it is that justness of spirit and that exquisite 
taste which derive their excellence from the purity of your 
soul . . . which . . .  I adore."
5. "Sometimes I dare flatter myself that Heaven has 
brought about a secret sympathy in our affections."
6. "the ardor of my desires lends to their realization 
the possibility which it lacks."
7. "I wish only to be cured or die, and I beg for your 
severity as a lover would beg for your kindness."
8. "Be, alas, other than yourself, in order that my 
heart may be able to return to itself."
Following a second letter of similar contrivance to the 
first, in which Saint Preux expresses his willingness to be 
unhappy if renouncing his love is the only alternative and 
in which he defines as unbearable his present state of soul- 
-that between hope and fear— he writes a third in which he 
recognizes that his expressions of love are in fact 
affecting Julie, even if for the worse. But Saint Preux 
goes further: He announces that Julie's sorrow has made him 
realize that his love for her is no passing delirium soon to 
be overtaken by reason, but that "with despair I feel that 
the fire which consumes me will be extinguished only in the 
tomb." Moreover, he expresses a tenuous altruism born of 
his sensitivity to Julie's suffering: "either I myself am
mistaken or your happiness is dearer to me than my own." 
(37)
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Saint Preux finally writes that the fatal passion which 
consumes him does not matter, because he "who cannot make 
himself happy can at least be worthy of being so." (37) He 
further insists that he will compel her to esteem him by his 
making himself worthy. He then bids her "adieu" and 
promises eternal adoration.
Saint Preux, like a man fencing desperately in the 
dark, has, in his attempt to win or even attract Julie, 
appealed to God, nature, love, and the promise of his future 
virtue. Moreover, he has made much of his sensitivity to 
and empathy for her. But, finally, his missives are little 
more than pleadings for recognition and for requited love. 
It all seems like a sophisticated courtship. It is at this 
very moment— when Saint Preux promises to depart and to win 
Julie's esteem by his becoming virtuous, that Julie has her 
first brief, enigmatic, and forceful say.
Her entire first communication to Saint Preux is as 
follows: "Don't seize upon the opinion of having made your
leaving necessary. A virtuous heart would be able to subdue 
itself or be quiet, and perhaps would become formidable 
thereby. But you . . . you may stay" (37)
The key question: Does Julie want Saint Preux to
subdue his heart or does she rather want him to appear to be 
doing so? Whatever the case, she is obviously interested in 
Saint Preux; she seems to see through his "arguments," and, 
though she "scorns" him in her very first note to him, she
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has entered into the love game. In the battery fire of 
missives that follow, Julie challenges Saint Preux to stand 
his ground. He takes refuge in a veiled threat of suicide. 
Julie pleads with him to wait for her next letter.
We have learned much of the personage of Saint Preux: 
He is passionate, though not necessarily profound; he says 
more than he understands and is not below (unconscious?) 
romantic demagoguery. Of Julie we know that her wit is 
concise, decisive, and penetrating. Her first full-fledged 
letter will tell us much more.
In that letter, which she had pleaded with Saint Preux 
to wait for, Julie expresses the secret love she has been 
harboring for him, ostensibly because she fears his suicide. 
But, in professing her love, Julie says that she has lost 
honor and has experienced a sort of death-in-life. "[I]s 
there a death more cruel than surviving honor?" (39) This 
is not the dying-to-the-world notion that we shall meet at 
the end of the Julie, but it is a sort of death for a higher 
purpose, a sort of fatal altruism: Julie gives up her honor
(she breaks her word with herself by confessing her love) 
for the sake of saving Saint Preux's life.
So the drama really begins with the consideration of 
whether life is more precious than honor— more specifically, 
should someone else's life be more precious to me than my 
honor? Can happiness be found through sacrifice? However, 
Julie goes on to belie this understanding that her
confession of love is for the higher purpose of saving her 
lover's life; she, like him, is simply caught up in a "fatal 
passion" which she cannot resist. But she, whatever the 
state of her desire, is aware of Saint Preux's "artful" 
game: "Led step by step into the snares of a vile seducer,
I see, without being able to stop myself, the horrible 
precipice toward which I am running." (39) Julie then calls 
him a crafty or artful man whose boldness is motivated more 
by his knowledge of her love for him than by his love of 
her. This noble young woman, not Saint Preux, seems to be 
the one who is truly lost to love. She is, it seems, 
knowingly in love with her inferior. Nonetheless, she does 
see some value or virtue in Saint Preux, which is expressed 
in her statement that, if his heart were such that it could 
peacefully enjoy this triumph, he would have never obtained 
it.
So, now, we must consider the artfulness of Julie. Is 
she saying that she could just as well have maintained her 
secret of love for Saint Preux? Is she saying that, in 
spite of her awareness of the cunning games he is playing 
with her, she has always loved him and that she sees in him 
at least enough goodness to justify her admission of love to 
him? If this is so, as I think it appears on close reading, 
then our love story begins with love games which are prior 
existentially either to a fatal passion or to a virtuous 
life, but not to love itself. In other words, the beginning
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of our story enacts a sort of chess game— Saint Preux 
attacking, Julie defending. Both, in their own differing 
ways, are in love. (The novel may be portrayed as a 
movement of Julie and Saint Preux toward an equality and a 
harmony in love— perhaps a remnant of Aristotle's 
friendship.)
But on what level of consciousness are Rousseau's
characters aware of the very games and artifices in which
they are engaged? Surely, Julie is not above blatant
manipulation: She confesses her passionate love to Saint
Preux and demands that he be her only protector against
herself, that is, against the loss of her virtue. And, like
Lafontaine's stork who extracts the bone from the throat of
the wolf, she writes: "Your virtues are the last refuge of
my innocence." (40) Julie is, of course, hardly a coy,
unquestioning lover. From her pen rebounds the first oath
of our long story, and it is in the paragraph headed by that
oath that Julie, in effect, challenges Saint Preux to
transcend his hedonistic desires:
"Oh God! am I not humiliated enough? On my knees 
I write you; I bath the paper with my tears; I 
hand up to you my timid supplications. And think 
not, however, that I am unaware that they were 
for me to receive and that in order to make 
myself obeyed I had only to make myself, with 
artfulness, scornful. Friend, take that empty 
victory, but leave me my integrity [honnetete]:
I prefer to be your slave and live blamelessly 
than to buy your dependance at the price of my 
dishonor. If you deign to hear me, what love, 
what respect must you expect from her who will 
owe you her return to life? How charming the
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sweet union of two pure souls 1 Your conquered 
desires will be the source of your happiness/ and 
the pleasures which you shall enjoy will be 
worthy of Heaven itself (emphasis added)." (40)
Julie seems to be saying that mastery of the desires allows
for, but is not equal to, the most celestial of pleasures.
As Saint Preux artfully— even cunningly— tested Julie
for the presence of passion in her, Julie tests Saint Preux
for the presence, for even the germ, of virtue in him. But
just as Saint Preux attempted to manipulate the mind and
emotions of Julie— to the point of threatening suicide!~
Julie also engages in such logistical structuring of this
incipient love affaire. She ends her first letter with what
might be called a power play: She says, in effect, that if
he takes advantage of her confused state of mind and the
trust she has placed in him, it would arouse in her scorn
and indignation, which, in turn, would cause her to regain
her reason and, by implication, reject him. A strange
little bit of psychologizing, the bottom line of which is
the following: "You will be virtuous or be scorned; I shall
be respected or cured; that is the sole hope which remains
to me besides that of dying." (41) Julie, in her own way—
but apparently Aristotelian nonetheless— has bound together
virtue and happiness; and virtue is represented by mastery
over one's desires. But, of course, the nature of what is
being overcome is somewhat confused and ambiguous at this
point: Are they trying to overcome anti-social behavior
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(Saint Preux is not of the proper social class to court 
Julie), or are they trying to overcome excessive and 
uncontrollable desire, or both? Our ultimate judgment of 
their success or failure will involve the object of their 
guest.
These letters often sound a little like diplomats 
negotiating treaties. In their very first epistolary 
exchanges, both lovers have threatened or mentioned suicide 
as tool of persuasion, or at least of manipulation. The 
only other interpretation might be that they— at the very 
beginning of the romance and before consummation of their 
love— are both somehow truly deranged; for nothing says that 
a deranged person is necessarily incapable of artfully 
manipulating another, both through argument and emotion.
In Saint Preux's response to Julie's admission of love 
for him, he uses "happiness" five times in the space of one 
and a half pages. He calls on "Heavenly powers" to express 
his ecstacy. In fact, it may be said with some degree of 
precision that Saint Preux is given an unearned— an 
accidental, if you will— taste of bliss, for he sees in 
Julie's last letter "how the most lively passions retain in 
a chaste soul the holy character of virtue." (41-42) And 
this possibility— that is, the reconciliation of passion and 
virtue— is the greatest hope set out in the Julie, ou La 
Novelle Heloise. As there cannot be, for Rousseau, virtue 
without freedom, so there cannot be virtue without passion.
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Saint-Preux's apperception of Julie as the reconciliation of 
passion and virtue is the first clear prefiguring of the 
manner of Julie's death.
Somehow, the co-existence of passion and virtue 
represents a "true happiness," whereas pleasure alone, or 
virtue alone, is lacking. But what accounts for the 
possibility of this reconciliation of opposing forces of the 
soul? It is Julie's highmindedness or discipline or 
chastity which allows her to suffer the fire of passion 
without submitting to it. But what of our young philosopher 
who defines himself in this letter as "a simple and 
sensitive man"— not as a "vile seducer"! Is he here 
experiencing anything beyond a strong and fumbling passion? 
I dare say yes, but to no great credit of his own.
Whereas Julie is disciplined (She comes from the lower 
nobility) in her wearing of her love by a chaste and 
controlled character, Saint Preux's fires of love are, as he 
writes, purified by the knowing of Julie. (43) That is, 
she, through her manipulative admonitions, controls the very 
sentiments of Saint Preux. Before she announces her love to 
him, he has been partially "purified." But what does this 
mean for the notion of happiness and, beyond that, for 
political philosophy?
The classical dualism of mind and body is operative in 
Rousseau's distinction between passion and virtue. And, if 
these latter cannot be reconciled, we are left with the
necessity of the tyranny of the soul over the body. If they 
could be reconciled, such a feat would have no small 
political implication. Aristotle offers us one road to 
happiness: control of the passions by virtuous moderation.
Will Rousseau reject this complex of Aristotelian notions, 
as well as Stoic notions? Rousseau's relationship to 
classical eudaemonism will remain a concern through the 
Julie. Although Rousseau does not reject this classical 
complex— not for routine political reasons anyway— he does 
attempt to temper it with love, compassion, and feeling— all 
of which might be said to be his Christian legacy of choice. 
(His broader project, of course, would be to educate the 
passions, as in Emile.)
But there is more than the political for both Aristotle 
and for Rousseau. Aristotle offers a sort of private 
contemplative bliss— in distinction if not in opposition to 
moral virtue and its accompanying happiness; Rousseau will 
offer the possibility of the sweet experience of the 
sentiment of one's own existence; in another way, that 
experience might be translated as the sweet sentiment of 
one's passions in such a way that they are never dissolved 
and never fulfilled.
But let us return to Letter IV. In a purely 
exclamatory remark, Saint Preux calls out to "Happiness, 
pleasures, ecstacies . . . !" We may readily see within 
this trio that "happiness" might be associated with an
Aristotelian sort of virtue; "pleasures" night be associated 
with mere hedonism; and "ecstacy" with a sort of religious 
bliss or "felicity" (a word Rousseau uses for the first time 
in this letter). These two young lovers, though undoubtedly 
experiencing love in some sort of amorphous form, are in 
over their heads (as are all first-time lovers). Saint 
Preux explicitly admits that they have no experience with 
passion, and he asks rhetorically if the honor which is 
guiding them is a deceitful guide. That is, they are not 
being led by past experience, but by an idea— that of honor, 
the political virtue par excellence. In other words, the 
lovers are attempting a political resolution to a radically 
private experience. But is that not how Western man has 
always dealt with the passions— at least until the birth of 
romantic love?
Denis de Rougement, in Love in the Western World, 
claims that the twelfth-century couple Abelard and (the 
original) Heloise was the first historical, as opposed to 
literary, instance of the living out of the quasi-religious 
myth of romantic love.3 Any serious exegesis of The New 
Heloise must consider the significance of Rousseau's
3Denis de Rougement, Love in the Western World 
(Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Publications, 1966, first pub.
1940). This work is more than helpful to an understanding 
of Rousseau's notions of love and happiness. De Rougement 
claims that Rousseau was writing within the tradition of the 
passion myth, an allegory of religious longing, the origins 
of which go back to a Christian gnostic heresy.
81
medieval allusion. How is Julie like the original Heloise, 
and how is she different from her? How each of these 
heroines seeks happiness might be the focal point of this 
investigation.4 In fact, our Heloise might be not only 
"new" but better.
In Letter VI, her first to her cousin Claire, Julie, 
already having demanded virtue from Saint Preux, reinforces 
her commitment to virtue by soliciting the aid and 
protection of Claire against what she sees as a dangerous 
temptation, for Saint Preux is not only worthy, he is also 
friendly and virtuous. It is then his good qualities that 
compose the danger of the temptation. We might ask: What
is the nature of virtue if it is to overcome the good? Or 
should we, as readers, have already surmised that questions 
of wealth and social status had already made Saint Preux 
into some kind of evil for someone of Julie's position? 
Whatever, she plans to resist him, but she plans to continue 
to see him. Why?
Is Julie not so wise as we might be led to believe by 
her intelligent letters? Or is Rousseau not working out, 
through the decisions and efforts of his characters, the 
very drama of humankind: the dilemma of the incongruity of 
nature (Julie's passion) and society (Julie's virtue)? At
OC, II, p. 3, n. 1.
the beginning of the novel, it seems that the social 
disparities between the lovers are at the source of Julie's 
resistance; otherwise, why not marry and resolve the 
dilemma? But, as we progress through the story into the 
rarefied regions of romanticism, we shall catch glimpses of 
a sort of metaphysical exigency for resistance to passion—  
something less necessary, but more rewarding than virtue. 
If a categorical statement may be made about Rousseau's 
characters, it is that they are always, more or less 
consciously, pursuing happiness as they understand it at any 
given moment in time. They grow and change, both due to 
external as well as internal forces, but they are always 
consciously pursuing the elusive goal of happiness. Claire 
touches on this reality of the often changing perceptions of 
happiness in her first letter to Julie.
In Claire's response to Julie (Letter VII), after 
adumbrating several dichotomies— such as prowess in reason 
versus weakness of heart, or the claims of honesty versus 
the claims of friendship and faith— she poses the 
fundamental question to Julie: "What do you want?" And
here we are at the root of the whole dynamic of the love 
story: Why must there be a conflict between passion and
virtue? Yes, the disparity in social class between Saint 
Preux and Julie disallows their marriage, especially given 
the type father Julie has. And Julie could, if she wished 
to end this budding relationship, merely mention it to her
mother. There are several questions here: 1) Does Julie
want a relationship with Saint Preux? 2) If so, what kind 
of relationship? and 3) If not, how does she choose to 
resist it? These are questions the answers to which involve 
the working out of Julie's happiness. But the most
universal answer might be that romantic love demands a 
conflict— an irreconcilable conflict— between passion and 
virtue; and the end, and origin, of romantic love is, and 
was, an experience of religious union— all of which may be 
taken as the barest statement of de Rougement's thesis.
Claire pinpoints the sporting nature of Julie's 
feelings when she says to Julie: "I understand you; you do
not wish some expedient which concludes everything; you are 
willing to take from yourself the power of succumbing, but 
not the honor of fighting." (I,VII,45) (This line of
reasoning concurs with what Claire said immediately before 
about the advisability of being virtuous because you wish to 
be, as opposed to because you are simple or ignorant.) And 
Claire, admitting that some would criticize her for not 
protecting her friend by simply revealing the secret romance 
to her mother, concludes that she values friendship over 
honesty and then allows herself a short meditation on 
morality and its relative nature: "I imagine that each
relationship, each age has its maxims, its duties, its 
virtues; that what would be prudence to others would be 
perfidy to me, and that instead of making us good ("sage")
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would make us bad ("mechant") by confusing all that." 
(I,VII,46) Then Claire develops the underlying metaphors of 
warfare by considering strategies of attacking this growing 
love affair. In brief, she says that, if Julie's love is 
weak, they will merely conquer it; if her love, however, is 
of an extreme sort, a frontal attack could lead only to 
tragedy. Claire seems practical in the extreme; and she is 
first and foremost "the friend."
So what is the quintessential cause or dynamic of our 
story? Is it that Julie, because of her nature, must 
experience the honor of the fight, or is it because her love 
is too "extreme" to be, with impunity, dealt with in a 
summary fashion. (Of course, these two reasons are not 
mutually exclusive.) We still, however, do not know what 
Julie wants. Yes, she seems to will her virtue, but does 
she will her love?
One almost has the impression that this love is like a 
force of nature attacking the integrity of Julie's 
personhood. May we not see the story as not only a battle 
between passion and society, but, beyond that, a conflict 
between irrational nature (or passion) and the rational and 
virtuous integrity of the person. We might further say that 
these necessarily protracted battles are rare, since both 
strong passion and high reason must be found in both parties 
to the affaire. Rousseau's whole life, it might be argued, 
was an attempt to reconcile these warring perspectives, to
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construct a small world where love and virtue would reign 
together. Such would constitute happiness. The story of 
the Julie is a record of successes and defeats in the 
pursuit of that happiness.
Saint Preux's promise to Julie that, for the sake of 
her honor, he would control his passion for her becomes too 
much for him to bear. In Letter VIII, he, in fact, formally 
takes back his word (like renouncing a treaty) and puts her 
formally on guard. Saint Preux gives several reasons for 
his change of heart: 1) Julie has changed and seems so
happy, whereas he is so miserable; 2) His two month triumph 
of abstinence does not seem to be appreciated by her; and, 
perhaps, 3) Julie now has Claire to protect her honor (as 
if it's now a fair fight).
But at the heart of Saint Preux's despondency seems to 
be something more, his realization of the complexity and 
illusiveness of happiness itself. In spite of Julie's 
professed love for him, Saint Preux must say of himself: 
"This unjust heart dares to desire more, when it has nothing 
more to desire; it punishes me with its imaginings 
("fantaisies") and makes me uneasy in the bosom ("au sein") 
of happiness." (47) The task of happiness, then, appears to 
be that of delimiting our desires to the possible, to the 
non-imaginary and attainable, even if not to the virtuous. 
We are even led to ask if Saint Preux, after consummating 
his love, will be happy. If he is motivated by desire, one
86
night be led to say that he will not be. Or is not
happiness a state of soul, as the Stoics would hold, as
opposed to an exercise of passion, reason, and will? The 
infinity of possible imaginings seems to demand that, in 
order to attain happiness, we restrain our imaginations, 
because "Whoever does what he wishes is not happy, if his 
needs exceed his forces."5
Saint Preux, though he appears to have had a glimpse of 
the illusory nature of happiness, chooses— and very 
explicitly!— to develop his means to new-born desire as 
opposed to restraining his desires. Baldly put, he intends 
to conquer Julie, and he tells her so! Julie must resist 
this love, not ultimately because of family and social 
barriers, but because this love is neither natural nor
virtuous; it is rather a creature of the illimitable
imagination or fancy of Saint-Preux. It, like present-day 
society for Rousseau, is an expression of chaos. The 
political teaching of the Julie, if there be one, will, we 
must surely expect, be an expression of order.
In her reply (Letter IX), Julie clarifies the 
irrational or chaotic state of Saint Preux's soul and his 
less than realistic approach to happiness. "I understand:
5 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile. II. as quoted in Roger 
D. Masters, The Political Philosophy of Rousseau (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1968), 95. This citation 
and a brief comment are all the space Roger Masters gives to 
the subject of happiness in his major work on Rousseau.
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the pleasures of vice and the honor of virtue would be for 
you an agreeable fate? Is that your morality?" (49) In 
effect, Julie accuses Saint Preux of wanting to have his 
cake and eat it, too. Julie claims to have had a sort of 
awakening. Curiously, this letter begins with the words "I 
understand" and concludes with the word "happiness." And, 
surely, the letter represents a summary of Julie's theory of 
happiness— at least at that given point in her life and 
love.6
Letter IX is truly a wonderful communication. After 
chiding Saint Preux for wishing to "reconcile" passion and 
virtue— he gave no rationale for his basically confused 
desire— she seems to contradict herself by saying that she 
has "discovered" (somehow!) that "the reconciliation 
("accord") of love and innocence seem to me to be paradise 
on earth." (51) But let us review this letter in some 
detail, for in it is one view of just what happiness is— in 
its relation to passion and virtue.
6 "Fundamentally there is only one difference between 
[the letter-novel form] and that of the memoir-form: the
perspective of time. The memorialist knows, at the moment 
of writing, how all his adventures turned out. Seeing them 
from a distance, he can now distinguish the incidents and 
actions which mattered. He can explain things which puzzled 
him at the time, and can judge how far his own hopes and 
fears were justified or mistaken. The character in a 
letter-novel, on the other hand, usually writes under the pressure of immediate events, and cannot see their outcome." 
Vivienne Mylne, The Eiahteenth-Centurv French Novel
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), 149.
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In sun, Julie says that she has "discovered" that her 
religious upbringing on the subjects of love and virtue was 
wrong. "I was raised with such severe maxims that the 
purest love appeared to me the height of dishonor." Her 
"troubled imagination" confused the avowal of a passion with 
a crime.
But no longer . . .  "I recognized that I was wrong," 
she concludes. But how did she come to such conclusions?
Did the presence of Claire make the difference? Whatever
the case, the event of this letter represents a sort of 
religious counter-conversion. Julie is, in effect, 
embracing a new religion— and one might prematurely say at 
this point, a religion of love. Before examining the 
content of this new dispensation, we should remind ourselves 
that Julie— at the moment of her marriage, the moment of her 
full entry into civil society— will undergo another 
conversion, one quite unlike the one at hand.
Two months of "experience" have taught Julie that (for 
her happiness) "my too tender heart needs love, but my
senses have no need of a lover." (51) Like a self-willed
new Heloise (and different from the original one), Julie 
jubilantly expresses her new-found power "to love purely." 
She categorically proclaims: "This state constitutes the
happiness of my life." She wishes she could communicate it 
to Saint Preux and thus make possible a "union of hearts." 
Julie has overcome the religious repression of the body by
89
means of a total abstraction from the body. But even the 
nature of such an abstraction does not shelter the lovers 
from the vicissitudes of fortune. Julie fears that they are 
at present as happy as they will ever be. Theirs, she says 
in so many ways, is a love and a happiness at the 
equilibrium point: "The moment of possession is a crisis
for love, and any change is dangerous to ours; we can no 
longer do anything but lose it." (51)
This is not a stoic happiness based essentially on the 
state of an independent and disciplined soul; it is rather 
a fragile happiness which depends, in part at least, on luck 
or fortune (an element of happiness clearly recognized, but 
not enthroned, by Aristotle) . Nonetheless, Julie eloquently 
extols their present for, we sense, as long as it might 
last: "The mind is adorned, the reason enlightened, the
soul fortified, the heart joyful: what is lacking to our
happiness?" (52) That question will echo to the end.
The irony of this letter of Julie's, when viewed within 
the context of the whole story, cannot fail to escape us: 
It is Julie who will eventually marry and live the life of 
the body and family, and it is Saint Preux who will become 
celibate. But, it can be argued at this point, Julie's last 
word on happiness contains elements of this early, rather 
juvenile expression. In this very early letter, Julie all 
but says "I understand happiness." And that happiness that
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she claims to understand is Platonic, at least in the 
popular sense.
Letter IX is most important for two related reasons:
1) In it, Julie confesses to a religious conversion; and 2) 
She also, thereby, professes to understand the nature of 
happiness (and love). Her new-found liberation and
understanding of love and happiness allow her to enjoy what, 
in a sense, she accused Saint Preux of fantasizing about: 
she pretends to attain both love and virtue at the same 
time. She has her cake and eats it, too. The difference, 
of course, is that Julie's love is "pure" and, we might add, 
consistent. Julie is a Christian. We must, then, ask if 
she is going to the well of Christian thought for the 
inspiration of her enlightened view of love, or is she (and 
ultimately Rousseau) essentially independent of Christian 
resources?
Saint Preux, for all of his stumbling and blind 
Chaplinesque antics, will accurately dissect Julie's chosen 
highroad to happiness. The short of it is that Saint Preux 
is the happiest of men (because he is loved by Julie), but 
also the most desolate of men (because he is unable to 
consummate his love for her). Because he feels that the 
"greatest of goods" is to be loved by Julie, he attempts 
both to understand and to accommodate what is in effect her 
asceticism. But he is compelled— perhaps equally for 
subjective and objective reasons— to point out to her that
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what she proposes is against nature. And nature, it seems, 
is stronger than wisdom.
But that is not his final word; Saint Preux admits to, 
or pretends to, a startling transformation— no less profound 
than that of Julie's recent conversion. "Beyond you alone," 
writes Saint Preux, "I see nothing in this earthly sojourn 
which is worthy of occupying my soul and my senses; no, 
without you nature is no longer anything for me (emphasis 
added): but its rule7 is in your eyes, and it is there that
it is invincible." (53) Saint Preux's love for Julie and 
her reaction to it has denatured him, or so it seems. But 
still Saint Preux would like to be able either to draw Julie 
down to his level or to elevate himself to hers. His 
transformation is only one of necessity; it is hardly a 
conversion. For him, Julie is a sort of saint ("adorable 
object"), but it is Saint Preux who is called upon by the 
situation, and who responds, to the demands of sacrifice: 
"not being able to reconcile my happiness with yours— judge 
how I love— it is mine that I renounce." His feelings are 
fraught with "inexplicable contradictions": "I would like
to live for you, and it is you who are taking life from me." 
(54) He is unhappy in his happiness— surely an inexplicable 
contradiction, perhaps given life by this new (Christian)
7This notion of "rule" is reminiscent of the sovereign 
Lady of troubadour days. It will recur.
92
element of sacrifice whereby Julie is demanding that Saint 
Preux die to the world of the senses.
It seems that it is this life of sacrifice and denial 
which, Rousseau hints, is at the root of a lively 
imagination. Saint Preux indulges his wishes regarding 
Julie in his imagination and never in her presence. The 
imagination becomes a sort of weapon by which he avenges 
himself for the respect which he is constrained to have for 
her! (54) His happiness, if it may be called that, is, at 
this point, hardly a peaceful one. He is called to 
restraint and sacrifice when he is neither Stoic nor 
Christian, but rather a young man in love.
Nonetheless, Julie begins Letter XI by addressing Saint 
Preux as "My friend," for, however confused his psyche might 
be, he is attempting to sacrifice for her. (She actually 
employs the word "sacrifice.") But, after attesting to a 
growing "attachment" to Saint Preux, Julie raises the 
labyrinthine question of the possibility of using love, or 
expressions of love, as a weapon of conquest and seduction. 
(54) Julie always seems aware of such a possibility. But 
she immediately takes back the thought of it and declares 
theirs to be a union of souls. Using a conceit from 
physics, which is reminiscent of John Donne's "A 
Valediction: Forbidding Mourning," she expresses their
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mutuality and inseparability: "like those magnets' of which
you spoke to me [in a physics lesson], that had, let's say, 
the same movements in different places, we would feel the 
same things at the two poles of the world." (55)
Not only their sensations or feelings but also their 
happiness must forever be a mutual experience; they have a 
"common destiny," declares Julie. And reason should be in 
the service of love in the conduct— preferably guided by 
herself— of their pursuit of a common happiness. Though 
they may never achieve a mutual understanding, as they now 
have a mutual sensibility, Julie, in fine Solomonic fashion, 
declares that she is sure of one thing: "I know that the
opinion (avis) of the one who least separates his happiness 
from the happiness of the other is the opinion that must be 
followed." (56) So, Julie has given the couple a code of 
conduct based on love and supported by reason. It is right 
opinion at work for the sake of happiness. And it is a sort 
of contract.
Julie makes several things clear in Letter XI: 1) The
couple will find happiness together, or they will not find 
it at all; 2) The voice of love and the voice of reason 
give like counsel in this pursuit of mutual happiness; 3) 
Saint Preux must learn to follow the dictates of his heart 
as opposed to the delirium of his heated imagination; and 4)
8 The word (amant) for magnet and lover is the same in French.
94
The whole question of friendship is broached. It should be 
clear by now that their deliberate and explicit concern is 
happiness, in the sense of eudaemonism, as opposed to mere 
pleasure.
In Letter XII, Saint Preux turns over to Julie the 
control and "care of our common happiness" (56), though he 
can still not think of her without experiencing an ecstacy 
which he knows he must conquer. And, surprisingly, 
reclaiming his position of authority and responsibility, he 
proposes a "method" to their program of studies which, 
because of their year-long romantic concern with each other, 
have suffered. One might glimpse a certain irony in that, 
in one breath, Saint Preux submits to Julie the control over 
his very will and that, a moment later, he assumes the 
consummate posture of (her) teacher by proposing to her a 
new method for the project of their studies together. He 
is, paradoxically, taking an active part in his submission.
Just what is the gist of Saint Preux's "methode"? Does 
it relate in any specific way to the first part of Letter 
XII wherein he submits his will to Julie's rule? In other 
words, does his method intend to promote in an explicit way 
their common happiness? The presentation might be distilled 
as follows: 1) This method will repair the damage done to
our pursuit of knowledge— damage caused by our distractions;
2) This "systeme" extracts much from little, as opposed to 
extracting little from many things; 3) Our knowledge will
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be converted to our use and nourishment, as opposed to being 
a means to commerce or fame; 4) "Read little, and meditate 
much on your readings"— or talk a lot about what you read; 
5) Depend on yourself, rather than on books, for your 
ideas.
Of course, nothing is ever as simple as it seems with 
Rousseau. The method, or system, proper takes about a page 
to describe; following that are several pages of elaboration 
and de facto adjustments— one might even say, allusive 
contradictions. For we have to keep in mind that this 
method might not be merely for academic instruction, but 
also for the attainment of happiness.
Saint Preux tells Julie that she, unlike many others, 
is a worthy candidate for the prescribed method, because her 
"active intelligence works on a book so as to make of it 
another book, sometimes better than the first one." (58) It 
might be premature to conclude, within the confines of this 
investigation, but our analysis of the Julie up to this 
point lends some evidence to the position that in the Julie 
Rousseau is, in fact, writing two books: There is the
popular and romantic story of the two lovers, and there is 
a philosophical subplot, treating essentially the notion of 
human happiness, wherein the irony of the characters (as 
Bloom might have been suggesting) is that they might express 
in the subplot the very opposite of what they do or express 
in the ostensible plot.
From the topic of self-reliance in reading and in the 
generation of ideas, Saint Preux broaches the subject of 
what might be called a moral aestheticism or an aesthetic 
morality: "As soon as we return back into ourselves, each
person senses that which is good ("bien"), each discerns 
that which is beautiful; we have no need of being taught to 
know either the one or the other. . . . But examples of the 
very good ("bon") and the very beautiful are more rare and 
less known, and it is necessary to go far from ourselves in 
search of them." (58) Contrary to popular opinion, 
greatness does exist, and we must recognize its existence in 
order to imitate it. We should find our principles and 
rules within ourselves and we should leave alone all vain 
disputations on happiness and virtue; "let us give ourselves 
great examples to imitate rather than vain systems to 
follow." (59)
So, it is not all books from which we should maintain 
a radical independence. Rather, stories of heroes should be 
cherished like a bible.
Then Rousseau takes off into what might itself be 
called a "vain system." "I have always believed," writes 
Saint Preux, "that the good was only the beautiful put into 
action. . . .  It follows from this idea that taste is 
perfected by the same means as is wisdom." An epistemology 
is hinted at: The dichotomy between "seeing" and "feeling"
must be blurred; we must "try to judge the beautiful by
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inspection and the good by feeling"; but they are ultimately 
the same. Is such the only road to wisdom, or only one road 
among many? At the least, we must learn to see and to feel 
as well as to reason. Not all humans are capable of 
following this method or way to wisdom, for "it does not 
belong to all hearts to be moved at the first sight of 
Julie." That is, all hearts are not put in the favored 
position of being able to recognize the beauty and goodness 
of Julie.
Saint-Preux concludes by explaining that his 
epistemology (the term is mine) is why he limits all of 
Julie's studies to books of taste and mores, of virtues and 
of good writing. Everything in his method centers around 
examples. But, as we observed above, Rousseau's, or rather 
Saint Preux's, rejection of the study of systems is based on 
a sort of system itself: the coincidence of beauty and
goodness, with no mention of a distinctive place for truth. 
So, Saint Preux plans on cutting back on Julie's subjects of 
study. The rhyme and reason of his enumerated changes 
hardly seem to follow from his method of examples only: 1)
He will eliminate languages (with the exception of Italian 
which Julie already knows and loves); 2) He will drop 
algebra and geometry, but will retain physics; 3) He will 
"renounce forever modern history, except that of Switzerland 
(and, by implication, he will retain ancient history); 4) 
With a few exceptions, he will eliminate all poets, and,
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without exception, he will proscribe all romance novels. 
Thus, for the most part, Julie will study physics and, we 
assume, ancient history. We are led to ask how the study of 
physics could be grounded on examples? Perhaps, it is 
because physics offers— if not examples— then at least 
metaphors of nature, as in the case, mentioned by Saint 
Preux in this letter, of the conceit of the lovers as 
magnets; such metaphors are somehow natural and not 
imaginary.
If our goal in education is to imitate— no, even to 
become heroes, then Rousseau all but discounts the need of 
formal education, even of the classics, at least for Julie 
and him: "true love is a devouring fire which carries its
ardor into the other feelings, and animates them with a new 
vigor. That is why it is said that love makes Heroes. 
Happy the one whom fate has so placed as to become one, and 
who would have Julie for a lover!" (61)
This equation of Julie and himself with the heroes 
finds resonance in a general characterization of the Julie, 
expressed in the Second Preface: Rousseau's interlocutor is 
accusing the novel of having nothing out of the ordinary; in 
effect, he judges the novel to be boring; Rousseau responds, 
"That is to say, you demand common men and rare events? I 
believe that I would prefer the contrary." (13) So, now, 
let us move back to Letter XII. Saint Preux is arguing that 
men of all ages are not the same. We do not admire the
99
ancients just because they are ancient; rather, "in days 
gone by one did great things with small means, and, today, 
one does the opposite." (60)
Does the above not enjoin the question of the 
comparability of the personages of The New Heloise with 
those of ancient heroics? This may be another way of saying 
that Rousseau's subjects are human happiness and the human 
soul— both illuminated by human love. For Rousseau, the 
ground of a new heroic! The frontier of greatness is within 
and concerns only happiness, as Saint Preux's pedagogic 
method attempts to make clear. In other words, to follow 
the above analogies, great souls, in the microcosm of love, 
comprise the true subject matter of the Julie. The rarity 
of the "events" are not at issue; only the nature and 
development of the souls of the personages. One might even 
say that an inner monologue of a person looking both out on 
nature and, simultaneously, within himself would be, for 
Rousseau, a more appropriate literary form for his subject 
matter. (The Reveries seem, in fact, to be just such a 
form.) Is love, for Rousseau, merely a convenient physical 
metaphor for the exploration of nature and happiness? And 
is the tableau of "heroes" portrayed in the Julie merely a 
schema of the human soul? Posed otherwise: Is love, other
than love of self (amour de soi), necessary for happiness? 
Just what is the status of the Reveries?
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In this Letter XIII, Julie, in effect, proposes a test 
for happiness and she says that she is "reserving a little 
surprise" for Saint-Preux, ostensibly because of his 
apparent maturity in arranging their program of studies.
She opens the letter: "I was in fact telling you that
we were happy; nothing instructs me of it so well as the 
pain that I experience at the least change in our 
situation." (61) Years later, in The Reveries. Rousseau 
posited a test for true happiness; it has to do with its 
eternal nature: "As for happiness which lasts, I doubt that
it is known here. In our most intense enjoyments, there is 
hardly an instant when the heart can truly say yes to us: 
I would like this instant to last forever." (Butterworth, p. 
68) Julie openly assumes that Saint-Preux could also pass 
the test, because she says that "she feels" his impatience 
at their short separation— that is, at a change in their 
situation.
Julie is won over, it seems, by Saint-Preux's program 
of study, because it has nothing in it, we must surmise, 
that would enhance a seduction. Saint-Preux, Julie says to 
him, you have made "sacrifices for virtue." (62) As his 
reward (She still knows that he is a child!), she will take 
him into the woods, along with her cousin Claire, to offer 
him "a little surprise." It is very probable that Julie is 
engaged, consciously or unconsciously, in a process of 
sublimating Saint-Preux's feelings for her. Surely, he does
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not want the situation to remain exactly as it is. So, if 
that is the happiness test, then he is not happy, as it 
seems that Julie is.
No sooner does Julie offer Saint-Preux a test for 
happiness— "I would like this instant to last forever"--than 
the reader is asked to apply the test to the behavior of 
Saint-Preux, subsequent to "the fatal kiss" that Julie 
allowed him.(XIV) As a result of the kiss, he is beside 
himself— drunk, insane, disturbed— saying that "this memory 
. . . will be the agony and the happiness of my life." (64) 
Is it happiness, since he would have liked the kiss in the 
arbor to have lasted forever; or is it not happiness, since 
he is not "happy" to live with the memory of the kiss. If 
true happiness is a permanent state of the soul (as the test 
itself implies), then Saint-Preux fails. One could say, his 
soul is not well disposed toward happiness.
Julie's response to Saint-Preux's delirious complaints 
about the cruelty of the kiss is to ask him calmly, and 
without explanation, to separate himself from her for an 
unspecified period of time. She also gives him money for 
the trip, which he considers an insult to his honor.
In Letter XVIII, Saint-Preux relates that he has 
submitted to Julie's instructions to leave town in spite of 
the pain (and near delirium) it caused him. But, more 
importantly, there are three statements of Platonism in the 
letter: 1) "each step that took me from you separated my
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body from my soul and gave me an anticipated sense 
(sentiment) of death." (68) 2) "I have dragged into my
exile only the slightest part of myself: all that is alive
in me remains ceaselessly near you. . . .  it penetrates 
everywhere like a subtle vapor, and I am happier in spite of 
you than I was ever with your permission." (69) 3) And
then he finishes the letter with an analogy of death: "I
must fly from everything and live alone in the world, if I 
cannot live in it with you." (69)
The point of these Platonic statements of duality may 
be seen as a lover's desperate attempt to save for himself 
what he sees as a failing love affair; it may be seen as a 
true philosophic conversion; or it might be Saint-Preux's 
answer to Julie's Letter IX, in which she announced that she 
wanted only a spiritual relationship. Is Saint-Preux, 
perhaps, fighting back, for between Julie's professed 
Platonism and this letter of Saint-Preux's, there is the 
kiss in the arbor, which represents Julie's compromise with 
her earlier avowal of only a spiritual relationship. Is 
Saint-Preux not here being "holier than the Church" in an 
attempt to win back Julie's affection?
Saint-Preux fears that Julie has forgotten him (after 
five days of separation), but he also dees some maturing: 
He now realizes why, in novels, so much is made of lovers' 
separations.(XIX) "Today I feel how little a peaceful soul 
can properly pass judgment on the passions, and how
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senseless it is to laugh at feelings you have never 
experienced." (70) Saint-Preux has at least discovered the 
formal content of the Arabic aphorism, "The fire only burns 
where it falls." He concludes the letter by consenting to 
being tested by Julie.
Saint-Preux claims that from Julie one learns 
"that divine union of virtue, love, and nature." He also 
points out to Julie that she is loved by and loves many 
people, whereas he loves only her. He says that, having no 
happiness himself, he will share Julie's. Needless to say, 
Saint-Preux senses the vacuity of his own existence, in the 
very act of experiencing his own existence for the first 
time.(XXI)
Mountain habitation seems to give Saint-Preux's 
thought and feelings a certain force and impetuosity. He 
speaks of "a mixture of savage nature and cultivated nature" 
in the mountains where, he says, one loses oneself. Yet, 
the process of sublimation continues: "Would that I could
right here bring my whole soul together in yours, and become 
in turn the universe for you." (83) One could say that this 
manifestation of sublimation is the mere work of prolonged 
separation.(XXIII)
Saint-Preux says that he cannot take payment from M. 
d'Etange for his tutoring lessons, as the Baron now insists, 
because it would either affect his behavior toward Julie or 
because he might be forced to betray his employer.(XXIV)
104
The question of honor regarding the money is addressed by
Saint-Preux: "True honor [unlike that based on public
opinion] is the essence of true happiness, because it alone
inspires that permanent feeling of inner satisfaction which
alone is able to make a thinking being happy." (84) It is
this true honor which Saint-Preux appeals to in refusing
payment for his services, unlike the original Abelard.
When the letters of Heloise and Abelard fall 
between your hands, you will know what I am 
telling you of this reading and of the conduct of 
that Theologian. I have always pitied Heloise; 
she had a heart made for love: but Abelard ever
appeared to me but a miserable creature who 
deserved his fate and one knowing as little of 
love as of virtue. After having judged him, will 
it be necessary for me to imitate him? 
Misfortune to whoever preaches a morality that he 
does not wish to practice! He who is blinded by 
his passion up to that point is soon punished by 
it and loses his taste for the sensations 
(sentiments) to which he has sacrificed his 
honor. Love is deprived of its greatest charm 
when honesty abandons it; in order to feel its 
full price, the heart must delight in it, and it 
must elevate us in elevating the one we love.
Take away the idea of perfection, and you take 
away enthusiasm; take away esteem, and love is no 
longer anything. How would a woman be able to 
honor a man who dishonors himself? How will he 
be able himself to adore her who has no fear of 
abandoning herself to a vile corruptor? That 
way, there will soon be mutual distrust; love 
will no longer be for them but a shameful 
business: they will have lost honor and will not
have found felicity. (85-86)
Julie and Saint-Preux, ironically, retrace the steps of
Heloise and Abelard. And they, like Heloise and Abelard,
spend their lives in an attempt to redeem their love from
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any dishonor.9 In retrospect, how pitiable is this portrait 
of the young Saint-Preux, so sure of his right thought and 
action and so critical of the passions of others: a
prejudice which he claimed to have some understanding of 
just a brief time ago!!
This show of strength by Saint-Preux seems almost to 
have weakened Julie. "I had predicted it, the time of 
happiness is passed like lightening." This premonition is 
followed by a statement of grief: "I feel, my friend, the
weight of your absence crushing me. I cannot live without 
you, I know, and this frightens me most." (88)
Saint-Preux answers Julie's letter of despondency with 
a call to action— with the spectre of the possibility of
9In The New Heloise. the relationship between honor and 
love replaces that, in the original letters of Heloise and 
Abelard, of sanctity and love. Whereas Heloise and Abelard 
achieve honor through a hard won sanctity, Julie and Saint- 
Preux achieve a sort of sanctity through a hard won honor. 
Sublimation is an arduous chore for the eighteenth-century 
couple, whereas it is an expected mode of living for the 
medieval couple, despite Heloise's difficulties at the 
outset of their separation. Heloise and Abelard reach 
sublimation through Christ. For Julie and Saint-Preux, the 
mystical heights are attained through a secularized, if one 
likes, form of courtly love. It could almost be said that 
happiness is more readily desired by Julie and Saint-Preux, 
but less tenuous for Heloise and Abelard. Just what each 
couple does in order to redeem its love from dishonor or 
unholiness is not essentially different: Heloise becomes
the bride of Christ; Julie, that of Wolmar; and both Abelard 
and Saint-Preux begin journeys for some philosophical- 
theological truth— journeys which, as far as we know, had no final terminations. See PC. II f p. 3, n. 1, for a 
discussion of Rousseau's use of the medieval allusion of 
Heloise and Abelard. The Editors do not give as much 
importance to this allusion as I do.
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losing happiness forever. Carpe diem! He borrows the 
hedonist's posture. He begins by describing the sad dilemma 
of the "sensitive soul." "He seeks supreme felicity without 
remembering that he is a man: his heart and his reason will
be incessantly at war." (89) He says that without her he 
would never have felt this tension between high and low. 
Then he proceeds to convince Julie that the time is right to 
act on this "eternal decree from heaven": "it is the first
duty of life to unite with the person whose duty it is to 
make life sweet for us." (92) Saint-Preux then attacks 
Julie's commitment to chastity, saying that it robs her of 
both reason and true virtue.
He reminds Julie that their youth is passing and tells 
her that "You are seeking a chimerical happiness for a time 
when we will no longer be." (93) Saint-Preux pressures 
Julie to the maximum— with a slightly veiled threat of 
suicide.
Claire informs Saint-Preux that the separation, coupled 
with his last letter, has sent Julie to the brink of death; 
she is so ill that her mother would even like him to return, 
despite the presence of M. d'Etange. Julie is hysterical 
and very ill. She complains of everyone close to her—  
including Claire. Her illness is apparently the result of 
the separation from Saint-Preux.
Julie confesses to Claire to have lost her innocence. 
Who, she asks, called that "cruel one" back? But she
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eventually blames only herself: "I forgot everything and
remembered only love." (96) Julie asks Claire to come live 
with her. Claire tells Julie that her, Julie's, passion for 
Saint-Preux was life or death— that is, she had to give in 
to her passion or die. She agrees to join Julie.(XXX)
Saint-Preux comments on how incompatible impulses can 
be in one heart. Of himself: "Drunk with love and sensual
pleasure, my heart swims in sadness; I suffer and languish 
in the midst of supreme felicity." (99) He chides Julie for 
having remorse for having obeyed natural and sacred laws. 
He proposes that they give themselves to each other as 
husband and wife, which would right any wrong. He calls 
himself her other half. But their age of innocence is over. 
As Julie writes, "our letters were facile and charming . .
. there was no need of artifice or coloring. . . . That
happy time is no longer." (102) Most of all, Julie regrets 
having betrayed the integrity of her love— "my regret is 
much less having given too much to love than having deprived 
it of its greatest charm." They have fallen into a form of 
hedonism: "We have sought out pleasure and happiness has
flown from us." When all is said, Julie is hurt by the 
realization that she and Saint-Preux are no more than 
"common lovers" who experience nothing but "fits of 
passion," as opposed to "a pure and holy flame." (In Part 
VI, when Julie proposes that Saint-Preux and Claire marry,
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he protests on grounds that he would become a mere "common 
husband.")
Again in our reading, we must ask just what Julie 
wants. She never said she wanted marriage and she never 
said, as far as the reader knows, that she wanted sex. This 
letter supports the Julie of the Platonic love, the Julie 
who needs a lover for her spirit, but no lover for her body. 
So it is for the second time that Julie asks Saint-Preux to 
be her holy knight, in fact: "Be then from now on my sole
hope. . . . May your worth erase my shame. . . .  As long as 
you will be worthy of respect, I will not be totally 
contemptible." (103) There seems little question that Julie 
is resurrecting, to an unawares Saint-Preux, a medieval 
notion of love: that of courtly love.10
The lovers, under the circumstances, are uneasy in 
social situations. Addressing Saint-Preux as "friend," as 
she did in Letter XXXII, Julie observes that "we love too 
much to be able to so restrain ourselves"; she goes on to 
delineate a private from a public life, and concludes that 
a solitary life would, for them, go further in nourishing 
their passions.(XXXIII) The grand Rousseauean theme of
10See Denis de Rougemont, Love in the Western World, for 
one explication of the origin and nature of the passion 
myth. See specifically pp. 225-28 for an interesting, 
though not always correct, interpretation of The New Heloise.
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solitude11 is introduced in a grand way, as Julie suns it 
up: "All grand passions are formed in solitude." It
nourishes love and melancholy; but /'oes solitude, we night 
prematurely ask, nourish happiness? (Julie concludes the 
letter by writing cryptically of the possibility of her 
pregnancy.)
The importance of the solitary, or private, life for 
the achievement of happiness has been dealt with in our 
earlier discussions, especially those of The Confessions and 
The Reveries. Here, however, we are dealing with a relative 
solitude— that is, one essentially of two lovers. We may 
eventually have to conclude that there is a direct 
relationship between the attainability of happiness and the 
degree of privacy or solitude (that is, apoliticality); but 
we might also have to show a shifting notion of solitude as 
the particular notions of happiness come forward, 
specifically, ranging from radically private to radically 
public. Simply stated: In The New Heloise. Rousseau is
portraying the pursuit of happiness of two people. The 
resolution of the work will have only partial, and perhaps 
not ultimate, application. Which, we might be led to ask,
“See PC. II. p. 105, n. 1.
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is the higher form of life— solitary, partial association, 
or political?12
Saint-Preux agrees to return to the solitary life and 
even generalizes the value of the decision: "the heart is
not at all nourished in the tumult of society." (107) 
Ironically, he asks if it is not preferable to meet for "a 
single instant and then die" rather than take all the 
precautions that would be necessary even in a solitary 
milieu. This calls to mind that mere solitude is no total 
answer to the happiness of the couple. Happiness will 
require a disposition of the soul as well as of the 
environment.
Then, Saint-Preux writes on blindly about his inability 
to fathom the nature of her secret [about her pregnancy]. 
It should perhaps also be pointed out— since I shall argue 
for the importance of the notion of cortezia in the Julie—  
that Saint-Preux playfully portrays the young men who 
showered attention on Julie at a party as "cavaliers," a 
word which in the seventeenth century was substituted for
,2If the love of two people is the best path to 
happiness for most people and if that happiness is best 
nourished in solitude, that might be a political problem in 
an urban age. For a discussion of the life of the Golden 
Age (the family) versus the political life of Sparta, see Judith N. Shklar, Men and Citizens— A Study of Rousseau's 
Social Theory (New York: Cambridge, first pub. 1968).
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the old French word "chevalier." This latter word means 
simply "knight."13
Continuing repeatedly to address Saint-Preux as 
"friend," Julie wishes her fears of lover allayed. She 
wants not only a lover but a friend— not only his heart but 
his faith. And she proposes, as an "expedient," a sort of 
initiation for Saint-Preux— in the presence of Julie and 
Claire— into an order of knighthood.(XXXV) Once he has 
sworn never to commit an act of treachery against his love 
for Julie, "you shall have the accolade and be acknowledged 
as sole vassal and loyal Knight." (Ill) By referring to 
Saint-Preux as a "chevalier," Julie communicates doubly: 1)
She obviously accentuates the courtly nature of their love; 
and 2) She distinguishes the order of their love from that 
of the "cavaliers," whose natures— as degenerate 
"chevaliers"— now become clear. It is likewise a commentary 
on the times. It will become progressively clearer just how 
important a role the notion of courtly love will play in 
Rousseau's notion of happiness— at least in the happiness of 
the lovers.
Julie arranges a love tryst, so she must be comfortable 
with Saint-Preux's profession of fealty. He responds. 
(XXXVIII) This letter from Saint-Preux is one of 
dichotomies and ecstasy— if not happiness. He appears
13See G. Cayrou, Le Francais Classiaue (Paris: Didier,
1923), citation: "cavalier," p. 127.
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profoundly touched by the spectacle of the friendship 
between Julie and Clair. He compares their peaceful bliss 
to voluptuousness, their friendship to love, and falls into 
an exciting eroticism: "No, nothing, nothing on earth could 
excite such a voluptuous tenderness than your mutual 
caresses, and the spectacle of two lovers would have offered 
up to my eyes a less delicious sensation." (115) The letter 
ends with a paean to nature and a hedonistic description of 
eternity: "How happy we would be if Heaven removed from
life all the tedious intervals which separate such moments 
[that is, their rendez-vous]." (117) The thought of several 
nights with Julie has sparked the "fire of love" which, in 
turn, animates all of nature. The abiding interest of the 
dichotomies of this letter lies on the side of "pure bliss" 
as opposed to "voluptuousness"; it is a harbinger of courtly 
love and its role in this drama.
After that ecstatic song of nature's complicity in the 
approaching love-making of our couple, the cold blast of 
duty cleans the pleasurable prospects away. Julie solicits 
Saint-Preux's assistance in the rescue of a servant, Claude 
Anet, from the obligations of an indenture, so that he and 
a neglected charge of Julie's, Fanchon, might marry. This 
sacrifice for virtue— they must postpone their rendez-vous—  
this altruism, represents a "[rare] opportunity to make 
people happy"; it is a sort of sublimation of the activity 
of our couple. It is a choice for virtue in the pursuit of
happiness. It is, if not a turning point in the novel, then 
a healthy respite and a sort of reality-test for the lovers. 
Saint-Preux agrees to comply with Julie's wish to help the 
couple. He claims, however, to be doing it for Julie alone 
and not for "hateful virtue" which is interfering with his 
preferred plans. He arranges the release of Claude Anet 
from military service, and to Julie expresses what must be 
termed a sense of happiness: "How happy one is to do good
in serving her whom he loves and thus unite the charms of 
love and of virtue in the same act of homage."14 Is this 
not a solution to the Kantian riddle of how to unite 
pleasure and duty? Is this not happiness? And is it not 
based on the tradition of courtly love, though not yet fully 
purified as a concept within our story? As mentioned 
earlier, Rousseau's characters do not always possess a high 
degree of self-awareness; and this is especially true of 
Saint-Preux. Nonetheless, after professing a profound 
pleasure in performing this virtuous service and after 
announcing Julie to be divine, Saint-Preux concludes by 
raising the possibility of rescheduling their love tryst at 
the chalet. The effect is clearly comic, and the conflict 
between appearances and reality shows itself in a profound 
and, simultaneously, humorous fashion.(XLIII)
140n the use of the word "homage," see Cayrou, Le Francais Classioue. p. 803.
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Julie continues to extol their act of virtue, saying 
that it is always sweet to have performed such an act and 
that "never has anyone been seen repenting of a good deed." 
Also, Lord Bomston's arrival is announced.
Letter XLVI, from Julie to Saint-Preux, has a 
disguised structure: 1) Men are always thinking of sex; 2)
This is because men are biologically— and, consequently, 
also in their souls— different from women; and 3) Because 
of all this, women make better friends to women than do men. 
And by telling Saint-Preux that Claire is "a hundred times 
more learned" than he in friendship, Julie continues to 
employ devices intended to purify and challenge Saint- 
Preux' s feelings for her. Though the superior in matters of 
love, Julie remains vulnerable to its heartache and she 
seems desperate to raise Saint-Preux to her level of feeling 
before it is too late for them both. Julie's intention, I 
feel, is to reconcile love and friendship— the existential 
equivalent of the reconciliation of passion and reason, 
pleasure and duty, the private and the public. The issue 
could be focused this way: Does love or friendship
constitute the happiness of the partial association?
Saint-Preux confesses to Julie his feeling of 
uneasiness about Bomston's seeming infatuation with Julie. 
Apparently, because of being under the spell of his love for 
Julie, Saint-Preux also confesses to having enjoyed Italian 
music for the first time. Saint-Preux describes in rather
technical terms the superiority of Italian music over French 
music. This confession is deceptively important to the 
development of our romance. Simply: Saint-Preux has
undergone an emotional conversion of sorts— concretized by 
the abandonment of French harmony in favor of Italian 
melody. For him, his conversion represents the embracing of 
a music of the heart, the soul, and their sentiments— and a 
departure from a music of technicality. We may say that 
this conversion is not merely aesthetic, because Saint-Preux 
radicalizes the importance of this music of the song of the 
heart and the soul. He gives his preference moral, and even 
metaphysical, value: "the pleasure [of Italian music] did
not stop at the ear; it penetrated to the soul." (133) And 
we may say that the artistic change of preference represents 
some sort of change of heart. He had heard the same birds 
singing before, but to no effect. In fact, Saint-Preux 
makes no secret of the fact that he associates his awakening 
to Italian music with his love for Julie ("I had only one 
regret [while listening to the Italian music); but it would 
not leave me; it was that another than you was making the 
sounds that so touched me.11) It seems that Saint-Preux has 
taken one step more toward worthiness of Julie's love. But 
an ironic perversion of this episode: It is a castrato who
teaches Saint-Preux the superiority of the Italian song and 
ministers to the opening of the heart to new and deeper
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sentiments. Claire's question reverberates: Does the soul
have a sex? (See Chapter 5, Part II)
Whatever the case with Saint-Preux's conversion to 
Italian music, Julie finds it exasperating that he fears 
losing her to Lord Bomston and, at the same time, speaks of 
"songs"! And this becomes an occasion for Julie to return 
to their night of love, when the loss of her innocence 
precluded any further aspiration toward happiness. She is 
fed up with Saint-Preux, for he is not good at the game of 
love. He knows not how to protect love, only how to take 
its pleasures. She must take the helm. But her situation 
is dire: "Is it possible ever to have happiness where shame
and remorse reign? God! What a cruel state, to be able 
neither to bear one's crime, nor to repent of it. . . . I am 
from here on at the sole mercy of fate. It is no longer 
either a question of force or of virtue, but of fortune 
(chance) and of prudence, and it is not a question of 
extinguishing a love which will last my lifelong, but of 
making that love innocent (harmless) or of dying guilty." 
(136-37) What would make her love "innocent"?
Julie provisionally defines happiness as depending on 
innocence— an innocence which could, of course, be bought at 
the price of repentance. But she can neither bear her crime 
nor repent. The classical answer to the quest for virtue—  
force or strength of soul— no longer applies, for she wishes 
to overcome nothing. The answer must be found elsewhere:
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It is in luck and in prudence that this love night play 
itself out successfully. Simply stated, the only way back 
to the pursuit of happiness is to make their love both 
innocent and harmless. For, as the French expression goes, 
Chase nature away, and she will return at a gallop! Julie 
is applying the lessons of Emile: Do not attempt to conquer
the passions, but rather raise them up to desire what they 
should desire. Julie, as has been pointed out before, is in 
the process of raising Saint-Preux into manhood and into 
love. It seems that, in order to make her love innocent, 
Saint-Preux must discover true love. He must become Julie's 
equal!
At a social function, Saint-Preux has evidently drunk
too much and has used offensive language in Julie's
presence. She takes this opportunity to explain to him just
what "true love" is, for obviously he does not know what it
is. The middle section of this letter (L) is a sort of
manifesto to and eulogy of "true love." Its essence is
intimately bound to that of "true happiness" and, seemingly,
at least partially exclusive of that of "friendship." Julie
speaks in a high tone:
I do not know if I am mistaken, but it seems to 
me that true love is the most chaste of all
bonds. It is true love, it is its divine fire 
which knows how to purify our natural
inclinations by concentrating them in a single 
object; it is true love which rescues us from 
temptations and which, except for that one
object, makes a member of the opposite sex no 
longer anything for the other sex. For an
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ordinary woman, every man is always a man; but 
for her whose heart loves, there is no man but 
her lover...They do not desire, they love. The 
heart does not follow the senses, it guides them; 
it covers their bewilderment with a delightful 
veil. No, [in true love], there is nothing 
obscene such as debauchery and its gross 
language. . . . Believe me, my friend, debauchery 
and love would not know how to live together and 
are not even able to balance off each other. The 
heart makes true happiness when there is love, 
and nothing can take its place as soon as love is 
no more, (emphasis added) (138-39)
This is a radically sublime understanding of love and
happiness. True lovers do not desire; thus, there is no
question of moderation of this love to a sort of
Aristotelian virtue. (It seems that rest, not motion, is
the proper state of man.) We can only wonder just what a
love, which is not ultimately a passion, must be. Surely,
we are in the vicinity of a neo-Platonic courtly love
tradition. And love is not happiness, but it is the cause
of it, or is at least its context. Nor should we forget to
point out that Julie, though continuing to address her lover
as "friend," seems to silently relegate friendship to a
level below the most chaste bond of love. The non-desiring,
or restful, state of true love might well stem from its very
particularity: the longing is allowed to come to rest in a
limited goal.
Letter L offers a rather transparent example of how 
Rousseau employs a small incident, such as drunkenness, to 
lay down notions of highly unorthodox import. Whether or
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not, however, these notions are fully his own— as opposed to 
those of a character he created--would be premature to say.
Saint-Preux claims, at great length, to have no memory 
of having, while under the influence, offended Julie. He 
swears off wine forever and requests that he be punished 
fairly and severely. He is applying a stern ethic to 
himself. Julie answers that she thinks his renunciation of 
wine to be, on practical and theoretical grounds, no less 
than ridiculous and more unpleasant a thought than the 
"wicked words" he spoke to her. She releases him from his 
vow and asks him merely to make an expiatory libation to the 
Graces, in her presence. She then turns to a discussion of 
her encounter with Italian music, via Bomston's castrato 
Regianino. She seems more interested in beauty than in 
morality. And she seems to agree with Saint-Preux regarding 
the superior nature of Italian music, but she speaks of it 
in a more restrained and even rationalistic manner than had 
he. Julie is giving Saint-Preux a hard time on two counts: 
the vow not to drink and his enthusiasm for Italian music. 
Why? Let us offer answers which merely fine-tune our 
understanding of Julie's project of, let us say, educating 
Saint-Preux: 1) Just before Saint-Preux's letter of
disavowal of wine, Julie had written to him not only of his 
offensive words, but she had also written a sort of 
manifesto of "true love," as she understood it. He writes 
back primarily defending himself and offering to take this
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heroic step of renouncing wine. Julie probably thought the 
occasion called for more substance— at least a passing 
reference to her idea on "true love." 2) And regarding the 
muted reaction to Italian music, it might be said that, 
since the discovery of this music seemed to have made him 
say and pretend to understand more about love than he truly 
did, Julie wants to slow him down with her manner of 
reaction. (Be it noted that Julie repeatedly continues to 
address Saint-Preux throughout these letters as "my friend," 
"my dear friend," etc. He does not generally follow suit.)
It is Julie who initiates their second romantic 
interlude. Because their plans for several rendez-vous were 
disappointed, Julie proposes a drastic and dangerous plan: 
that Saint-Preux meet her in her bedchamber. She vows that 
she is ready to die in his arms, if they are discovered. 
Saint-Preux has a nervously excited time in Julie's chamber, 
as he simultaneously writes of his emotions at being in this 
sanctum. (He has conveniently found paper and pencil, while 
waiting for Julie.)
Saint-Preux writes about his second and his ultimate 
night of love with Julie. And here his sentiments seem to 
catch up with the false conversion to that Italian music of 
the soul. He begins this recapitulation of the night of 
love not by addressing Julie as "my love," but by "my sweet 
Friend." Immediately thereafter he refers to Julie as "the 
beloved of my heart." There is no way to summarize his
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expressive effusions, except to say that he is a convert to 
"true love." What he had thought was happiness was only 
pleasure, he says; he was a child, now he is a nan.
What Saint-Preux claims to value most from the night of 
love was "the close union of souls" (Remember Letter LI and 
his cavalier appeal to "the union of our souls."). He 
questions his past "love" and announces that "My sentiments- 
-do not doubt it— have since yesterday undergone a change of 
nature." In the hour after love, they talked and he says 
that, at that time, "1 adored you and desired nothing." The 
happiness was "eternal" and "peaceful" and "of the soul": 
"It is the first time in all my days that I experienced it 
with you; and, however, judge what strange change I 
experienced; it is, of all the hours of my life, the one 
which is most dear to me and the only one that I would have 
wanted to prolong eternally." (148-49) (This is the same 
definition or test for happiness that Rousseau gives in The 
Reveries— to wish the moment to last forever.)
Saint-Preux then seems to pose a senselessly rhetorical 
question. In effect: Was what I felt before love or is
what I feel now love? (149) I contend that his questioning 
makes sense only if we recast the question: Was I your
lover before, and am I now your friend? Can love and 
friendship be reconciled? Admitting the more peaceful 
nature of his present feelings, Saint-Preux says "The 
sweetness of friendship tempers the frenzies of love." But
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the notions of love and friendship seem to become confused 
in the ensuing paragraphs, or, at the least, he is speaking 
(unawares?) of two sorts of "love." Friendship is 
associated with sweetness and peace, and love with frenzies 
(emportements). But Saint-Preux tells Julie that he has the 
suspicion that she knows how to love better than he. Love 
has more deeply penetrated her soul. And it is that which 
makes her so enchanting. Then, does Saint-Preux not give 
another way of defining happiness when writing of the love 
that infuses Julie's being? "How far away I am from that 
charming state which suffices unto itself! I wish to enjoy, 
and you wish to love; I have ecstacies and you passion; all 
my frenzies are not worth your delightful languor, and the 
sentiment with which your heart is nourished is the only 
supreme felicity." (149)
If he is aware of what he is saying, Saint-Preux must 
be speaking of two sorts of love: a love of frenzy and
passion (commonly understood), and the love Julie 
symbolizes— a reconciliation of voluptuousness and eternity, 
of passion and friendship. And this latter is that state 
sufficient unto itself. In fact, Rousseau closes this 
letter to Julie with words that might have been reserved for 
a God: "You alone are worthy of inspiring a perfect love;
you alone are the one to feel it. Ah give me your heart, my 
Julie, so that I may love you as you deserve!" (150)
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We now seem to be at the heart of Rousseau's 
romanticism, for which happiness is something different than 
for Greece or Rome or Christianity.15
Drunk, Bomston offends the name of Julie.(LVI) Saint- 
Preux and he plan to duel. Claire advises Julie to break 
off this two-year-old romance with Saint-Preux, before it 
becomes public and ruins her good name and causes someone 
harm.
Julie writes Saint-Preux a long and reasoned refutation 
of the grounds for duelling. However valid these numerous 
arguments, they concern us only tangentially. Does Julie 
intend to replace the fashion of honor with the fashion of 
love?— "your friend [Julie herself] wishes to examine with 
you just how you should conduct yourself on this occasion 
according to the sentiments that you profess and of which I 
suppose you do not make a vain and false parade." (152) And 
honor is the principle from which Julie realizes that she 
must reason.
After almost seven pages against false honor, Julie 
broaches the subject of courage. "Like all women, I think 
that the fire of courage enlivens that of love. But I want 
valor to show itself on legitimate occasions." (158) It 
would not be too much of a leap to say that Julie is pairing 
false honor with immature love and courage with mature love-
lsSee Bloom, Love, p. 65, for a discussion of love as a 
substitute for morality.
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-especially if we recall that Julie arranged a test of
courage for Saint-Preux and herself, a test which seemed to
have caused their "true love" to flower. And, if love is
necessary for happiness, then so is courage! But what sort
of courage does Julie have in mind?
True courage has more constancy and less 
eagerness; it is always that which it should be; 
it is necessary neither to stir it on nor to hold 
it back: the good man carries it with him
everywhere— into combat against the enemy, into a 
gathering where he stands for those absent or for 
the truth, into his bed against the attacks of 
sorrow and death. The strength of soul which 
inspires it is in evidence in all ages; it always 
places virtue above events, and does not consist 
in fighting, but in fearing nothing. (158)
Julie, professing to Bomston her love for Saint-Preux,
asks, in her own inimitable way, that he not duel and kill
her lover. Saint-Preux writes to Julie of his meeting of
reconciliation with Bomston who, in fact, prostrated himself
before Saint-Preux. Important to note are Bomston's remarks
regarding Saint-Preux and Julie, after he had heard their
story from Saint-Preux himself. Bomston admits that they
are no ordinary individuals and "cannot be judged by common
rules." Their happiness will take another path from that of
others; for them, only "tenderness and peace" are necessary,
whereas others search for power and recognition.
Furthermore, their love is joined to an emulation of virtue
which elevates them. And they would be less worthy if they
did not love one another. The practicality of the
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Englishman speaks: "Love will pass, and virtues will
remain." (165)
They see themselves as extraordinary because of their 
love; Bomston, though he recognizes the uncommon nature of 
their "tenderness and peace," sees their enduring uncommon 
quality to be that of virtue. Bomston seems to admit that 
their happiness comes from their love, but would he also 
admit virtue as a basis of happiness? When love passes, 
will happiness also pass? Is virtue unhappy and loveless? 
Bomston seems to imply as much. Our young couple, on the 
other hand, believes in the creative force of their love. 
The question, raised much earlier, of the reconcilability of 
passion and virtue is raised again, but this time by a third 
party— and at a time when our lovers are convinced of it.
Julie corrects Saint-Preux's salutation from his last 
letter: from "let us live in order to love each other" to
"let us love each other in order to live." (LXI) Love is 
primary for Julie— the source of life, but not for that a 
means as opposed to an end.
Claire describes a heated conversation between Lord 
Bomston and the fathers of Julie and herself. Bomston is 
trying to arrange marriage between Julie and Saint-Preux. 
Baron d'Etange violently objects on grounds that Saint-Preux 
is not nobility, but a "quidam," or nobody. Thereupon, 
Bomston attacks the very foundations of nobility and even 
raises the spectre and the crimes of Machiavelli's founding
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prince (without mentioning Machiavelli). Saint-Preux is 
lauded as a natural aristocrat and therefore worthy of 
Julie's hand; thus the gist of the argument is not that they 
truly love each other. Nonetheless, this attack by Rousseau 
on aristocracy does show that 1) the notion of aristocracy 
can be— as it is in the case of our lovers— an obstacle to 
true love and, thus, to happiness; and 2) the foundations 
of the institution are philosophically tenuous. Here, then, 
Rousseau's political and romantic theories complement each 
other.
Claire advises that Bomston be sent away, for he, in 
trying to be of assistance, is damning the cause of Julie 
and Saint-Preux.
Julie writes Claire of the aftermath, in Julie's 
household, of the argument in Letter LXII. Baron d'Etange 
blames Julie for this idea of her marrying Saint-Preux, and 
his fury reaches such proportions that he begins to beat 
Julie mercilessly. They eventually make up, but not without 
his reminding her of the arranged marriage with Wolmar and 
not without his forbidding her to ever see or speak to 
Saint-Preux again. At this point, Rousseau allows himself 
a well-placed political comment: "Ah, my cousin, what
infernal monsters are these prejudices, which deprave the 
best hearts and silence nature at every moment?" (177) 
Here, Rousseau explicitly enjoins the question of the 
relationship between political order and (love and)
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happiness. Not only does Julie suffer physical abuse, but 
she must also live torn between her family and her lover. 
Her emotions are so contradictory that she lives in "A sort 
of hebetude which makes my soul almost insensible and leaves 
me the usage neither of the passions nor the reason." (145) 
She is dehumanized! Such is the denaturing effect of the 
enforced prejudices of aristocracy. Julie does not even 
know whether to hope or to resign herself and her lover to 
the compensations of love.
She closes with a post scriptum in which she suggests 
that the fall suffered at the hands of her father might have 
caused a miscarriage.
In the brief Letter LXIV, from Claire to M. D'Orbe, her 
husband to be, Claire merely solicits his assistance in the 
task of separating Julie and Saint-Preux. She does, 
however, draw a distinction which appears of growing 
importance in the analysis of the nature of happiness as 
regards the two lovers.
However successful M. D'Orbe might be in winning 
Claire's esteem, friendship, and even "more tender 
sentiments," he should not delude himself— "as a woman I am 
a kind of monster, and, I know not by what peculiarity of 
nature, for me friendship outweighs love. When I tell you 
that Julie is dearer to me than you, you only laugh, and yet 
nothing is more true." (179)
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And Claire must call upon her friendship for Saint- 
Preux, friend of her friend, for courage in executing the 
unnatural act of sending Saint-Preux away from his love: 
"Oh divine friendship! the only idol of my heart! Come 
inspire my hand with your pious cruelty. Give me the 
courage to be barbarous." (179) This Machiavellian theme of 
the necessity of performing barbarous acts is modified here 
by a contingent necessity— depending on the prejudice and 
stupidity of the aristocratic institution. Whereas 
Machiavelli sees the necessity for cruelty, Rousseau sees 
that necessity itself as man-made. This may be another way 
of saying that Rousseau is, fundamentally, utopian.
Claire describes to Julie the scene during which Saint- 
Preux is told that he must leave town and, of course, Julie. 
Though she does not believe much in "verbose philosophy," 
Claire instructs Lord Bomston to prepare Saint-Preux with 
some stoic philosophizing— such as: One's own happiness is
within one's own power. Whatever his subliminal 
preparation, the ordeal is frightful and pitiful for Saint- 
Preux and, it may be said, meant to affect the reader into 
a veritable hatred for the institution responsible. 
Romanticism meets where "true love" and true merit (of that 
love) meet— where there is no artificiality, political or 
otherwise.
Nonetheless, removing the political obstacles to 
happiness would only be a first step to realizing happiness.
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If the pitfalls to happiness are writ large in society and 
if their resolution seems obvious, the road to happiness on 
an individual level— between two lovers, for example--must 
always be purified and perfected, as Julie was attempting to 
do throughout Part I of the novel. Even if the only 
challenge to the lovers was to love one another, it would 
still be a challenge, and maybe a greater challenge than 
otherwise. Whether there are any obstacles to happiness, 
which are not ultimately socio-political defects, only begs 
the question, since humankind must ultimately "leave" the 
socio-political in order to be happy— whether romantically, 
solitarily, spiritually. To the extent that humankind is 
happy under the regime of The Social Contract, it is not 
acting and living as a political species, but as a 
collective individual.
A provisional summary of Part I: Happiness emerges as
the underlying theme of the work. How happiness is attained 
is more ambiguous. The primary question might be, Is 
happiness more readily attainable through love or through 
friendship? Attributes of love would be passion and motion; 
those of friendship would be virtue and rest. Honor and 
courage seem necessary to both, unless we are to split them 
up and say that honor regards friendship and courage regards 
love. This is another way of asking whether the way to 
happiness is through the public or through the private modes
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of existence. It cannot be ruled out that Rousseau is 
"creating" a tertiary mode of being, as a new dispensation.
In any case, most of the elements of the romance and 
its resolution appear, at least, in Part I: love versus
virtue; passion versus happiness; imagination versus 
restraint; Platonism; courtly love; the happiness test; love 
versus friendship; and motion versus rest. These and other 
themes, including that of the pleasure found in doing of 
good works, will be pursued by our author in Parts II 
through VI. In a sense, we shall end where we have begun—  
only more simply and more aware.
CHAPTER 5 THE LETTERS OF THE SEPARATION
With Part I ends the actual love affair, though the
lovers are not aware of or resigned to that fact. Though
they maintain hope, Part II does begin as the lovers'
attempt to understand their love and to understand how it
might subsist unfulfilled. And such meditations naturally
entail consideration of the nature of happiness, for the
link between love and happiness will be questioned but never
totally dissolved.
Part II
Now separated from Julie, Saint-Preux questions the
very value of happiness, but also questions the value of
life without it. "It was better to have never tasted
felicity than to have tasted it and lost it." (11,1,190) If
he had never known happiness, he might still have reason,
virtue, and sense of duty. As it is, he is a deranged fool
with nothing— not even courage, or so he writes. Then he
recants all those doubts. "I prefer the pleasures which are
in my memory and the regrets which rend my soul to ever
being happy without my Julie." He expresses the morality of
love and its invincibility— both foundations of happiness
but independent of happiness.
If I am dead to happiness I am not at all to love 
which makes me worthy of it. This love is 
invincible like the charm which gave it birth.
It is based on the unshakable foundation of merit 
and of the virtues; it cannot perish in an 
immortal soul; it no longer needs hope as a
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support, and the past gives it powers for an 
eternal future. (190)
But, then again, Saint-Preux falls from these lofty heights
of assurance back into despair, but not before questioning
the eudaemonism of his thought. Is happiness the goal of
man; or is it love?1
If we shall ever become sure that the lovers have
resigned themselves to unfulfilled love, we shall have had
an indication that they have accepted this (Kantian) view of
happiness— something to be worthy of, though not necessarily
attained. And will one of the lovers resign herself or
himself and not the other? It should be remembered that to
maintain the eudaemonistic orientation does not mean being
hopeful of fulfilled happiness— it means only the nurturing
of the passion for it.
From this letter which prefigures Kant, we move to a
letter by Lord Bomston; he more than anyone else represents
a sort of political virtue which is embodied in his
statement that "Every man is always master of his life."
(11,11,193) Praising Saint-Preux's qualities, Bomston— in
fine rationalistic fashion— all but says that Saint-Preux's
salvation is that he is a potential philosopher: "sublime
reason is only attained through the same vigor of soul which
gives rise to great passions, and philosophy is not worthily
*Of course, Kant would say that it is duty that makes us worthy of happiness.
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served except with the same fire that one feels for a 
mistress." (193) Is love, as a sort of source of 
philosophy, superior to philosophy; or is philosophy, as a 
sort of end of love, not superior to love? Bomston's whole 
presentation argues for the latter.2 He is concerned for 
the couple, not for the sake of their love, but for the sake 
of justice and order which require that everyone be put to 
the best personal and social use. And they were made for 
love! Happy coincidence! They are meant to be an example 
to the world. But this dictate of nature3 is thwarted by 
"an absurd prejudice." The conjugal tie is subject neither 
to sovereign power nor to parental authority. The political 
Bomston is again attacking society in the name of society.4 
(There is a curious gestalt at this point: We have, on the
one hand, two lovers suffering the pains and even suicidal 
distress of separation; on the other hand, we find Lord 
Bomston pleading their case in a most rationalistic and
2See PC.II. page 193, n. 1 for a brief discussion of 
the value of love.
3"These two beautiful souls left nature's hand made for 
each other." Cf. Emile, opening sentence, Allan Bloom 
translation (New York: Basic Books, 1979), P. 37:
"Everything is good as it leaves the hands of the Author of 
things; everything degenerates in the hands of man."
4Man is the cause of his own unhappiness, but is he the 
cause of his happiness? From Letter XXIV (penultimate 
paragraph) we see that chance plays an enormous role in the 
calculus of free and natural happiness between two lovers. 
Beyond certain macrocosmic reforms, it becomes almost 
academic to contend that Rousseau even theoretically claimed 
that social engineering would solve all human problems.
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political manner. We may surmise that Rousseau is 
juxtaposing two— ultimately distinct?— realms of existence: 
the private and the public.)
Bomston, by arguing for freedom in the marriage 
process, says that "character and temperament,,5~natural 
attributes— make for happiness or unhappiness in the married 
life. And, some lines below, he calls for merit and choice 
as the true principles of marriage and "social order." 
Nonetheless, he does allow society (the paternal order) some 
macrocosmic role: the father should be able to inform the
daughter if her boyfriend is a complete fool. Is Rousseau 
then allowing to society a role as censor? It seems so. 
Nature must function within certain frontiers— not unlike 
the fundamental educative principle of Emile.
A reasonable match must be joined to the absence of 
obstacles or prejudices to combat. Julie and Saint-Preux, 
in spite of being driven by love, are a reasonable match. 
But there is still a problem: What if reason and passion do
not coincide, as they fortunately do with our couple? 
Bomston implies that if love is prevailing over reason in an 
affair, then "nature has already chosen." We seem to be 
left, for Bomston's part, with the best of the worst, though 
he does not explicitly say so.
5See page 372 where Julie, after her conversion to 
marriage and society, also speaks of "characters and 
humours" as being more important for marriage than other things, such as love.
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Such is the sacred law of nature [love] that it is not permitted to man to transgress, which he 
will never transgress with impunity, and which 
consideration for positions and ranks can repeal 
only at the cost of unhappiness and crime. (195)
Reason must bow to love, according to Bomston, because to do
otherwise would be disastrous— not because love is a more
sublime principle than reason. "Happy are those whom love
unites as reason would have done and who have no obstacles
to surmount or prejudices to combat." The ideal, for Lord
Bomston, is reason.
There is an irony that exists between what Bomston says
about the inviolability of the sacred law of nature— love—
and his ongoing action of distancing Saint-Preux from Julie.
So a second order of unnatural and unjust actions is being
undertaken in reaction to the first order "evil" of Julie's
father. This little drama is a demonstration of just how
rapidly the good things of nature (in our case, love) can
degenerate under human hands. For example, Saint-Preux has
all but become mentally deranged. He has (temporarily) lost
his humanity to a prejudice.
The nature of love, and consequently the nature of
nature, undergoes some scrutiny in this time of trouble and
separation for the lovers. Bomston has an ambivalent
attitude or idea of love; he seems to stand in awe of it,
but, perhaps like an ancient Greek, he views it as a sort of
illness (as he says, "corrosive acid") which has progressed
too far in the noble hearts of Julie and Saint-Preux. He
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offers them an estate in England where they might live out 
their "true happiness." They are beyond repair, one might 
say. (II,III)
Even when love is viewed as a true expression of 
nature, it is seen in conflict with other aspects of nature. 
In dire straits, Julie describes herself as being between 
love and nature. And nature must be read to mean family or 
"blood." (II,IV) Whatever course she takes— choosing love 
or family— Julie sees herself as condemned to unhappiness 
and guilt. Claire confirms this view of reality as
conflicted and disharmonious: "in this case, whatever
course you take, nature both authorizes and condemns it, 
reason both blames and approves it, duty either is silent or 
contradicts itself." (II,V,203) Asked for her advice, 
Claire refuses, saying that reason itself imposes silence on 
her and that the only rule to follow here is for Julie to 
listen to her own inclination. There is, then, more than 
one nature, and irreconcilable conflicts result.
This questioning of nature is radicalized when Claire, 
speaking of her fiance, asks, "Does the soul have a sex?" 
Earlier, Saint-Preux had, in effect, answered that it did. 
Here, Claire doubts it. This Platonic-like question, 
dropped in passing, so to speak, signals the preoccupation 
of the remainder of the novel: How is love to survive
outside of physical union?
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Whereas, in Part I, a strong and direct relationship 
was established between love and happiness, in Part II that 
simplistic relationship begins to break down as the disunity 
of nature begins to show itself. Julie declines Bomston's 
offer of an idyllic retirement estate; she says: "[Your
offer] is a great deal for love; is it enough for 
happiness?" (II,VI) There was a time for Julie when there 
was no difference. But shame— even in love— disallows 
happiness.
In II,IV, Julie spoke of the conflict between love and 
nature, with family playing the role of nature. Now 
(II,VI), she speaks as if love were the reflection of 
nature: "when before has virtue thus had to balance the
rights of blood and of nature?" Now, love and family seem 
to be of equal value in the heart of Julie. The ascendancy 
of the family bond grew as it was being threatened, not 
unlike the growth in the status of passionate love in Part 
I. It is as if nature, when endangered from whichever side, 
moves to protect itself.6
But what of our other lover? After the separation, 
Saint-Preux engages in immature, despicable, and ultimately
6For a discussion, within the context of Rousseau's 
Confessions, of this diversity or incoherence of human 
nature, see Samuel S. B. Taylor, "Rousseau's Romanticism" in 
Reappraisals of Rousseau, S. Harvey et al., ed. (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1980), pp. 16-17. He refers to 
this apprehension of nature as the first move "towards 
Baudelaire's discovery of the beauty of the taboo."
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delusional behavior (See Letters II,VII,VIII,IX and X).
Julie's training of him into maturity did not withstand the
violence of his separation from her. Eventually recognizing
the weakness of his character, Saint-Preux seems to
attribute it to his upbringing in philosophy. He professes
to Claire in a passing manner a conversion from philosophy
to, it seems, love:
Speak to me no more of philosophy! I scorn that 
deceiving show which consists only in empty 
words; that phantom which is only a shadow, which 
stirs us to defy passions at a distance and which 
leaves us like a blustering bully at their 
approach. (220)
In the following paragraph, Saint-Preux gives substance to
his conversion: "Chaste love and sublime friendship will
restore the courage that a cowardly despair was ready to
take from me." (220) So, love and friendship replace
philosophy as ruling principles of his life.
From this letter in which philosophy is rejected as a
way of life, we come to a restatement of the relationship of
philosophy to happiness and find that Plato, not the Stoics,
represents the proper way. Letter XI represents Julie's
farewell and final counsel to her beloved; we can only
expect a letter of substance. Even her short counsel—
"Never forsake virtue, and never forget your Julie"— may be
read as an intended reconciliation of nature (Julie/love)
and society (virtue) . It is a call to the impossible: the
reconciliation of duty and inclination. Only if we contrive
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to make duty the object of our love is any sort of
reconciliation possible; and Julie will eulogize several
ancients who did just that. But, first, Julie dismisses
rationalist philosophy and calls on Saint-Preux to return to
the depths of his soul.
[I]t is there that you will always rediscover the 
source of that sacred fire that so many times 
embraced us with the love of sublime virtues; it 
is there that you will see that eternal
simulacrum of true beauty the contemplation of 
which enlivens us with a holy enthusiasm, and 
which our passions defy incessantly without ever 
being able to efface it. (223)
At this moment, Rousseau injects one of his Editor's
Footnotes. He writes: "The true philosophy of lovers is
that of Plato; while the spell lasts, they never have
another. A man who is moved cannot forsake this
philosopher; a reader who is cold cannot endure him."
How seriously do we take this footnote of Rousseau's?
Whatever the ultimate answer, it is definite that in this
Letter XI, Julie goes to some effort to offer a Platonic
interpretation of happiness and love. For one, Socrates is
grouped with Brutus, Regulus, and Cato, as examples of
beauty which does not perish— as examples of a "divine
model" which everyone carries within himself.
Secondly, Julie asks, "if the true pleasure of the soul
is in the contemplation of the beautiful, how can the evil
man love it in others without being forced to hate himself?"
(224) One might ask at this point: Can we be the object of
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our own love? That is, if man can be happy by contemplating
the "divine model" of the beautiful within himself, might he
not be self-sufficient? Julie seems to have this question
in mind when she writes the following.
[T]he source of happiness is not totally in the 
desired object nor in the heart which possesses 
it, but in the relationship of one and the other, 
and . . .  as all the objects of our desires are 
not capable of producing felicity, all the states 
of the heart are not capable of feeling it. If 
the purest soul is not alone sufficient to its 
own happiness, it is surer still that all the 
delights of the earth would not be able to make 
[happy] a depraved heart; because there is on 
both sides a necessary preparation, a certain 
coming-together from which comes this precious 
sentiment sought after by all sensitive beings, 
and always ignored by the false sage who limits 
himself to the pleasure of the moment in the 
place of knowing a durable happiness. (225)
When read in conjunction with Julie's letter, Rousseau's
footnote seems to be making the following point: For
lovers, love is the quest of the beautiful; and happiness
must consist in the courage to continue that pursuit in
spite of obstacles. "[W]ould it not be better to cease to
be than to exist without feeling anything?" (226)
Whereas Saint-Preux had, in Letter X, totally rejected
philosophy in the name of love and friendship, Julie
demonstrates to Saint-Preux that there is a philosophy which
is the very essence of love and friendship. One may
tentatively conclude that Julie rejects the rationalism and
self-sufficiency of Stoicism, for the essence of life is to
feel— to love. And Rousseau understands Julie to be talking
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about Plato; for that is the significance of his Editor's 
Footnote.
But this Plato is interpreted in the most fatalistic
and romantic of ways, if we are to take Saint-Preux's
formulations of their love as being consistent with the
formulations of Julie. That is to say, in the context of
discussing the happiness surrounding Claire's marriage to M.
d'Orbe, Saint-Preux writes to Julie of their contrastingly
tortured love (II,XVI,245):
[T]he powerful transports of two hearts toward 
each other always have a secret (sensual) 
pleasure unknown to tranquil souls. It is one of 
the miracles of love to make us find pleasure in 
suffering; and we would regard as the worst of 
misfortunes a state of indifference and oblivion 
which robbed us of all the feelings of our 
misery.
The above is not a gratuitous masochism, but rather an 
indication of the role of the obstacle (to love) within the 
passion myth as set forth by Rougement. The totally 
satisfied love dissipates totally its passion. But Saint- 
Preux takes the interdependence of lover and beloved 
further— to a sort of Platonic sublimation of passion and to 
its relation to happiness: "like the divinity draws all its
happiness from itself, hearts warmed by a heavenly fire find 
within their own feelings a sort of pure and delicious 
enjoyment, independent of fortune and of the rest of the 
universe."
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So, the union of two souls makes it god-like or self- 
sufficient. Over-riding all notions in the above citations 
is the concept of independence and sufficiency of the two 
loving selves. For, as Saint-Preux had said in the previous 
Letter XV, "we shall be united in spite of our separation; 
we shall be happy despite fate." (236) But this is not the 
god-like Stoic happiness of the lone individual (impossible 
according to Julie); it is, rather, the happiness of the 
couple.
It is fair to ask if Rousseau is here speaking of love 
in his own name, or whether he is creating (or recreating) 
and propagating an ethos or ethic of love which he thinks 
salutary. And will the course of the novel retract, in 
effect, these romantic notions? And, of course, since the 
question of de Rougement's passion myth has been brought 
into the discussion, will Rousseau find a resolution to the 
passion myth? De Rougement notes that, unlike the pure 
myth, The New Heloise ends in a conventional marriage— at 
least for Julie. Whether or not that marriage dissolved the 
passion is more problematic, as any reader of the novel may 
surmise from Julie's deathbed admission of continuing love 
for Saint-Preux. Nonetheless, it should be clear by now 
that the social obstacles to union of the lovers, though 
important for an exposition of Rousseau's socio-political 
observations, serve ultimately as a context within which the
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romantic myth of unfulfilled love is explored and
expounded.7
Part III
The discovery by Julie's mother of her daughter's cache 
of love letters radically twists the fate of the young 
couple. Julie, the essence of the good daughter, grieved 
over the pain she has caused her bed-ridden mother, becomes 
the ghost of herself. Claire writes Saint-Preux, insisting 
that he cease causing such misery and that he renounce Julie 
forever.
He writes back to Madame d'Etange an impassioned letter 
of contrition and a promise to neither see nor write to 
Julie as long as the mother requires. Saint-Preux claims 
that he is able to "break the sweetest, the purest, the 
holiest tie that has ever united two hearts," because, in 
effect, "Julie has taught me too well how one must sacrifice
7The remaining Letters XVII-XXVIII of Part II of the 
novel seem to be of marginal value to the topic of 
happiness. I would only comment that Letter XVII, the 
central letter of the work, contains a sort of epistemology 
of the difficulties of studying the world. That it is 
reminiscent of Plato's Allegory of the Ship of State is 
interesting; but more interesting would be to apply the 
lessons of the difficulty of studying the world to the 
difficulties of studying love (and happiness). And one 
might also wish to evaluate Saint-Preux since his 
renunciation of philosophy as his guiding principle. 
Whether there is a relation seems impossible to determine, 
but the fact that he falls in with some prostitutes would 
seem to some highly unphilosophic. He is, however, 
functioning: he is writing long letters on Parisian life
and the Parisians themselves home to Julie, and letters on French politics to Lord Bomston.
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happiness to duty." (111,11,311) If happiness represents 
the reconciliation of duty and passion, it is evident that 
the present situation called for a sacrifice of passion or 
inclination. In fact, Saint-Preux says that he has learned 
"that cruel art of conquering love" from Julie. So, it is 
love itself that had to be sacrificed to duty, and, though 
he wishes that happiness be restored to Julie, it is, 
according to our notion of happiness, impossible. Fate has 
decreed that love and virtue would not coincide in the life 
of Julie and Saint-Preux. If, in fact, fate ever so 
generously obliges, if de Rougement is right about the 
passion myth, the love and faltering happiness would never 
be so (bitter) sweet as that of our couple. That is another 
way of saying that without the obstacles to love there is no 
love story . . . and no love.
Along with his letter to Julie's mother, Saint-Preux 
wrote an accompanying letter to Claire, the "cruel one." In 
that letter, it is as if Rousseau wanted to show his reader 
the rabid nihilism of unbridled romantic love. Saint-Preux 
justifies sacrificing all of humanity to his love alone. 
"Ah, what is a mother's life, what is my own, yours, even 
hers, what is the existence of the whole world next to the 
delightful sentiment which united us?" (111,111,312) 
Threatening a sort of suicide of his human nature, Saint- 
Preux concludes this most bitter message to Claire with: 
"it is better to renounce humanity." (313)
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What has Rousseau just done with those Janus letters? 
He has from the same envelope shown us two faces of the 
passionate lover. The one sacrificing himself for another; 
the other, willing the sacrifice of all of humanity for his 
love. If there were ever any questions about the easy 
acceptance of romantic love by Rousseau, they should be put 
to rest. One might even argue that the general intent of 
The New Heloise is to bridle romantic love with an ethic, 
but with an ethic suitable and acceptable to itself.
Claire understands the extremes of Saint-Preux7s anger 
and despair; she writes to compliment him on choosing the 
prudent course of virtue, as opposed to the course of love. 
She writes: "you have a hundred times proved to us that
there is no road to happiness more sure than that of
virtue." She follows by implying that love is a bad gamble: 
"If one succeeds, the happiness is purer, sounder, and
sweeter because of virtue; if one fails, virtue alone can be 
the compensation." (Ill,IV,314) The logic of Claire's 
reasoning seems tenuous, even bogus; virtue is always— win 
or lose— the winner over the course of love. What would the 
practical Claire say that love has to offer, even as an 
outside bet? Probably nothing, for, as we remember, she
chooses friendship over love. She is one character whose 
character is unchanging.
From the death of Madame d'Etange until the marriage of 
Julie to Wolmar, the exchanges of letters possess the
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character of desperation. Blaming Saint-Preux for her
mother's death, Julie venomously and dramatically announces
that death to Saint-Preux, as well as the end of their love:
"It is done: the empire of love is extinguished in a soul
given over to despair." (Ill,V,316) And she bids him
"Adieu." As we shall see, through to the end of the story,
the empire of love never abandons Julie. The irony of her
statement of the death of love is total.
Now in a passionate rage, Saint-Preux writes Claire of
his loss of Julie, but he is convinced that she cannot be
happy without him.
Love the conquering was the misfortune of her 
life; love conquered will only give her more 
suffering. She will pass her days in sorrow, 
tormented at the same time by empty regrets and 
empty desires, unable ever to satisfy either love 
or virtue. (Ill,VI,318)
Here we have the image of disunified man, mentioned in
Chapter I of this study: "Always in contradiction with
himself, always floating between his inclination and his
duties, he will never be either man or citizen. . . .  He
will be nothing." (Emile I 40) Rousseau more than intimates
here that what he has been talking about all along in this
novel is not only love and virtue, but nature and society,
man and citizen. From Claire's Letter IV we learned that
love and virtue were two different roads to happiness; but
might we not ask if happiness is less generic and rather a
pole of the dichotomy: happiness-duty. That is what Kant
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would like to do with Rousseau: that is, make happiness a
means to a way of life. I think, rather, that for Rousseau 
happiness is the end of man, though the morphology of 
happiness might vary and require mostly psychic unity only.
To continue with the letter. Saint-Preux gives Julie 
over to Claire— that is, to "holy friendship." (318) And he 
hopes that with Claire Julie will be able to recover "her 
original virtues, her original happiness." (318) It is as 
if leaving the state of first love is equivalent to leaving 
a sort of state of nature. He is hoping, in effect, that 
she regain some form of psychic unity or innocence, taken 
from her not so much by love as by the failure of love. He 
wishes for her to be something and not nothing. He wishes 
her to return to her metaphorical state of nature, in which 
she was authentically and wholly virtuous.
Claire responds in reconciliation and love. She thanks 
him for teaching Julie and her to think, as they taught him 
to feel. She assures him that Julie and he were not 
responsible for Madame d'Etange's death. Then Claire, as an 
outsider to love, surmises from what Julie and he have told 
her that
If love is a desire which is enflamed by 
obstacles, as you were still saying, it is not 
good that it be content; it is better that it 
last and be unhappy than that it extinguish 
itself in the bosom of pleasure. Your (love) 
fire, I swear, has stood the test of possession, 
of time, of absence and of sufferings of all 
kind; it has conquered all obstacles except for 
the most powerful of all, which is to no longer
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have anything to vanquish, and to nourish itself 
solely from itself. The universe has never seen 
a passion stand up to that test; what right did 
you have to hope that yours would? (111,711,320)
Claire's observations are within the strict anatomy of the
passion myth. As with Tristan and Iseult, separation and
pain represent not the death but the life— even the
resurrection— of Julie's and Saint-Preux's love. All this
seems quite fatalistic, and one is compelled to ask if there
might not be the possibility of a happy issue to such a
passion. Strictly speaking, no, but there is the
possibility of indefinitely sustaining the love. It is then
as if cruel fate were the only salvation of the passion.
But could one not ritualize the sustenance of the passion,
as in the courtly love tradition? In any case, the above
observations by Claire on the "fires of love" do much to
substantiate de Rougement's contention that Rousseau was
writing within the tradition of the ancient passion myth.
After receiving a note from Julie and her father,
Saint-Preux, of course much against his will, sends a brief
sentence back to the Baron, by which he restores to Julie
her freedom. Another letter from Julie immediately follows:
She was forced to ask for her freedom; she still loves him;
and she bids him another last adieu. So, the obstacle— the
Baron— has done his work for the fires of love. If not
happiness, then the chance of happiness is sustained.
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The storyline develops with Julie contracting smallpox 
and Saint-Preux, alerted by one of her letters, travelling 
from Paris to see her, which he does when Julie, on her 
sickbed, is only semi-conscious. Claire finally admits to 
Julie that her dream of seeing her lover at her bedside was, 
in fact, reality. The illness and the long road of 
obstacles to their love turn Julie to a course of submissive 
resolution.
In Letter XV, Julie, surrendering to love, confesses to 
being "tired of serving a chimerical virtue at the expense 
of justice." (334) She resigns herself and her love to him 
forever, for he has the "legitimate" claim to her 
affections. And that claim is of nature: "Nature, ah sweet
nature, resume all your rights! I abjure the barbarous 
virtues which annihilate them." (335) She goes on to oppose 
nature to reason which has often misled her. But Julie is 
in the process of giving all and, therefore, in a sense, 
nothing. "[L)et not the rights of blood and friendship be 
extinguished by those of love." (335) The dichotomy of 
nature-society, passion-virtue, love-blood, has been 
extended into a triad: love-blood-friendship. It seems
that friendship (with Claire) represents what is often 
called partial association, a surrogate for actual political 
and civic association. So, nature has been divided into 
love and blood.
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When all is said and done, Julie refuses to choose 
between the demands of the various orders of life. She will 
love her lover forever; and she will not abandon her father 
or her dear cousin. This is perhaps Julie's attempt to 
preserve her psychic unity, her very identity. She is 
fighting the harsh realities of life with the acceptance, 
resignation, and all-encompassing embrace of a buddhistic 
quietism.
Duty, honor, virtue, all that no longer speaks to 
me; but yet I am not a monster; I am weak and not 
denatured. My decision is made; I do not want to 
sadden any of those I love. Let a father, slave 
to his word and jealous of an empty title, 
dispose of my hand as he has promised; let love 
alone dispose of my heart; let my tears not cease 
to flow into the bosom of a tender friend. Let 
me be vile and unhappy; but let all who are dear 
to me be happy and content if it is possible.
The three of you constitute my only existence, 
and may your happiness make me forget my misery 
and my despair. (335)
Julie is pretending to live life on her and not life's
terms, for her course is impracticable, lacking reality, and
even benevolently nihilistic. In effect, Julie is saying
that, by rights, she should not have to choose between
lover, father, and friend. Therefore, she will not choose!
She is here a utopian, for the utopian does not seek, in
strict terms, what is impossible, but rather what could be,
if only . . . Her way of dealing with the de facto
impossible is to do the impossible.
And what is Saint-Preux's reply to this strange letter
from Julie? He regards her profession of love as a partial
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victory, but knows that Julie's utopian resolution could
\
never satisfy him. He admits that remaining to their
relationship is only love (and sorrow), but that would be
enough for him if only Julie would be realistic.
Alas, a heart less pure would not have led you so 
astray! Yes, it is the integrity of yours which 
causes us to be lost; the upright feelings of 
which it is full have chased out wisdom. You 
wanted to reconcile filial tenderness with 
indomitable love; in giving yourself over at the 
same time to all your propensities, you confuse 
them instead of harmonizing them and you become 
guilty because of virtues. . . . you deserve
esteem because of your faults. (Ill,XVI,336)
Later in the same letter, he is more succinct, if still
enigmatic, about what would be the nature of their fulfilled
love: "Well then, we shall be guilty, but we shall not be
evil; we shall be guilty, but we shall always love virtue."
(338)
There is much to discuss in this letter, for it not 
only adumbrates a paradoxical ethic of love, it also— by 
omission— draws attention to friendship as one of the 
central propensities of human life. First, the latter 
point: Julie had written Saint-Preux that she was resigned
to sharing her life as best she knew how between lover, 
father (and his choice of husband for her), and friend. 
When writing of her "penchants" in his response to Julie, 
Saint-Preux mentions only blood and love. Apparently, he 
does not see the friend Claire as a threat. But should he 
not see friendship as a threat or at least as an alternative
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to passionate love? (Remember Claire's announcement to M. 
d'Orbe that she would always love Julie more than him.) 
This neglect of friendship represents a portent of things to 
come. It is friendship that constitutes the partial 
association— the closest association, except for that of the 
farm hands at Clarens, to the purely political that we have 
any sustained contact with throughout the novel.
One might say that this lover is so caught up in his 
love that he can entertain only the intense demands of 
nature: blood or erotic love. Julie, on the other hand,
underwent a catharsis, caused by the diverse and 
irrepressible demands being made on her heart and soul. In 
a very meaningful sense, the strongest of the two was the 
first to "fall." And her collapse made her existentially 
aware of the necessity of respecting all the propensities: 
love, blood, friendship. Julie is preparing for her entry 
into society.
If Julie was utopian in her resignation, Saint-Preux 
was idealistic. Though his love was more than an idea, its 
fulfillment was not— not as long as the indomitable father 
was there to object or, if necessary, to kill him. Saint- 
Preux wants them to live out the myth in the most dramatic 
way: dying together on some metaphorical island. He is
resolutely— and will remain so throughout— apolitical. He 
remains vertically oriented, whereas Julie, in effect, 
accepts an equality among the propensities.
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A brief note from Claire, or rather from the now Madame 
d'Orbe, informs Saint-Preux that "Your lover is no longer, 
but I have recovered my friend. . . . Julie is married. . . 
. Now is the time when I shall learn if . . . your heart is 
sensitive to a pure and disinterested friendship." 
(Ill,XVII,339) The importance of friendship then becomes, 
not as an alternative to love, but as a substitute for it. 
Friendship, even during the early days of their love and 
happiness, represents a sublimation of love, whereas 
marriage, according to the passion myth, is its death, its 
complete resolution.
One of the most important letters of the novel follows 
this note from Claire. Letter XVIII (25 pages) of Part III 
is from Julie and is described by the Pleiade editors (340, 
n. 1) as being composed of three large parts: 1) A resume
and examination of their past together; 2) A moral 
meditation containing a description of her marriage and 
conversion, followed by a religious meditation and a prayer; 
and 3) Reflections on the necessity of conjugal fidelity 
and the evils of adultery, followed by some personal 
considerations.
I would go further and say that this letter, among what 
the Pleiade editors propose, is a document of allusions
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which tell us much about the general nature of the Julie; ou 
la Nouvelle Heloise.8
With the general outline of the letter in mind, let us 
examine segments of interest to the topics of this study:
1) Julie tells Saint-Preux how it came to pass that 
she consented to marry Wolmar. At one point, "the wailing 
voice of nature [the loss of her mother due, as Julie 
thought, to her discovered love affair] muffled the murmurs 
of love." She was resolved to renounce Saint-Preux; but she 
regained her strength, so to speak, and, for the first time 
in her life, stood up to her father in opposing the 
marriage. Her father fell, crying, to his knees. At her 
feet, he pleads. We learn that between the time the Baron 
had promised his daughter to Wolmar and the present time, 
Wolmar, because of a revolution in his homeland, has lost 
almost everything. If the Baron refused him Julie now, it 
would appear that it was because Wolmar was now penniless. 
It is now not only a question of her duty but of his honor; 
"honor has spoken, and, coming from the blood that you do,
8Speaking in the most general terms, Julie, in this 
letter, embraces marriage to Wolmar and requires that her 
former lover sublimate his passion for her into a dear 
friendship; moreover, Julie takes the high ground, a 
religious pose, and speaks with utter confidence and 
assurance. It is only natural to compare this self- 
assurance with Julie's deathbed admission that she was never 
able to overcome her love for Saint-Preux. The importance 
of this comparison is not in what it says about Julie (We 
know that she is an exceptional person!), but in what it 
says about the religious faith that she embraced 
simultaneously with her liberation from her passion.
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It is always [honor] which decides." (350) Julie has to
write asking that Saint-Preux release her from any promises,
for, even according to the Baron, such promises are a matter
honor. Julie falls ill; later Saint-Preux visits her, and,
when Julie realizes that his visit was not a dream and that
Saint-Preux had in fact inoculated himself of smallpox by
kissing her hand, her love for him revives. As she writes,
I saw that I had to love in spite of myself; I 
felt that I had to be guilty; that I was able to 
resist neither my father nor my lover, and that I 
would never reconcile the rights of love and 
those of blood except at the expense of integrity 
[honnetete]. (351)
So now we see that it was radical acts of solicitude by both
her father and her lover that led her to the sort of
paralysis that we saw in Letter XV. Strictly speaking, the
tension was created by her father's "honor" and by her
lover's risking his life because of love for her. She felt
responsible for both and therefore decided to accommodate
both in the only way she saw possible. She was aware that
being all things to all people would not secure happiness
for her, but she had hoped that it would assist her loved
ones. (It is ironic to note that passionate love has no
ceremonial closure; and that might be why Julie chose to
marry Wolmar and not merely stay with Saint-Preux.)
2) The central portion of this central letter contains
the account of Julie's marriage and religious conversion.
Having arrived at the Church, I felt on entering 
a sort of emotion that I had never experienced. .
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. . A sudden fright made me shiver . . .  I felt 
my anxiety increase during the ceremony . . .  I 
believed I saw the instrument of providence and 
heard the voice of God in the minister . . .
everything made upon me such an impression that I 
believed I felt internally an unexpected upheaval 
[revolution] . . . All of a sudden an unknown 
power seemed to correct the disorder of my 
affections and reestablish them according to the 
law of duty and of nature. (353-54)
When asked if she would promise obedience and fidelity, she
writes to her former lover that her mouth and her heart
promised it; and "I will hold to it until death." (354) So,
it took a religious conversion to reconcile duty and nature,
irreconcilable on a naturalistic plane.
As far as their relationship is concerned, Julie claims
that she feels for Saint-Preux as much, if not more, love
than before, but she can feel that love now without
blushing. But it is her conversion that she seems more
concerned with: "I believed I felt myself being reborn; I
believed I was beginning another life. . . . Sweet and
consoling virtue, I rebegin life for you. . . . Ah, I have
learned too well what it cost to lose you to abandon you a
second time!" (355) It took a miracle of sorts but it seems
Julie has returned to her former state of virtue— shall we
say, innocence or nature. Has Julie in fact "recovered her
former virtues, her former happiness," as Saint-Preux wished
for her (III,VI), or is this a quasi-recovery— a further
removal in fact from her original state?
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We are approaching what is for Rousseau a fundamental 
political and human question: To what extent can a person
(or humankind) regain lost innocence, and how? And, if 
regained, how secure is it? In the Letter XVIII Rousseau 
offers some indications of what is happening to Julie.
3) The religious nature of this letter cannot be 
overemphasized, even though this analysis abstracts from it 
exceedingly and gives undue weight to its small 
philosophical content. It is unclear what Julie means by 
her "interior principle"— whether its source is purely 
religious or whether it is philosophical. She says that, 
before her conversion, she was devout at Church and a 
philosopher at home. So she has found a unifying principle 
of both thought and action. (357) Reminiscent of much 
earlier Platonic letters, Julie writes: "Only if the
character and love of the beautiful be imprinted by nature 
in the depths of my soul, I shall have my rule as long as it 
[the beautiful] is not disfigured." Her guide is the 
beautiful. But how do we preserve the integrity of the 
beautiful in a world of changing tastes and prejudices, 
Julie asks? Her answer is facile: "Everything that you
cannot separate from the idea of this [infinite] essence is 
God; all the rest is the work of men." (358)
In fact, Julie exhorts Saint-Preux to abandon 
philosophy— empty sophisms of a reason that relies only on 
itself. The nature of the attacks on philosophy make it
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clear that she is attacking a way of life, not just the
reliance on an academic reason. The lowering of philosophy
is the obverse of the elevation of marriage (and religion,
though not a strictly orthodox religion). In attacking
adultery, Julie writes that the adulterer, among other sins,
"violates the public and sacred faith of marriage without
which nothing in the legitimate order of human affairs can
subsist." (360) Julie, not unlike Rousseau after his
experience on the road to Vincennes, seems to be taking
responsibility for the welfare of the human species. If
this is so— if Julie's conversion is meant to be compared
with Rousseau's— some textual support should be forthcoming;
and it is. The last three pages of this letter contain the
allusions mentioned at the head of this analysis. The first
is to Heloise and Abelard; the second, to On the Social
Contract: and the last, to Emile.
Before the allusion to Heloise and Abelard, Julie has
some blunt words for Saint-Preux:
A sentiment [that is, the love they had for each
other] so perfect must not perish of itself; it
was worthy only to be immolated to virtue...
I shall tell you more. Everything has changed 
between us; it is absolutely necessary that your heart change. (363)
Then, Julie quotes his own words to him. They are from Part
I, Letter XXIV, before the love affair had progressed to
intimacy. Saint-Preux was commenting on the Letters of
Heloise and Abelard and describing Abelard as "a miserable
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creature" and a hypocrite.9 The passage quoted emphasizes
that love must maintain its integrity and especially honor.
If not, love becomes a mere "shameful business." And then
Julie seems to quote her own words, also from Part I, when
she writes: "Yes, my good and worthy friend, in order for
us to love each other forever we must renounce each other.
Let's forget all the rest and be the lover of my soul. This
idea is so sweet that it offers consolation for everything."
(364) This echoes from the time when Julie wanted a lover
for her soul, but not for her body.
It seems clear that Julie has become the "new Heloise"-
-not in the least because she, and not her lover, is the
leader into this new and virtuous life. She even speaks of
having a rule (une regie) which, in context, one might be
justified in translating as "a rule of an order."
I believe I have a surer rule . . .  I listen in 
secret to my conscience . . . and never does it 
mislead a soul who consults it sincerely. . . .
How did this fortunate change come about? I am 
unaware of it (Je 1'ignore.) (364)
So Julie has developed or has been given an infallible
conscience. How did this happen? She is ignorant of that.
This begins to sound surprisingly like the first paragraph
of Chapter One of On the Social Contract:
Man was born free, and everywhere he is in 
chains. One who believes himself the master of 
others is nonetheless a greater slave than they.
9There are only three references to Abelard in the 
novel, and this one is the most extensive and substantive.
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How did this change occur? I do not know (Je 
1'ignore). What can make it legitimate? I 
believe I can answer this question.
What Julie does know about her change from a bad to a good
conscience is that "I keenly desired it. God alone did the
rest." She continues, however, by speaking in what might
just as well be psychological categories.
I would think that a soul once corrupted would be 
so always, and would never return to the well­
being of itself; unless some sudden upheaval 
[revolution], some brusque change of fortune and 
situation suddenly changed its relations, and by 
means of a violent shock assisted it in 
recovering a good disposition. All its habits 
being broken and all its passion modified, in 
that general confusion one regains sometimes his 
primitive character and becomes like a new being 
recently out of the hands of nature. And the 
memory of his preceding baseness can serve as a 
preservative against falling again. (364)10
It was her marriage, Julie says, that made her experience
something similar. She encourages Saint-Preux to purge by
Christian morals the lessons of philosophy, for she is
convinced that "there is no happiness without virtue." She
confesses that she could never be happy if he were not
happy. He has lost a "tender lover" but has gained a
"faithful friend."
A third allusion: The first sentence of Emile reads as
follows: "Everything is good as it leaves the hands of the
Author of things; everything degenerates in the hands of
10This passage is reminiscent of conversations I have 
had with psychiatrists and psychiatric patients regarding 
the purgative and rejuvenating effects of mental breakdowns.
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nan." But, as Rousseau goes on to say in so many words, a 
deliberately half-deformed creature is better than if "a man 
were abandoned to himself in the midst of other men from 
birth." And the Emile is meant to make one "like a new 
being recently out of the hands of nature." (364)
What we are stalking is the relationship between the 
Julie and On the Social Contract and Emile, not to mention 
the Letter of Heloise and Abelard. Surely, in Letter XVIII, 
Julie has become the bride of Christ, but without 
sacrificing the married life; and that is partially what 
makes her the "new Heloise." This Letter XVIII also teaches 
us that society is almost tantamount to marriage and 
religion. In a sense, Julie left the state of love— a sort 
of state of nature— in order to consciously accept religious 
and social principles as a way of life. She did on her own 
what the original Heloise did only reluctantly, though of a 
sort of necessity.
Julie attributes to God what Rousseau reserves to his 
On the Social Contract— that is, making a legitimate society 
out of what was a general state of slavery. And Julie seems 
to attribute to fortuitous psychic forces and upheavals what 
Rousseau would attribute to his Emile— that is, the return 
to a sort of quasi-wholeness of the individual human being. 
Can the Julie, in fact, not be seen as a sort of 
serendipitous Emile for late adolescent girls already gone 
wrong in love? Whatever the case, falling out of passionate
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love does seem to be, for Rousseau, a fortuitous event, not 
totally manipulatable.
The entire discussion of Letter XVIII relates to our 
central issue of happiness, for the former relation of love 
to happiness has been broken in favor of the relation of 
virtue to happiness. And it is a virtue intimately bound to 
religion and societal norms. At this point suffice it to 
say that as the story progresses, the extremes of love and 
society as bases of happiness will be mitigated into the 
elevation of friendship as the basis of happiness and even 
of society. In fact, friendship has already become, among 
other things, the sublimation of love. It will eventually 
resemble courtly love, as a visionary re-creation of Julie.
These conclusions are reinforced by a letter from 
Julie, in reply to a letter by Saint-Preux urging her not to 
divulge to Wolmar the story of their love affair. Julie 
claims that the only thing lacking to her happiness is his 
happiness. She then describes her husband as a man of 
ultimate rationality— never gay and never sad; he is 
everything Saint-Preux is not— in fact, in his god-like 
detachment, he is the very opposite of passionate love 
itself.
Julie has borrowed, as if from him, a new temperament 
if not a new character. As she writes: "That which has
long misled me and which perhaps still misleads you is the 
idea that love is necessary to form a happy marriage."
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(III,XX,372) In fact, she says that love, being unstable,
is little suited to marriage and its many duties. Marriage
is a question of fulfilling the duties of civil society; the
only thing lovers can do is love one another. But what does
Julie now think of love in itself, outside of marriage? It
is, she says, the ardor itself of love which consumes it; it
wears out with youth; it passes with beauty and age; early
or late, lovers cease to adore each other. Julie seems to
have truly fallen out of love with love. She even has the
heart to tell Saint-Preux that even if she felt for him as
she did before and with the knowledge she has now, she would
choose Wolmar over himl
She seems to have chosen what she, under the tutelage
of her husband, now views as virtue and happiness, as
opposed to love and eventual unhappiness. And, since Saint-
Preux will not agree that she tell Wolmar of their affair,
Julie sees fit to discontinue all "commerce" between them.
In her farewell, Julie distinguishes between a
happiness brought by fortune and one brought by God, as well
as between true and false virtue.
Adieu, my dear and good friend; if I believed 
that fortune were able to make us happy 
(heureux), I would say to you: run toward
fortune; but perhaps you are right to disdain it 
with enough treasures to do without it. I prefer 
to tell you: run toward felicity, it is the
fortune of the wise; we have always felt that
there was none without virtue; but be on guard
that this word virtue, too abstract, not have
more bang than solidity, and that it not be a
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word to parade around, which serves more to 
dazzle others than to content us ourselves. (376)
Soon afterwards, she bids him a last farewell. They will
not exchange letters again until Part VI of the novel.
The next letter is a justification of suicide, written
by Saint-Preux to Lord Bomston. There are some curious
conclusions that he draws from both philosophy and religion,
but suffice it to put down the fundamental proposition on
which he bases his argument: "Seek your good and avoid your
bad in that which does no offense to others." (Ill,XXI,378)
Bomston writes back with his list of arguments, the first
being: Do you not believe that the goal of human life has
a moral object and that we must make an effort to attain
that objective? A disappointment in love is not grounds to
end a life— and besides, on your own grounds, you cannot
leave, for you would be harming your friends. But Lord
Bomston does allow suicide in two instances: explicitly, in
cases of extreme physical disability; and, implicitly, in
order to save one's country. It is clear from these letters
that Bomston is the political being and that Saint-Preux
remains radically private.
When Julie reaches hopelessness, she turns to civic
virtue, religion, and marriage. When Saint-Preux reaches
hopelessness, he turns to a meditation on suicide. Julie's
conversion kills romantic love just as surely, it seems,
as Saint-Preux's suicide would. Both characters are still
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consciously pursuing happiness. It is evident in Julie's 
case; and a study of some of Saint-Preux's arguments would 
point toward his continued preoccupation with happiness. 
Simply put, he argues that he will be happier in the next 
life than he is in his unbearable misery in this life.
Saint-Preux's immediate fate is decided when he accepts 
an offer arranged by Bomston: to undertake a three-year
(hopefully healing) tour of the world on an English warship. 
He will hire on as engineer of landing forces, his specialty 
of study. So, he writes to Claire (also addressing Julie as 
Claire's friend), informing them of his sea voyage and 
hoping that on the high seas he will be able to rediscover 
the calm which forsakes his troubled heart.
This second segment of the novel (Parts II and III) 
ends with the finalization of the physical or sexual 
separation of Julie and Saint-Preux. Julie's marriage is 
irrevocable? and adultery is unthinkable for both of them. 
They are finally in that new world toward which they have 
been moving in spite of themselves— the world of spiritual 
love, surely a world of imagination and emotional ingenuity.
CHAPTER 6 
THE LETTERS OF REUNION
Part IV
The prelude to Saint-Preux's return— after a six-year 
absence— is an exchange of letters between Julie and Claire. 
Julie's letter is nostalgic: "life flows by, the fleeting
happiness that it offers is between our hands, and we 
neglect to enjoy it." (IV,I,398) She writes to Claire of 
their friendship, and how the passage of tine has 
concentrated their feelings for each other. One dies little 
by little, "But a sensitive heart defends itself with all 
its force against this anticipated death." (399) She says 
that the thought of the past "humiliates me so that I lose 
courage," but she encourages herself with the honor that she 
has gained from six years of marriage. She feels herself 
cured of those old wounds and dares to believe herself 
virtuous. She cries, but assures Claire that they are tears 
of pity, regret, and repentance— "love is no longer a part 
of them; love is nothing to me now." (403) (Her life with 
Wolmar is not strictly speaking one of love.)
Without calling Saint-Preux by name, she confides to 
Claire that she thinks he is probably dead. And almost too 
sympathetically for a married woman, she writes as if in a 
sigh: "Ah my dearl What a soul he had! . . . how he could
love!" (403) Julie pleads with Claire, now a widow with one 
female child, to come live with her at Clarens. And Julie
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expounds the first statement of what might be called the 
cult of friendship: "Do you not know that the communion of
hearts imparts to sadness something indefinably sweet and 
affecting which contentment does not have?" (404) She goes 
on to say that friendship is a solace and consolation for 
one's misery and pain. Writing Claire that, without her, 
she is nothing, Julie asks that she be allowed to await the 
next life in the midst of "innocence and friendship." (405)
It seems clear that Julie, though contented in her 
marriage with Wolmar, is not, or does not feel herself 
happy. Wolmar is her superior, not her friend per se, and 
she needs a friend in order to be happy. Whether or not she 
still feels that love could make her happy, she dare not 
even mention.
Claire responds that 1) Saint-Preux is probably alive, 
for he was seen two months ago off the Canary Islands, and
2) she plans to move to Clarens, Julie's estate, after the 
summer. So they can both share the hope of "an eternal 
reunion."
It is at this point that a letter arrives to Claire 
from Saint-Preux. He returns the well-travelled and tested 
sailor. "Am I returning freer and wiser than I left? I 
dare believe it and can not affirm it." (IV,III,415) He 
returns as a friend, conquered by Julie's virtue. But he is 
aware of the dangers of the blurring of the past and the
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present. He asks for permission to see Julie so that he 
will, in effect, know himself.
Wolmar, now advised of the former love affair between 
Julie and Saint-Preux, invites Saint-Preux to his house, 
where "innocence and peace" prevail. Saint-Preux is assured 
that he will find friendship, if his heart is ready for it. 
But there is more, as an accompanying letter from Claire 
explains: Not only does Wolmar offer his friendship, he
intends to "cure" Saint-Preux (of his passion), for none of 
them can be perfectly happy before that occurs. Thus, 
Saint-Preux will enter an environment of peace and order, 
where the most intense relationships are those of friendship 
and maternal affection (Julie is the mother of two young 
sons.).
After their first meeting, Saint-Preux writes 
ecstatically to Lord Bomston: "I have seen her, my Lordl
My eyes have seen her! . . . She showed joy at seeing me; 
she called me her friend, her dear friend." (IV,VI,418) 
After having time to recover himself and observe Julie, he 
finds that "In place of that suffering modesty which 
formerly made her lower her eyes incessantly, one sees the 
security of virtue ally itself in her chaste look to 
sweetness and sensitivity . . .  a freer air and franker 
manners have succeeded that constrained behavior mixed with 
tenderness and shame." (421-22) Then he meets Julie's two 
children— "more beautiful than the day" and already showing
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resemblances to their mother. "A thousand cruel and 
delightful memories divided my heart." He realizes that it 
is a mother of a family to whom he is speaking. From that 
moment of realization, Saint-Preux writes that he knew that 
they were no longer the same and he began to feel better 
about himself.
Thus, it is established that both Saint-Preux and Julie 
still feel something for each other, but both feel that it 
is something different from their former and passionate 
love. But Claire's statement that Wolmar intended to "cure" 
Saint-Preux more than implies that at least Wolmar somehow 
claims to know that Saint-Preux is still lovesick. Be that 
as it may, what might this cure consist of? Obviously, it 
will not be an attempt to have Saint-Preux forget or 
disfavor Julie. The cure can only be one thing: He must
come to know the joys of friendship; he must transform 
himself from lover to friend. And what will be the nature 
of this cure? It is, in fact, given voice in Letter VI from 
Saint-Preux to Lord Bomston.
The situation surrounding the enunciation of Wolmar's 
first principle of morals is a conversation between Julie 
and Saint-Preux. At Julie's request, he spoke of Bomston, 
which led him to speak of his, Saint-Preux's, sufferings and 
Bomston's assistance; this led Julie to enter into her 
"justification" for all she had done. At that moment, 
Wolmar returned to the conversation. Julie continued
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speaking as before. Wolmar discerned Saint-Preux's
astonishment.
You have just seen, says Wolmar, an example of 
openness which rules here. If you sincerely want 
to be virtuous, learn to imitate it: That is the
only request and the only lesson that I have to 
give you. The first step toward vice is to 
shroud innocent actions in mystery, and whoever 
likes to hide themselves sooner or later has 
reason to hide themselves. A single moral 
precept can take the place of all others; it is 
this: Never do or say anything that you do not
want the whole world to see and hear.(424)
Clasping Julie's and Saint-Preux's hands together, Wolmar 
announces "Our friendship now begins." To consecrate this 
bond, Wolmar instructs Saint-Preux to "Embrace your sister 
and friend." He urges them to be familiar with each other, 
"But act alone as if I were present, or before me as if I 
were not." (424)
Wolmar has, in effect, given Saint-Preux a conscience, 
for as Saint-Preux confides to Lord Bomston: "I began to
understand with what sort of man I was dealing, and I 
resolved to keep my heart always in a state to be seen by 
him." (425) He comments tellingly that he was finally 
enjoying the pleasure of Julie's presence, without 
uneasiness, fear, or anything to disturb it. He is finding 
a new "innocence"— without suffering, without the obstacles 
to fulfilled passion. For now, he is outside the myth. He 
puts himself to bed at the end of this day of reunion,
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vowing to leave the Wolmar house if he ever becomes too fond 
of it.
It is clear that our story has entered a new realm, 
after that six-year hiatus. The baldest statement of the 
change is this: Whereas love had reigned, now friendship
does. And we have been given some precise indications of 
how to comprehend friendship as opposed to love. We might 
ask the question thus: How is friendship most unlike love?
The most general answer: Love is private; friendship is
public. Or to put the issue in terms of Letter VI: Love is
secretive; friendship is open. All that lovers can do is 
love one another. Their relationship thrives on secrecy. 
(Of course, we continue to speak of romantic love.) 
Friendship, as Aristotle put it, is the basis of society. 
A friendship of two is always likely to network into 
thousands of relationships, even if not of the same depth 
and intensity. Question: Does all this make marriage but
one friendship among others? And what is the relationship 
between openness/friendship and happiness? And, more to the 
point of Wolmar's cure, does openness cause the sting of 
love/secrecy to go away? One thing is clear: If Julie and
Saint-Preux are to find happiness, between themselves or 
absolutely, they must find it in openness/friendship as 
opposed to secrecy/love. That, simply, is the challenge of 
the "cure.1
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Secrecy, as Wolmar suggests, leads to distrust; it 
represents a sort of loss of Innocence, as does its 
accompanying passionate love. Openness leads to trust and 
to a sort of innocence regained. In even broader terms, 
love is, for Rousseau, a loss of innocence, for, in its 
absolute privacy, it says "This is mine!" It is the 
beginning of the comparison of oneself with others; it is 
the beginning of amour-propre. In a state of openness, one 
regains one's original innocence— ironically, one's interior 
as opposed to external life. It is living outside the self- 
-in the loved one!— that alienates the self. But, 
ultimately, passionate love causes alienation only because 
its fulfillment is deadly to itself.
But to return to the more practical matter of just how 
the couple (Julie and Saint-Preux) is to act. Wolmar 
advised that they should act as if he were there when he was 
not, and as if he were not when he was there. This seems 
like a conundrum, for if he is there and they act as if he 
is not there, this is tantamount to being alone and acting 
as if he were there. Moreover, he says that when he is 
there he will tell them what he thinks. Therefore, Wolmar 
will always be there as a conscience or, as we might say 
today, as an alter-ego.1 But of essential importance is
*See Judith N. Shklar. Men and citizens (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1969), pp. 90-142 passim, for a 
discussion of Wolmar's god-like qualities.
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that the goal of this moral principle of openness is virtue, 
and, we can surmise, the ultimate goal is still happiness 
(but Wolmar has not explicitly expressed that conclusion). 
Whatever, Wolmar is in the process of laying down the law! 
Following the train of the story, we can say that, as 
lovers, Julie and Saint-Preux attempted to follow love and 
nature to happinesd; as friends, they will be forced to 
follow virtue and moral principle.
The subsequent letter from Julie to Claire is of 
interest for several of Julie's comments: 1) She loves
Saint-Preux as tenderly as ever, without loving him in the 
same way; 2) She finds him to be a matured man of the 
world, more assured and less prone to general philosophical 
propositions; and 3) She finds that, next to virtue, Saint- 
Preux loves her best in the world. But there is a "post 
scriptum" to the letter in which the theme of censorship is 
developed. (430)
Julie was resolved to take the precaution, what with 
Saint-Preux returning, of choosing her husband as her 
confidant and of writing every letter as if he did not have 
to see it and showing it to him nonetheless. On the face of 
it, this self-imposed but virtual censorship seems an 
application of the principle of openness. But Wolmar
rejects the plan for a number of reasons: 1) Marriage is
too serious a state to admit of openness in every little
matter of the heart, as is the case with "tender
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friendship"; 2) It is good that a wife have a faithful 
woman friend whom she may confide in, independent of her 
husband; 3) It is dangerous to make a law of openness, 
because it could become an undue restriction, making 
confidences less sweet, because too extended; 4) Some 
secrets are best shared between two people at a time, even 
though three should know them; 5) The letters risk being 
eventually written to Wolmar and not to Julie's friend, such 
that Julie will be at ease with neither one nor the other; 
and 6) If Julie does not show her letters to Wolmar, she is 
more likely to speak kindly of him in them.
A central objection that Wolmar makes to Julie's 
proposal of censorship is that making openness into a law is 
unadvisable— primarily, because it would take a certain 
sweetness out of life. For the proposal would extend the 
number of people involved in a confidence. As a legislator, 
Wolmar seems sensitive to privacy, at least insofar as he 
allows a sort of semi-privacy within the circle of 
friendships. So Wolmar bends his moral law. And not 
surprisingly, for it is his own personal moral authority on 
which Wolmar depends, more than on any inflexible moral 
principle.
Julie's letter-writing proposal also shows us how 
thoroughly even Julie places herself in Wolmar's guiding 
hands. In fact, it tells us that Julie, as well as Saint- 
Preux, sees herself as in need of a cure. For she admits to
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the possibility of needing to be censored in what she writes 
even to her best friend. In a sense, Wolmar is mentor to 
Julie and Saint-Preux, not unlike Rousseau the tutor was to 
his Emile. The difference, of course, is that our couple 
grew into adulthood without a mentor and now has to be 
returned to some sort of state of quasi-innocence, if not of 
nature.
Thankful for the tranquil life of friendship, as
opposed to that of impetuous passions, Saint-Preux describes
to Lord Bomston the world of peace and order and innocence
of Clarens— where everything is in harmony "with the true
end of man." (441) It is as if Rousseau were dusting off
his Aristotle in an attempt to circumscribe the person and
world of Wolmar. Saint-Preux, in Letter X, attempts to give
Bomston an idea, in detail, of a domestic economy which is
the felicity of both the Wolmars and of their employees.
Much of what is discussed would be called today land and
personnel management. Over-riding all the insights into
conflict resolution, worker motivation and loyalty, is a
benevolent and effective paternalism. (447) One also sees
this distrust of explicit laws restraining the behavior of
workers, just as we saw in the application of the moral
principle of openness. For example,
In order to prevent a dangerous familiarity 
between the sexes, they are not constrained here 
by positive laws which would tempt them to break 
them in secret; but, without appearing to do so, 
customs (usages) more powerful than authority
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itself are established. They are not forbidden 
to see each other, but things are arranged such 
that they have neither the opportunity nor the 
will. This is done by giving them occupations, 
habits, tastes, pleasures entirely different (one 
from the other).
At this point, the reader might wonder just how Wolmar
would react to his daughter having a love affair. The
answer, of course, is that his daughter would never do such
a thing. But his wife did have an affair, and in a very
real way is still under its spell; in effect, Wolmar7s
actions toward Julie and Saint-Preux are lessons in how to
manage "dangerous familiarity between the sexes."
Saint-Preux points out a difference between the purely
political and purely domestic economy when he writes,
In the Republic, citizens are restrained by 
manners, principles, virtue: but how to contain
domestics, mercenaries, other than by constraint?
The whole art of the master is to hide this 
constraint under the veil of pleasure and of 
interest, such that they think they want 
everything they are obliged to do. (453)
One might ask, without going beyond the confines of the
text, whether Wolmar7s cure of Saint-Preux (and Julie) is a
virtue of the citizen or a quasi-virtue of the servant? It
seems that with the principle of openness Wolmar has given
the situation a chance to be worked through in an authentic
manner. That is, he has given Saint-Preux and Julie the
chance of becoming (or remaining) full citizens of Clarens.
And such a citizenship entails a certain happiness. On the
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other hand, openness is also a principle to be upheld by the 
servants; as Saint-Preux writes,
[I] think . . . that whenever there is mixing of 
the sexes every public entertainment becomes 
innocent simply by being public, whereas the most 
praiseworthy business is suspect in private 
(tete-a-tete). (456)
It remains unclear just what difference there is between
governance of one's family and of one's city. But there is
one error which pertains to both domestic and civil economy:
It is a big mistake in domestic economy as well 
as in civil [economy) to want to fight a vice 
with another one or make between them a sort of 
equilibrium, as if that which sapped the 
foundations of order were able ever to serve to 
establish it! All one does by this bad policing 
is to reunite all the unwanted things. Vices 
tolerated in a home do not rule there alone; let 
one take root and a thousand will follow. (461)
But we just saw that the art of the master was to hide
constraint of servants under the veil of pleasure and
interest. What does this mean for the status of openness as
a principle? Not being open with servants must not be a
vice, even though covert action looks like one vice trying
to correct another.
Summing up his little treatise on the Wolmar estate,
Saint-Preux concludes: "Only the order and the rule that
multiplies and perpetuates the use of goods can transform
pleasure into happiness." (466) And it is evident to him
that it is "a happy being" who rules Clarens. In fact, only
in such a setting can one, according to Saint-Preux, be
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happy or contented: The surest sign of true contentment is
a domestic life of retreat. The father of a family is 
"Alone among all mortals" master of his own felicity, 
"because he is happy even like God, with nothing more to 
desire than what he enjoys." (466-67) This master wishes to 
acquire nothing new, but rather to better possess what he 
has. And one thing he does is to form or shape those around 
him. (467-68)
Julie and Saint-Preux are reunited, of course, at 
Clarens— under the all-seeing eye of Wolmar. Will Wolmar's 
dealings with them be open (appealing to manners, 
principles, and virtue), or will they be closed (hiding the 
motives of pleasure and interest)? This might be another 
way of asking if we can be tricked into happiness (even by 
a god-like master). Or if true happiness does not demand a 
totally open road and a totally open conscience. Whatever, 
it is somewhat ironic to read Saint-Preux as he writes about 
the first chore of the master of the house: to allow only
honorable people who harbor no secret desire to trouble the 
order of the house. And how do you find such servants? No, 
you "make" them, you form and shape those around you! Of 
course, that— education— is the first political art.
Saint-Preux is a witness to the frank and open nature 
of the Wolmars' communication with the servants. Since they 
do not have a different morality from the one they want to 
give others, they have no need of circumspection in their
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speech. They do not "tell all," but they do tell freely all 
their maxims. (468) But does Wolmar, we might ask, tell his 
servants that, on principle, he hides what he wants from 
them under the veil of pleasure and interest? The first 
principles of governance of Clarens do not, at least on 
Saint-Preux7s telling, seem clear or non-problematic. 
Saint-Preux tells Bomston that there is much more to 
describe— how the Wolmars themselves live and raise their 
children— and that "all that forms a tableau so enchanting 
that in order to love to contemplate it I need no other 
motivation than the pleasure I find in it." (470) We are 
reminded here, incidentally, that pleasure is not 
necessarily an ignoble motivation.
Saint-Preux writes a second letter to Bomston about 
life at Clarens; he begins by reaffirming his first most 
general observation: "One sees nothing in this household
which does not join the agreeable to the useful." 
(IV,XI,470) But useful is not limited to that which brings 
profit; it consists also of "any simple and innocent 
amusement which nourishes the liking for seclusion, work, 
and moderation . . . and . . .  a healthy soul, a heart free 
from the anxiety of the passions." (470) Labor and 
recreation are equally necessary to man.
But Letter XI is specifically about Julie7s Elysium, a 
wooded area where art has improved on nature, or at least 
brought the illusion of the beauties of nature to a place
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decided upon by nan. If the unity of the whole of Clarens 
is happiness, Elysium is the place to find that principle 
written large. Only one datum from the Elysium will be 
considered: the tamed birds that stay in the garden as if
there were an actual aviary.
Wolmar explains that, with the help of nature (some 
birds were there to begin with), it took "patience and time" 
to perform the "miracle" of taming wild birds. The 
additional birds were attracted by anticipating all their 
needs, by never scaring them, by allowing them to make their 
nests with security, and by not disturbing the little ones. 
(476) This, of course, could be a description of how Wolmar 
provides for his domestics and servants. Their peace and 
security— their happiness— is the immediate concern of the 
master. No doubt, a paternalism. (477) And neither 
paternalism nor constructing Elysia are natural in the 
strict sense; in taming it, a certain violence (480) is done 
to nature. But that is the only way the less adventurous 
are able to experience nature, for she hides herself in 
rugged and secluded places. (480)
Saint-Preux has an objection to Elysium. He says it is 
a superfluous amusement. That objection is, in effect,
given two responses: 1) In so many well-chosen words,
Wolmar reminds Saint-Preux that the other woods, outside 
Elysium, were the site of his and Julie's first kiss. She 
avoids that wood. Wolmar concludes: "this place was
planted by the hands of virtue." (485) Is that not another 
way of closely comparing a rather unnatural place like 
Elysium with the nature of virtue? Is virtue not like tamed 
wild birds— acted upon by a sort of violence and existing as 
a sort of illusion? Wolmar's response to Saint-Preux's 
objection was the right of virtue, or the political 
response. Julie's response will be quite different. 2) 
Julie tells Saint-Preux that when she became a mother, her 
zeal for embellishing Elysium augmented. She thought of one 
day turning over the care of Elysium to her sons. She 
thought of her children returning to her those attentions 
that she bestowed on them, "and the joy of their tender 
hearts in seeing their mother walk with delight along the 
shady paths formed by their hands." (485) Then Julie 
positions herself beyond Wolmar: "In truth, my friend, she
said with emotion in her voice, days spent that way have to 
do with the happiness of the next (literally: other) life, 
and it is not without reason that in thinking of it I gave 
in advance the name of Elysium to this place." (485-86) 
Thus, Julie justifies Elysium for the maternal and religious 
sentiment it engenders, whereas Wolmar justifies it on moral 
grounds— that is, it helped keep Julie virtuous and free 
from thoughts of her former love.
The next day, Saint-Preux entered Elysium alone. He 
spent two hours there, he says, and he preferred that time 
to any other time in his life. (The reader might realize
182
that Elysium has preempted that sublime hour spent with
Julie in Part I.) Saint-Preux reflects on the nature of
revery and finds that
there is in the meditation of honest thoughts a 
sort of well-being that wicked people have never 
known; it is that of being pleased with oneself.
. . .  I do not know another pleasure which could 
equal that one. (487)2
A further reflection almost allows him to draw the
conclusion that those who love solitude are more likely to
be virtuous, because 1) the enjoyment of virtue is wholly
internal and, therefore, most accessible to the solitary;
and 2) non-virtuous activity would be a torment for the
solitary.
Whereas Wolmar spoke of virtue in relation to Elysium 
and Julie spoke of happiness, Saint-Preux speaks of "well- 
being" and "pleasure." "Being pleased with oneself" becomes 
the greatest pleasure that man can experience. Though 
pleasure is not happiness, for Aristotle at least, it 
accompanies happiness. But Saint-Preux is silent on that 
point. Only to the extent that Elysium reminds him of the 
once-beloved Julie does that place seem to be more than the 
Epicurean garden.
The following Letter XII, though it gives us an 
extraordinary profile of the person of Wolmar, is prompted 
by Julie's misgivings at being left alone for a week with
2What of the pleasure of knowing you have done good, as 
in the Claude Anet/Fanchon episode?
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Saint-Preux while her husband makes a trip. She writes to 
Claire for advice, because she begins to distrust reason and 
understanding as much as the passions and sentiments.
The letter is mostly a narration of what takes place 
when Wolmar proposes that he, Julie, and Saint-Preux take a 
morning walk in the very woods where Julie and Saint-Preux 
experienced their first kiss. They all sit down, near that 
fatal spot, and Wolmar, somewhat uneasily, begins to talk. 
He says that he envisions the possibility of the three of 
them being able to live together, but he thinks they should 
know him better. He describes himself as naturally having 
"a tranquil soul and a cold heart." (490) "My only active 
principle is a natural liking of order. . . .  If I have any 
ruling passion it is that of observation: I like to read
the hearts of men." He says that society is pleasing to him 
for the sake of contemplation, not for being a part of it. 
Ideally, he would be a "living eye." (491) Because of his 
virtual need to observe, humankind may not be dear to him, 
but it is necessary to him. He went to great pains— even to 
changing his name and station in life— in order to observe 
men.
I felt, as you have remarked in one of your 
Letters, he says to Saint-Preux, that one sees 
nothing when he is content to look only, that it 
is necessary to act oneself in order to see men 
acting, and I made myself an actor in order to be 
a spectator. (492)
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This reference is to the central letter of the collection,
Saint-Preux's Letter XVII of Part II. Wolmar begs a
comparison between the attempts of the two young but very
different men to study the world. Wolmar gives Saint-
Preux' s Letter XVII more focus and importance as a treatise
on methodology within The New Heloise. So let us return to
that so important Parisian letter; afterwards^ we shall
return to the continuation of Wolmar's story about himself
and his understanding of how to "know" the world.
Saint-Preux has been separated from Julie against his
will. He is living in Paris. Their love is reciprocal at
this point— both implicitly and explicitly. In the turmoil
of big-city life, he says that both love and reason give him
an aversion to the tumult around him, which he has time to
neither feel nor examine. (245) This raises the question of
the difficulties of studying the world.
The philosopher is too far from it; the man of 
the world is too close to it. The one sees too 
much to be able to reflect, the other too little 
to judge the total picture. Each object that 
strikes the philosopher, he considers separately, 
and being able to discern neither the connections 
nor the relations with other objects which are 
beyond his reach, he never sees that [object) in 
its place and senses neither the reason of it nor 
its true effects. The man of the world sees 
everything and has time to think about nothing.
The mobility of objects permits him to perceive 
them only and not to observe them; they wear away 
together and rapidly, and there remains to him of 
everything only confusing impressions which 
resemble chaos. (245-46)
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So Rousseau makes the evident but ironic point that the man
of the world sees more than the philosopher and that the
philosopher— in spite of his superior powers of reflection—
cannot fully know the world without a knowledge of its very
materiality. But there is another methodological problem-
more epistemological in nature: "Nor can one see and
meditate alternatively, because the spectacle demands
continuous attention, which interrupts reflection." (246)
And, if a person wanted to divide his time between the world
and solitude, "always disturbed in his retreat and always a
stranger in the world," he would be nowhere. Even dividing
his entire life into two big parts— the one for seeing, the
other for reflecting— is "almost impossible": the reason
cannot be turned off and on so easily. (246)
Moreover, it is foolish to try to study the world as a
mere spectator who— "useless in business and unwelcome in
pleasures"— is never given entre.
One does not see others act, except insofar as 
one acts oneself; in the school of the world as 
in that of love, one must begin by practicing 
what one wants to learn, (emphasis added) (246)
Then Saint-Preux presumably gives his chosen course of
action: as an idle foreigner he must assume the manners of
the world and he must make himself agreeable, for he is good
for nothing else to anyone. And he must fulfill various
rules of social etiquette. Having done that, he says that
he has gained access, even to the more exclusive "private
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suppers." So he studies Parisian society and theater, and
what does he find?
In general, there is much discourse and little 
action on the French stage; perhaps it is that, 
in effect, the Frenchman speaks more than he 
acts, or at least that he gives much more value 
to that which is said than to that which is done.
(253)
Because of the Frenchman's valuation of word over deed, 
Saint-Preux cannot claim to know the hearts of the 
Parisians. For deeds do not (always) resemble speeches. He 
sees then only appearances. He is still too much of an 
outsider to claim to know and pronounce on the Parisians. 
(The above, of course, assumes that deeds are a more 
accurate portrayal of a man's soul than are his words.)
His chosen method of studying the world has failed, at 
least in this instance. But what toll has that method 
exacted from him as a person? He says he is beginning to 
feel the intoxicating effects of being of the world. He 
sometimes forgets who and what he is, for he plays a role 
each day, to the point of perverting the order of his moral 
affectations. "I thus see disfigured that divine model that 
I carry within me, and which served at the same time as 
object of my desires and as rule for my actions." (255) He 
is like a small ship on the high seas. (255) Confused and 
humiliated at how he has fallen from his love of Julie, he 
tries to return within himself to determine if his former 
affections are still alive— in short, to see if he still
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loves Julie. That is the test of his authenticity and 
identity. And when he finds Julie still on her "throne of 
glory," "I believe to have recovered my existence and my 
life." (256) The privacy of love, as well as its very 
existence, is threatened by the whirlwind of worldly living, 
of city life.
But what is Saint-Preux's life? What is Saint-Preux? 
Is he a man of the world? Obviously, not. Is he a 
philosopher? Less obviously, not. He is something apart: 
he is a lover, for as he himself distinguishes, "in the 
school of the world as in that of love, one must begin by 
practicing what one wants to learn." (246) So what is the 
true object of philosophy, if not the world and not love? 
Or is philosophy epistemologically possible? If you cannot 
philosophize about what you are doing and if you cannot know 
without doing, is philosophy then not an illusion— or at 
best a wish. Did not Saint-Preux reject philosophy for love 
and friendship? Perhaps there are sounder (?) reasons for 
doing so than mere lovesickness. But what, one might ask, 
is wrong with Saint-Preux's method of studying the world, as 
presented in Letter XVII? Does he not at the end of each 
intoxicating day sober up to find himself and his sacred 
love intact? He does until Letter XXVI of Part II, when he
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becomes the willing victim of Parisian prostitutes! The 
dangers of studying the world are too greatI3
But to return to Wolmar's account of himself in Julie's 
Letter XII of Part IV. Wolmar agrees, then, with Saint- 
Preux: to know, you must act. Wolmar was also able 1) to
intensify his love of order by acting and 2) to acquire a 
new liking for the good by means of contributing to it 
through actions. Unlike Saint-Preux, Wolmar was not a mere 
"idle stranger" in the world. But solitude— even 
accentuated, it seems, by his good actions— became 
unbearable to him. It was the vision of an old age without 
consolation that made him uneasy and sad for the first time 
in his life. It was then that Julie's father offered
Julie's hand in marriage to him. Wolmar describes meeting 
Julie and experiencing the first and only emotion he had 
ever had, when Julie embraced her father with such great joy 
and emotion. He explains to Julie and Saint-Preux that, if 
that emotion was only slightly felt by him, it was unique, 
and "feelings (sentiments) only need that force for acting 
in proportion to those feelings that resist them." (492-93) 
Wolmar loved, though feebly, he admits, but his soul
contained no other passions to counterbalance that
sentiment. Thus, his love totally conquered him. He admits
3Though Julie forgives Saint-Preux for the prostitute 
incident, it is immediately after that incident that all 
turns sour. Mme d'Etange discovers Julie's cache of letters and Julie breaks off the romance.
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that, if he had ever had another passion, it would have 
derailed him.
He takes the opportunity to meditate out loud about the
psychology of the philosopher as opposed to that of the man
of the world. And he brings the brief discussion to a
synthesis or answer— though still ambiguous in its terms.
only fiery souls know how to struggle and 
conquer. All great efforts, all sublime actions 
are their doing; cold reason never did anything 
illustrious, and passions are overcome only in 
opposing them one against the other. When that 
[passion] of virtue comes to the fore, it alone 
dominates and keeps everything in equilibrium; 
that is how the true wise man is formed, who is 
no more than another who is sheltered from 
passions, but who alone knows how to conquer them 
with themselves, as a pilot sails by adverse 
winds. (493)
From this account the man of reason might be the 
philosopher, but surely not the wise man, who is a man of 
passion— even if the passion of virtue. He is the man who 
seeks the Good passionately, erotically, to allude to a 
Platonic metaphor. He is, in short, the lover. Wolmar 
admits to being neither a man of love, nor a man of the 
world. In fact, he is living in that in-between world of 
partial association, whereby he creates his own world with 
the self-sufficiency of a god.
After a long prelude in which Wolmar confides that 1) 
he realizes that Julie and Saint-Preux could never forget 
each other without losing much of their worth, 2) the good 
can be obtained from sensitive souls with confidence and
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sincerity, and 3) they should not fear themselves, he, 
Wolmar, brings Julie and Saint-Preux to embrace at the spot 
of their first embrace. This kiss in the bosquet is surely 
meant to be a dose of the cure, and it appears to work on 
Julie, for she writes that the kiss was nothing like that 
first one, that she sadly congratulated herself for having 
such an altered heart.
But Julie's reaction to news of an upcoming trip of her 
husband— which would leave her and Saint-Preux alone at 
Clarens— belies her profession of an altered heart. She 
asks Claire for advice: Should she stay alone with Saint-
Preux? Should she ask her husband to take Saint-Preux with 
him, and thereby show her weakness? She confesses that she 
no longer trusts anything that she sees or feels. "I am 
experiencing with sorrow that the weight of an old failing 
is a burden that must be carried for life." (499)
More than anything else, Letter XII offers a comparison 
of the "modi vivendi" of Saint-Preux and Wolmar. Both agree 
that to know we must act, but Wolmar's action is of a 
decidedly different order from the passive participation in 
Parisian society engaged in by the young Saint-Preux. In 
fact, Saint-Preux seems to think that he can experience the 
world as he does the passion of love. And, ironically, his 
pursuit of the world ends in a prostitute's bed. Whereas 
Wolmar's action on the world for the good (of the world and 
of himself) ends in marriage to Julie. Saint-Preux is a
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lover; he wants to love the world. His mode of seeing and 
being is loving. Wolmar seems to be a legislator; he wants 
to order the world. When they speak of action, Saint-Preux 
and Wolmar are speaking of two distinct activities: the one, 
a passion or feeling; the other, an action or ordering. The 
only passion that Wolmar seems to recognize, except for his 
unique love of Julie, is that of virtue, but exactly what 
the "passion of virtue" is remains unclear. The wise man 
possesses it and he seems the ideal synthesis of thought and 
action, or, rather, of thought, action, and feeling. In the 
midst of the Enlightenment, Rousseau is bringing to bear the 
necessity of feelings for the purposes of knowledge, virtue, 
and happiness. Whereas Wolmar blends thought and action 
well, it is Saint-Preux who seems closer to a synthesis of 
thought and feeling.
Wolmar writes a rare letter (XIV) to Claire, in which 
we experience Wolmar, as the Enlightenment-like personage, 
in the process of applying not only science, but applying 
the science of man to the cure of love. What a sacrilege! 
Yet it is brought to us by him who is ostensibly the most 
respected and benevolent character of the novel. Let us 
trace the cold though not ill-intended reasoning of Wolmar 
as regards the state of the lovers' souls and the course of 
action required to resolve the love.
Wolmar is not unaware of Claire's rather humorous 
opinion of his observations of love (508); but he hazards
the following ideas regardless, because he is so sure of 
himself. First, he contends that he has made a discovery: 
the couple burns more ardently than ever for each other, and 
there reigns between them nothing more than an innocent 
attachment— "they are still lovers and are no more than 
friends." (508) (If this is true, it is most important, for 
it heralds the reconciliation of love and friendship; if it 
proves false, it might be Rousseau's indication that love- 
and-friendship is a non-synthesizable dichotomy.) Wolmar 
qualifies his statements by specifying that he is speaking 
mostly of Saint-Preux, for Julie can only be spoken of 
through conjecture: "A veil of wisdom and innocence is
folded so around her heart that it is no longer possible for 
the human eye to penetrate to it, not even her own eye." 
(509) Secondly, as for Saint-Preux, he is not in love with 
Julie de Wolmar, but with Julie d'Etange. "He loves her in 
the past tense: that is the true clue to the enigma. Take
away his memory and he will no longer have love." (509) He 
is confusing the times and tenses, and loves only a memory. 
Thirdly, Wolmar must make a decision in his approach or 
cure:
I do not know if it is better to succeed in 
curing him or in disillusioning him. . . .  To 
show him the veritable state of his heart could 
be to teach him the death of that which he loves; 
it would give him a dangerous affliction in that 
the state of sadness is always favorable to love.
(510)
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Does Wolmar intend to cure or merely disillusion Saint- 
Preux?
I thought . . .  it necessary to make him lose 
memory of the times that he must forget, by 
substituting adroitly other ideas for those that 
are so dear to him. (511)
Wolmar makes it clear that it is Saint-Preux's imagination
that must be changed. In place of seeing his mistress, he
must see the spouse of an honest man and the mother of his
children. *'I erase one painting with another, and cover the
past with the present." In such a way, he will dissolve the
fear in the hearts of the couple, which fears are caused by
the fires of the imagination outlasting those of the heart.
When he is finished with them, their monsters will disappear
at their approach. (511)
Wolmar goes on to say that he thinks he judged right by
planning to leave the couple alone together at Clarens.
"The more they see each other alone, the more they will
easily understand their error by comparing that which they
will feel with that which they would have formerly felt in
a similar situation." (511)
The question of happiness is boldly addressed by Julie,
as told in Letter XV from Saint-Preux to Bomston. Alone
with Saint-Preux after Wolmar's departure, Julie confides in
Saint-Preux: "My dear friend . . . there is no true
happiness on earth." She catalogues her blessings and
concludes: "Favored in all things by heaven, by fortune,
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and by men, I see everything converging toward my happiness. 
A secret sorrow, a lone sorrow poisons it, and I am not 
happy." (513) (We shall discover later that the cause of 
this unhappiness is the atheism of her husband Wolmar, who 
is a scientist to the core.)
While Wolmar is away, Julie writes him a brief note 1) 
suggesting that he visit Claire on the way back in order to 
hear from her what happened while he was gone, and 2) 
chiding him for sporting cruelly with his wife's virtue. 
(Claire obviously told Julie of Wolmar's tactics of the 
cure— that is, the plans to leave the former couple alone 
together.) And what happened while Wolmar was away? Did 
the cure work? Did the love grow dimmer? In brief, Julie 
was tested in such a way as to test Wolmar's theories about 
her and Saint-Preux.
Along with three oarsmen and a servant, Julie and 
Saint-Preux set out on a boat ride on Lake Geneva. There 
came a storm and by the hardest they reached the far shore 
and Meillerie, the place where Saint-Preux spent his first 
separation from Julie (Part I). He and Julie took a walk 
while at Meillerie, and he confesses to Lord Bomston that 
his secret motive was to visit the spot with Julie and to 
show her the memorials of his constant and unfortunate 
passion. In the most romantic fashion, Rousseau describes 
this mountainscape which should have been "the refuge of two 
lovers who alone escaped the confusion of nature." (518) He
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showed her her initials engraved in a thousand places and 
pointed out and memorialized the moments of his love in 
exile. As Saint-Preux begins to talk of the regret he 
feels, Julie seems to think he is too close to the edge of 
the mountain. She pulls him back and asks that they leave.
As the moon rose, they boarded the boat for Clarens. 
He took her hand and would not have let go of it until 
death— that only resolution of the passion myth— took hold 
of him. The process that Saint-Preux seems to undergo on 
the crossing is realization as opposed to cure4 or 
disillusionment— a sharpening of lost love as opposed to a 
dulling of it by continued contact, as Wolmar, in his 
rationalistic wisdom, had predicted. The process is one of 
wide-eyed realization: "It is done, I said to myself; these
times, these happy times are no more; they have disappeared 
forever . . . yet we live, and we are together, and our 
hearts are still joined." (520-21) To be with her and know 
her lost to him was more unbearable than being distanced 
from her. "That was what threw me into fits of furor and 
rage which agitated me by degrees to the point of despair. 
. . .  I was violently tempted to throw her with myself into 
the waves." (521) At this point, Saint-Preux lets go of her 
hand and goes to the bow of the boat.
4Cf. Duffy, Rousseau in Englandr p. 103, for a 
differing interpretation.
Tenderness overcame despair. He began to cry. And, 
later, when composed, he joined Julie again. He took her 
hand. He saw that she too had been crying. He said to her: 
"I see that our hearts have never ceased to hear each 
other." "It is true, she says in a changed voice; but let 
this be the last time that they will have spoken in this 
manner." (521) It seems that Wolmar partially
miscalculated. Yes, Julie was able to stave off her and 
Saint-Preux's emotions, but the process that the lovers 
underwent was one of sad realization, even tragedy— surely 
not that of displacement of memories or a dulling of 
passions. And the disillusion went beyond the pain of 
resignation, without resigning itself. Perhaps Wolmar is 
not the infallible all-seeing eye that he is pretended to 
be. For one, Julie chides him for his irresponsibility! 
And one must say that the irresponsible miscalculation is 
born not only in the pride of philosophy, but in a total 
lack of understanding and experience of passionate love. 
Wolmar is a consummate public man5; but he has no notion of 
the private. His principle of total openness is based, it 
seems, on a lack of appreciation of the private which is 
circumscribed by romantic love.
Saint-Preux tells Bomston that on that day of the boat 
ride, he "felt without exception the most lively emotions
5Philosophy is public in that its knowledge is not essentially esoteric.
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[of his life]." And he hopes that they will be the crisis 
which will restore him totally to himself. He ends with 
praise of Julie's (and his) virtue and victory over 
temptation.
Several observations may be made after a reading of 
Part IV: 1) Friendship is presented as a substitute for
love; 2) Though Julie and Saint-Preux have changed somewhat 
in their affections, they still harbor deep feelings of love 
for one another; 3) Wolmar, the philosopher par excellence, 
has ultimate confidence in his ability to "cure" the couple; 
4) Questions of epistemology and of the true and, by 
implication, happy life are raised; and 5) Wolmar's 
understanding of love, and thus of lovers, is tacitly 
questioned.
Part V
Saint-Preux concludes Part IV with praise of and thanks 
to Lord Bomston for his example of virtue and resistance to 
his mistress— the thought of which sustained Saint-Preux 
during his long day of temptation with Julie. Part V begins 
with Bomston's two-pronged reply to his friend: 1) He
exhorts Saint-Preux to grow up, that is, to become a man of 
thought as opposed to one of experience and feeling; and 2) 
He asks Saint-Preux if he is mature enough to help him, 
Bomston, with problems centering around his love life. It 
is curious that Rousseau ends this letter with an Editor's 
Footnote that questions both Bomston's intelligence and
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sensibilities, all of which night urge the reader to ask if
Bomston's advice is not untrue, or wrong, or inpractical.
In brief, Letter I of Part V nay be viewed as a continuation
of the previous discussions on method— that is, on the
proper manner of studying the world and, by implication,
dealing with it.
"Leave your infancy, friend, wake up," begins Bomston's
strident reply to Saint-Preux. He asks him not to give his
entire life over to the long sleep of reason. "My dear,
your heart has for a long time imposed on your thoughts.
You wanted to philosophize before being capable of it."
(523) Bomston admits that the heart is primary for the
truth, for "he who has felt nothing can learn nothing." The
sentiments deal with the true relation of things to man, but
it is to limit oneself to the first half of this 
science not to study, beyond that, the relations 
that things have among themselves, in order to 
better judge of the relations that they have with 
us. It is a small thing to know the human 
passions, if one cannot appraise the objects [of 
those passions]; and this second study can only 
be done in the calm of meditation. (523)
Bomston proceeds to elaborate one of the alternative
methods presented by Saint-Preux in Part II, Letter XVII
(246). Bomston says:
The youth of the wise man is the time of his 
experiences, his passions being the instruments 
of them; but after having applied his soul to 
exterior objects in order to feel them, he turns 
his soul within himself in order to consider 
them, to compare them, to know them. (523-24)
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To this alternative method of dividing one's life into 
halves— one half for seeing/experiencing, the other for 
reflecting/knowing— Saint Preux offered the following 
objection (as early as Part II): "But that even is almost
impossible; for the reason is not a piece of furniture that 
one moves around at his whim, and whoever has been able to 
live ten years without thinking, will never in his life 
think." (246)6 And the same may be said for feeling!
Bomston thinks that Saint-Preux, more than anyone else, 
is at the point in his life when he should begin to study 
the objects of the passions, for he has exhausted all the 
feelings and sentiments that could fill up even a long life. 
In short, he has the raw experience of an old man.
In spite of his many experiences and travels, the first 
object of his passion— Julie— still rules. Saint-Preux's 
wide experiences are a sort of gage of the ultimate worth of 
Julie. As Bomston argues, "You no longer have anything to 
feel or to see which merits your attention." (524) The only 
object left for him to study is himself; the only enjoyment 
to taste is that of wisdom.
*When all is said and done, we seem to be left with 
three distinct methods for knowing the world: 1) Wolmar
chooses to perform good actions; 2) Bomston would have one 
divide his life into an active and a meditative half; and 3) 
Saint-Preux chooses to participate (in Paris) as an idle 
stranger, clearing his mind each night of the affairs of the 
world. They all seem to be mutually exclusive.
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In the past, Julie was the source of Saint-Preux's 
virtue, but, Bomston asks, "Will you not go toward the good 
on your own strength, as Julie has done?" Or will you, he 
continues, content yourself to make good books instead of 
performing good actions? Bomston sees weakness in his 
friend, as regards his feelings for Julie. Hating weakness 
above all things, Bomston claims that there is no virtue 
without strength. Bomston seems to suggest that courage is 
the master virtue. "Do you dare count on yourself having 
heart without courage?" (525)
Stepping back from this first part of the Bomston 
letter, we see that he is asking Saint-Preux to attempt to 
abandon his very identity, which is that of a person who 
feels the world as opposed to knowing it. (Did Saint-Preux 
not renounce philosophy for love and friendship?) And, as 
Saint-Preux wrote in Part II, whereas it is almost 
impossible to turn one's reason off and on at will, is it 
not also just as difficult to turn one's feelings on and 
off? Thus, Bomston's advice might be both wrong and 
impractical. For Bomston, experience and feeling are no 
more than means to the objectives which are wisdom and good 
actions. For Saint-Preux, living a life of "sentiments" or 
feelings is an end in itself; it is even a life of 
dependency on the love object, whereas Bomston's philosopher 
would be self-sufficient— dependent only on his or her own 
strength.
Bomston, baldly stated, is a public man or citizen— and 
thus useful to others; Saint-Preux is a private man and 
lover and of no use to others, except perhaps the beloved. 
Bomston is attempting to make a public man of Saint-Preux; 
he is, if we do not push the implied argument too far, 
asking Saint-Preux to analyze Julie to death— to analyze 
erotic love to death. Replacing it will be, of course, 
friendship. And, though the subject is not explicitly 
raised in Letter I, it is acted out when Bomston essentially 
asks Saint-Preux if he is capable of being his friend and of 
advising him on his, Bomston's, love life. Self-sufficiency 
and friendship are not mutually exclusive. Bomston must 
know if Saint-Preux's judgment can be trusted (He.knows he 
has a good heart.). He wants only reason to rule in his 
affairs. And he gives at least one definition of or role 
for the friend, while discussing his needs. He says that he 
is not afraid of the passions which make open war on us, or 
which allow us consciousness of what we are doing; he fears 
the illusion of the passions which fool us instead of 
fighting us. The friendship of a wise man serves the 
purpose of seeing for us, from another point of view, the 
objects that we have an interest in knowing well.7
7Bomston is asking Saint-Preux to be his friend, just 
as Bomston has just furtively been a friend to Saint-Preux: 
that is, Bomston argued that Julie was a person of strength 
and self-sufficiency and, thus, we could conclude from 
Bomston's point of view, not a person of passion or love. 
In other words, Bomston gave Saint-Preux a different view of
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As was mentioned, Rousseau concludes this letter with
an Editor's Footnote, which reads as follows:
The galimatias of this Letter pleases me in that 
it is totally in the character of good Edouard 
[Bomston], who is never so much the philosopher 
than when he does silly things and never reasons 
more than when he does not know what he is 
saying. (526)8
If there is one conclusion to be drawn from reflection on 
Bomston's dogmatic remarks to Saint-Preux, it is that we are 
not always free to choose our manner or method of approach 
to life and to study of the world. Rather, all men do not 
share the exact same nature (Cf. Emilel, and the 
contingencies of life and the world do not affect all in the 
same manner.
This whole question of method of study of the world and 
of living in the world is, of course, intimately bound to 
the question of happiness. In other words: In which
epistemological (and psychological) mode is happiness to be 
found? And are there, correspondingly, different species or
the object of his passion.
8It could be argued that the Editor's Footnote is a 
veiled reference to the fact that soliciting Saint-Preux's 
assistance in Bomston's affairs is a mere ploy to test his 
maturity, judgment, and self-mastery. Perhaps so, but it 
may also be a flippant indication of the fallacious, and 
irrelevant, nature of Bomston's arguments.
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nodes of happiness? Or can one shape himself to a 
preconceived method or mode?9
In his reply to Bomston's letter of exhortation (V,I), 
Saint-Preux claims to be (partially) cured by Wolmar of his 
passion for Julie. But the caveat is more important, it 
seems, than the bulk of his words. He declares that "the 
scene of Meilleries [i.e., the boat ride and promenade] was 
the crisis of my folly and of my ills." (527) Wolmar had 
explained to him the true state of his soul— evidently, that 
he was in love with a mere memory. "This too weak heart," 
he tells Bomston, "is cured as much as it is possible to be, 
and I prefer the sadness of an imaginary regret to the fear 
of being ceaselessly beset by crime." That is, he is only 
capable of a partial cure, which consists in knowing and 
accepting the fact that his love is imaginary10. He 
professes to have found peace, through the aid of Wolmar, 
whom he now calls friend. Living in the simplicity and 
equality of the Clarens household, his heart, by degrees, 
comes into union with those of Julie and Wolmar, "as the 
voice, without thinking of it, takes on the tone of the 
people with whom one speaks." (527)
9It should not be forgotten that Rousseau is the father 
of a school of developmental psychology, the primary 
principle of which might be formulated simply as follows: 
Development cannot be forced. I refer to the thought of Jean Piaget.
10What nonsense!
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So the cure administered by Wolmar leaves Saint-Preux 
with an imaginary love of the past that he happily accepts 
as such, but still with an ability to live in the present 
with that same woman as a heartfelt friend. He then goes on 
to speak of life at Clarens and of the wisdom and goodness 
of Julie and Wolmar. If there is in this world a happy life 
it is theirs— a life in retreat surrounded by one's family. 
But one must know how to employ "the instruments of 
happiness" and must know how to taste of happiness. So, it 
is the art of being happy, in a particular situation, that 
Saint-Preux proceeds to describe to Lord Bomston.
In Part V, happiness will be pursued in two directions- 
-from the public and from the private aspect. The communal 
life at Clarens represents the public enterprise; and the 
love of Julie and Saint-Preux, the private. On the one 
hand, country life, it is argued, makes for a simpler and 
happier life; on the other, Saint-Preux and Julie attempt to 
cure themselves of misdirected passion, at one time thought 
to be the way of happiness itself. But why is country life 
more amenable to happiness? Briefly stated, because, in the 
country, people accept their positions and stations in life; 
whereas, in the city, they are continuously torn by real and 
imaginary ambitions. Stated otherwise, in the country, life 
is simple and its desires easily fulfilled. And that state 
of affairs more generally allows that our strengths be as 
great as our wishes: one Rousseauean formula for happiness.
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It is a life according to nature that Rousseau pretends to
.portray in his descriptions of the Clarens household.
On another level, the psychological drama of the
ascendancy of love over friendship seems to be playing
itself out. This process— the attempt to enthrone
friendship— is similar to the dynamics of country life: the
goal of controlling the imagination (and thus ambition).
The couple must- replace the memory of what was love with
current memories of friendship.
One might ask: Does Rousseau link the success of
country life in controlling the imagination with the success
of the couple's love cure? Mutual success seems to be based
on the absence of a loss of innocence. If the country
peasant has not seen the city and if the lover has not ever
been in love, the imaginations of both will probably be dull
and their ambitions minimal. Rousseau demonstrates these
general principles by various descriptions of life at
Clarens. But the cornerstone of all arguments (if they are,
in fact, that) is Julie. She is raised to the level of
heroine or saint, at least in the mind of Saint-Preux.
There will never be but one Julie in the world. 
Providence has watched over her, and nothing of 
that which regards her is the effect of chance. 
Heaven seems to have given her to the earth in 
order to show at the same time the excellence of 
which a human soul is susceptible and the 
happiness which it can enjoy in the obscurity of 
the private life, without the help of 
extraordinary virtues which could raise her above 
herself, nor with the glory that could honor 
them. (V,II,532)
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Julie becomes symbol— of what humankind can and cannot do. 
In being what she is, she is both horizon and limit. If 
humankind can be happy or saved, this Julie— this child of 
Providence— can surely be also. (This privileged position 
of Julie in the scheme of things might well be kept in mind 
as we approach the end of the story of this search for 
happiness.)
The first ingredient of country happiness is given as 
Julie's grand maxim: Do not favor changes in condition, but 
rather contribute toward making each person happy in his or 
her present condition; and prevent the villager from leaving 
the countryside. Saint-Preux objects to Julie that nature 
gives diverse talents to men without regard to their 
conditions in life. Julie responds that morality and 
happiness must be given precedence over talent. And, 
besides, if we hold that all talents should be developed, we 
must also believe that talent must coincide with the 
necessary jobs of life. But this does not seem so. Who 
would work the fields if we waited for agricultural talent 
to fill the positions? We could stretch the implications of 
this line of thought to say that Providence does not 
distribute the talent and that the development of talent 
does not necessarily lead to either happiness or morality. 
In fact, "the most vile [of all talents] is the only one 
that leads to riches." (536-38) Julie's ideas on talent are 
often similar to Rousseau's of the First Discourse: What
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we, in our "fallen state," want is often not in our best 
interests.
The above night well prepare us for a discussion of a 
practice of Julie's which night be called ascetic pleasure. 
But this discussion of self-inposed privation for the sake 
of heightened pleasure is prefaced with a sort of anti­
cartesian hymn to Julie.
Julie's soul and body are equally sensitive. The 
same delicacy reigns in her feelings and in her 
organs. She was made to know and to taste all
the pleasures, and for a long tine she has not
loved virtue so dearly as the sweetest
voluptuousness. (541)
Nonetheless, "the art of enjoying is for her that of
privation," though not a painful privation. Julie believes
that when a pleasure becomes a dull habit it ceases to be a
pleasure and becomes a need. Therefore, she deprives
herself of a pleasure and, when she partakes, partakes in
moderation— all with the purpose of enhancing the pleasure.
But
A more noble objective is proposed by her in all 
that— to remain mistress of herself, to accustom 
her passions to obedience, and to shape all her
desires to the rule. It is a new11 means of
being happy, for one only enjoys without anxiety 
that which one can lose without pain, and if true 
happiness belongs to the wise man, it is because 
he is, among all men, the one from whom fortune 
can take the least. (542)
There is no question that Julie's art of enjoying 
echoes of Aristotelian moderation, but what do we make of
“Compared to Aristotelian moderation?
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Rousseau/Saint-Preux's claim that it represents a new means 
of being happy. By way of answer, it could be said that for 
Aristotle pleasure was not taken in the fulfillment of 
individual desires, but in the awareness that one was master 
of oneself. But Julie— a sort of voluptuary, according to 
Saint-Preux— was not one to separate mind from body, or 
morality from pleasure. Moderation, even self-mastery, was 
in the service of pleasure/happiness. Saint-Preux even 
makes the argument that Julie had improved on vulgar 
Epicurians who never lost an opportunity to follow a desire. 
(542)
The secret of the happy life, in the midst of country
retreat, seems to be restrained ambition.
A small number of nice and peaceful people, 
united by mutual needs and reciprocal goodwill, 
converges by diverse services to a common end: 
each finding in his state all that is necessary 
to be content and to not wish to leave it, one 
attaches himself to it as being necessary to 
remain there all his life, and the only ambition 
that one keeps is that of successfully fulfilling 
one's duties. (547-548)
The chores of country life are one's duties and pleasures.
(549) The useful is joined to the agreeable. Repetition
and the love of repetition is the hallmark of this simple
life: Content with today, Julie asks nothing different from
tomorrow.
She does always the same things because those 
[things] are good, and because she knows nothing 
better to do. Undoubtedly she enjoys every 
happiness allowed to man. To take pleasure for
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the whole length of one's state in life, is it
not a sure sign that one is happy in it? (553)
As we saw expressed in the Reveries. the wished for 
duration— to the ideal point of everlastingness— of a 
particular state attests to the genuine happiness of that 
state. Rousseau would have us assume that the city-dweller 
is bored by repetition, probably because what the city 
dweller does each day is not inherently good, or natural, as 
well as because of an unbridled imagination. The city
dweller is "the man of man, in place of [the man] of 
nature." (554)
As is evident enough, Letter II recapitulates much of 
the teaching of Rousseau's first two discourses. But, in 
Letter II, he takes some steps toward describing his answer 
to the degeneration of contemporary life, in Paris, for 
example. Before On the Social Contractf he prepares his 
ground with a eulogy of agrarian society, but that country 
life, with the Wolmars as reigning king and queen, is hardly 
one of liberty and equality, even if it is blessed with 
benevolence. Perhaps Rousseau offers the paternalism of the 
Wolmar estate as the best that the European could achieve as 
it waited for the introduction of "the general will" and 
democracy. The New Heloise went on sale in January of 1761; 
On the Social Contract was published in April of 1762. And, 
as we shall see in Letter III of Part V, Rousseau was also
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concerned at this tine with the ideas of his Emile, which
was condemned by the Paris court on June 9, 1762.
In the beginning of Letter III, Saint-Preux, again
writing to Bomston, discourses on what we have called the
theme of private happiness or, more specifically, the
happiness of the couple Julie and Saint-Preux. Musing on
the supremely pleasant life that he is living at Clarens, he
allows himself a meditation on his former love.
If extinguished love throws the soul into
emptiness, subjugated love gives to it, with the 
consciousness of its victory, a new elevation and 
a more lively attraction for all that is grand 
and beautiful. (V,III,557)
And, justifying his very life, he concludes: "I feel that
it was necessary to have been what I was in order to become
what I want to be." (557) One cannot help asking just what
Saint-Preux wants to be. Is it the much admired Wolmar or
the adored Julie?
Whatever his wishes for himself, he immediately begins
for Bomston a description of the famous "matinee a
l'anglaise" during which, after the departure of some
guests, Wolmar, Julie, and he are— just the three of them—
reunited and in silence. It is a state of being he feels
that few people know. It is a friendship that requires no
words— that is beyond words! It is "a state of
contemplation" in which friends are gathered into each
other: "the least distractions are disheartening, the least
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constraint is unbearable." (558) The presence of a stranger
restrains the feeling of this state.
Two hours passed between us in this immobility of 
ecstacy, a thousand times sweeter than the cold 
repose of the Gods of Epicurus. (558)
This is at least the second time that Rousseau has
compared the pleasures of his sort of friendship to the
pleasures of Epicurean philosophers who were known to value
friendship above all else. Even Rousseau's brand of
friendship is categorically different from anything that
went before. It is a communion of souls, but not within the
bosom or brotherhood of any religion or philosophy. It is
as if Rousseau embodied that anomaly of the secular mystic—
whatever that might mean.12
The happiness of the individual and the happiness of
the human species are different and, it seems, mutually
exclusive goals. This is demonstrated, or revealed, in
microcosm, in the discussion of Julie's theories of
education which follow more or less immediately upon Saint-
Preux 's description of the happiness of the three of them in
a garden even more sublime than that of Epicurus.
Beyond the constitution that is common to the 
species each person brings at birth a particular
12A1s o, these "two hours" of communion of souls might 
relate to the two hours Saint-Preux spent in Elysium and to 
the one hour spent talking with Julie after their love- 
making. These times involved one, two, and three persons, 
respectively; and they were each decidedly heightened 
experiences for Saint-Preux— three different experiences of 
happiness, we are tempted to conclude.
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temperament which determines his genius and his 
character, and it is not a question of changing 
or constraining it, but of forming and perfecting 
it. (563)
Furthermore, there is "a universal system" into which
everyone fits; there are no faulty or errant souls
necessarily. "Every man has his place assigned in the best
order of things; it is a question of finding that place and
not perverting that order." (563) This sounds a little like
Plato's Myth of the Metals, and, sure enough, two pages over
Plato is explicitly cited for the insight that knowledge and
philosophy "can do no more than draw out from a human soul
what nature had placed there." (565)
Wolmar steps in to elaborate on this Platonic notion of
education (Saint-Preux is relating these theories as if
Julie and Wolmar agreed on everything.). Referring to two
dogs of the same litter, which were raised the same, but
which act so differently, Wolmar concludes:
The sole difference in temperaments produced in 
them [the difference] in character, just as the 
sole difference in the interior organization 
produces in us [the difference] in intelligence 
(esprits). (565)
In order to change a mind or spirit, it is necessary to
change the interior organization of the person; and to
change a character, it would be necessary to change the
temperament. (566) Reason must be a major element of
temperament, because it is reason "that makes character come
out and gives it its veritable form." (566) And each person
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is an individual; education must address itself to the 
particularities of each individual. "One man is made to 
carry human knowledge to its furthermost point; to another 
it is fatal to know how to read." (566)
All this seems simple enough: Nature gives certain
latent characters and talents; it is for the educator to 
bring them out. However, our allusion to Plato's Myth of 
the Metals becomes more problematically operative when 
Wolmar (and Julie?) begin distinguishing between education 
for country life and education for city life. Men destined 
for the simplicity of country life have no need, in order to 
be happy, of developing their faculties, and their talents 
are like legally non-exploitable gold mines. But city life 
requires otherwise: All talents must be developed for
diverse and more complex chores— for the survival of the 
individual! But the main point is this: Education of the
villager regards the species; whereas education of the 
urbanite regards the individual. What Rousseau does not 
have his characters conclude here is that, in the country, 
the happiness of the individual and of the species coincide; 
whereas, in the city, the individual flourishes and the 
species dies. In a sense, the type of person one might 
become depends less on naturally constituent metals as on 
the accident of place of birth (for not all talented country 
boys make it to the city). One begins to wonder about the 
"universal system" wherein all works for the best, where
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everyone has a place and will find it, if only nan would 
follow nature. The argument begins to sound somewhat 
tautological: Nature is perfect; if something is not
perfect, it is not nature, but man-made. Another conclusion 
might be this: If there is a "universal system," it does
not seem to be one, necessarily, of individual happiness. 
Whatever the case, Rousseau is aware that a right education 
(something unnatural but done naturally) is dependent on so 
many contingencies that "wisdom depends much on happiness." 
(585) This seems to make happiness dependent, at least to 
a great extent, on contingencies. The element of chance, 
regardless of Rousseau's use of the notion of Providence, 
plays a large role in the pursuit of happiness.
An earlier mention of mysticism sprung from the 
"matinee a l'anglaise." In Letter V, Saint-Preux formally 
discusses the subject within the context of religion—  
specifically, the unbelief of Wolmar and the belief of 
Julie. We shall deal briefly with the latter, since it 
addresses Rousseau's ongoing pursuit of happiness. Saint- 
Preux claims that one might say that nothing of this earth 
is sufficient to fulfill Julie's need to love; and that this 
excess of sensibility, by which she is devoured, is forced 
to return to its source. Comparing Saint Theresa 
unfavorably with Julie, he writes that Julie's heart is 
truly inexhaustible, that neither love nor friendship could 
consume it, that it looks to the only Being worthy of it.
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What is singular about Julie is that the more devout she is
the less she believes herself to be, and "she complains of
feeling within herself an arid soul which does not know how
to love God." (590)
It is no use, she often says, the heart attaches 
itself only by the mediation of the senses or of 
the imagination which represents them, and the 
means of seeing or imagining the immensity of the 
great Being! When I wish to raise myself to him,
I do not know where I am; perceiving no rapport 
between him and me, I do not know how to reach 
him; I no longer see nor sense anything, I find 
myself in a sort of nothingness, and if I dared 
judge others according to myself, I would fear 
that ecstacies of the mystics not come less from 
a full heart than from an empty brain. (590)
Julie continues by saying that, in order to rescue herself
from the phantoms of a reason which leads her astray, she
substitutes a crude cult which is within her reach for those
sublime contemplations which surpass her faculties.
Regretfully, I lower divine majesty; I interpose 
between it and myself sensual objects; not being 
able to contemplate it in its essence, I 
contemplate it at least in its works, I love it 
in its good works; but whatever approach I take, 
in the place of pure love that it demands, I have 
only an interested acknowledgement to offer. (590-91)
Saint-Preux steps in to draw conclusions from Julie's 
account of her religiosity: "It is thus that everything
becomes sentiment in a sensitive heart . . .  if the God of 
the universe escapes her weak eyes, she sees everywhere the 
common father of men." (591)
Before the novel ends, Julie will confess to a sort of 
world weariness, which seems to relate to both failed
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religious aspirations as well as to (the related) failed 
romantic passions, for just as romantic love seems to be 
metaphoric for knowledge of the divine13, so desire for 
knowledge of the divine seems here a metaphor for the 
frustrations of the inherent impossibilities of a fully- 
fulfilled romantic passion.14 If happiness depends either 
on apperception of the infinite or on the satisfaction of a 
passion for absolute union, then there is no happiness here 
below for Julie. Perhaps, there is simply no happiness here 
below.
But what of the happiness of country life? As was 
stated above, these last few letters deal intermittently 
with the happiness of the species and the happiness of the 
individual. They are two almost equally impossible chores, 
given the present developed state of the species and the 
mere nature of what would be a conscious and non-alienated 
human. This is not to deny that, as we saw in Chapter 2, 
Rousseau, especially in the Reveries. expresses that he 
found for himself, finally, some form of happiness— even if 
it involved the absence of all other human beings (or, 
should we say, required the absence of all other humans?). 
It does seem to mean that the species can only achieve a
13Cf. the more Platonic-erotic passages of Part I of the novel.
14This impossibility relates to the very nature of the passion myth itself.
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very tenuous happiness (or a slowdown in the rate of
increased unhappiness) and that Julie's elaborate and 
seemingly paradigmatic life proved an inadequate means to 
earthly happiness.
It was during the first of their discussions of
religion that Saint-Preux envisioned the most formidable 
obstacle to any "guilty desire" which he might still harbor 
for Julie: "She was surrounded by the supreme majesty;
incessantly I saw God between her and me . . .  my heart was 
purged by the fire of her Zeal, and I shared her virtue." 
(593) The first obvious obstacle to their love had been 
Julie's father; this last (?) obstacle— God— may also be
said to be her Father. This is the novelist's way of
absolutizing the physical separation of the lovers, while 
allowing a friendship of spiritual communion. We are 
returned to the sort of dualistic Platonism that permeated 
Part I, but now they are, one might say, soul friends as 
opposed to soul lovers (Julie had, we might remember, asked 
Saint-Preux to be the "lover" of her soul.). While a "veil 
of sadness" covered the union between Julie and Wolmar, 
because of his disbelief, Julie could still converse 
sympathetically in tete-a-tetes about religion with her 
former lover. He has, in fact, by necessity, become the 
lover of her soul. But does this state of the affair make 
him happy?
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In Letter VII, from Saint-Preux to Bomston, the grape
harvest becomes the setting— a celebration that returns one
to "the time of the patriarchs" (603) and, as the Pleiade
editors express it,
the evocation of an Edenic community where beings 
live in an atmosphere of celebration, joy, love 
which possesses something of the sacred.”
It is within the context of the harvest that the
reconciliation between Saint-Preux and the Baron (Julie's
father) is announced by the novelist. Wolmar's second test
of Saint-Preux was whether he would embrace Julie's father;
he did, and as a curious Editor's Footnote, quoting an
uncollected letter where Julie quotes Wolmar, says: "From
that instant, I counted on him totally." (605)
It is only too ironic that just four pages further on,
Saint-Preux, while listening with Claire and Julie to the
peasants singing old familiar ballads, falls into a lover's
melancholic revery.
Casting my eyes on [Claire and Julie] and 
recalling distant times, a shiver takes hold of 
me, an unbearable weight suddenly falls on my 
heart, and leaves me with a deadly impression 
that I cannot undo with impunity. (609)
This might be a foreshadowing of the customarily accepted
foreshadowing of Julie's death (i.e., Saint-Preux's veil
dream; see below), but it is also an indication that he (and
Julie, for she blushes at the sound of the singing) is not
15OC II 602, n. 2.
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fully in control of his imagination; he has not, as Wolmar's
theory of the cure requires, replaced old memories with new
and harmless ones. And, as if to weave perfectly the
questions of private and public happiness (or lack of it),
Saint-Preux ends the letter with an echo of Rousseau's test
of happiness.
Everyone drinks to the health of the victor 
[judged to have done the most work at harvest] 
and goes to bed, content with a day passed in 
work, gaiety, innocence, and [content] not to be 
sorry to recommence the next day, and the day 
after, and for one's whole life. (611)
Ostensibly, there is both public and private happiness
in Letter VII, unified seemingly by the fact that Saint-
Preux "truly felt himself in the country" (602) where
happiness seems at least possible. If this is so, what is
the import of Saint-Preux's "deadly impression"? Could it
not be a premonition that there will be no happiness either
for Julie or for him? And the seemingly happy peasants sing
their way into another happy tomorrow. They do not have
romantic frustrations because 1) their masters work to
prevent them from germinating and 2) they do not have
developed imaginations (or talents). It seems that only
persons autocratically controlled have a chance at anything
that might be called public happiness. (Of course, this is
before the offered solution of On the Social Contract.)
It should be clear enough by now that on the success of
the "cure" of Saint-Preux and Julie hinges the symbolic
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possibility of the reconstitution of fallen (or degenerate)
humankind for a happy social as well as private life. Our
protagonists are something like the guinea pigs of
civilization1 It is in Letter VIII that Saint-Preux
proclaims to his benefactor Wolmar that the cure has been
successful Ml As critics, we must not only question whether
the cure has finally taken, but also why. Whatever the
truth about the cure, Saint-Preux writes to Wolmar in almost
unexplainably hyperbolic fashion.
Enjoy, dear Wolmar, the fruit of your labor. 
Accept homage from a purified heart, that, with 
so much trouble, you have made worthy of being 
offered to you. Never has man undertaken what 
you have undertaken, never has man attempted that 
which you have achieved; never has a grateful and 
sensitive soul felt what you have inspired in me.
[My soul] had lost its energy, its vigor, its 
being; you returned it all to me. I was dead to 
virtue as well as to happiness: I owe you this
moral life into which I feel myself reborn. Oh 
my Benefactor! Oh my Father! By giving myself 
entirely to you, I can offer you, as if to God 
himself, only the gifts that I have because of 
you. (V,VIII,611)
Saint-Preux is telling Wolmar that he, Wolmar, has turned
back the march of progressively degenerative history by
curing Saint-Preux of his malady of the imagination and
memory.16 But how can Saint-Preux say what he does, and is
it true?
Saint-Preux confesses that, just eight days before, he 
had thought all was lost— that the cure had failed. But now
16We might be reminded by Saint-Preux's hyperbolic 
language that for Nietzsche forgetfulness was a blessed art.
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he believes himself cured not only because Wolmar tells him 
so, but because he, Saint-Preux, feels it. He says that he 
has written Claire the details of what he terms as his "last 
fault." (The fault is a dream of Julie's death, all to be 
analyzed shortly.) But what could have finally clinched the 
cure? It might be that, first, he has learned that the 
education of the Wolmar children will be turned over to 
him17, and, secondly, he realizes that his friend Bomston, 
normally considered his superior, is in need of his wise 
assistance.
Perhaps Saint-Preux's elevation to those two positions 
of responsibility has given him an assurance of himself and 
of the cure. But, as we learn in Letter IX, the drastic 
change in him is more enigmatic— mysterious even. What is 
it that cures Saint-Preux of his passion/love for Julie? 
Though the answer will remain ambiguous within the context 
of the novel, it might have been something as simple as the 
love of another woman. If that is, in fact, the case, it is 
a sort of "elective affinity"— not the machinations of a 
wise man— that finally resolves Saint-Preux's passion. Such 
is the import of this seemingly trivial question: Reason
cures nature, or nature cures nature. Rousseau stands
l7In mentioning the education of the boys, Saint-Preux 
points out the fundamental principle of Emile: "everything
consists in not spoiling the man of nature while 
appropriating him to society." (612) He seems to say that 
he was spoiled, but that Wolmar brought him back to 
innocence, so to speak.
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between the Reason of the Enlightenment and the Romantic 
Naturalism of the nineteenth century. What we finally 
discover to be Rousseau's answer for the cure of life 
itself— Reason or Nature— within the context of The New 
Heloise should help to crystalize a definition of Rousseau 
himself.
In Letter IX to Claire, Saint-Preux relates the story
of his "last fault" and of his final cure. He is travelling
with Lord Bomston to settle Bomston's affairs; they stay
over at Villeneuve and Saint-Preux finds himself in the same
hotel room as he occupied ten years before on the way to
Sion, when he was first separated from Julie. An almost
uncommunicable impression seized him. He instantly became
what he had been; his present unhappiness left him at first,
but then all of the intervening misery overcame him.
I delivered myself up, in the peace of innocence, 
to the ecstacies of a shared love: I savored at
length the delicious feeling which made me live:
The sweet vapor of hope inebriated my heart.
(V, IX, 615)
He describes a sort of delirium, in which he envisions 
Julie's death. If she were dead at least he would have the 
hope of meeting up with her. "But she lives; she is happy1 
. . . she lives, and her life is my death, and her happiness 
is my torture." (615) Thus far is Saint-Preux's waking 
dream.
There is no question that his imagination and memory 
have not been reconstituted. In fact, he is living not only
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in the past, but also in an agonizing present. In any case, 
he goes to sleep, and those "sad ideas" follow him and 
transform into a most cruel dream. He believed he saw 
Julie's mother on her deathbed and Julie, mourning at her 
side. After some conversation, Julie is in the place of the 
dying mother, but her face is covered by the ubiquitous 
"veil." Trying desperately to rip the veil away, Saint- 
Preux hears Julie say to him, "The formidable veil covers 
me, no hand can take it away," and, drenched in 
perspiration, he wakes in tears.
This same dream recurred that night a second and a 
third time, after which he gets up and eventually enters 
Bomston's room with the prophetic words— "It is done, I 
shall see her no more." (617) As soon as Bomston learned 
the situation and the seriousness with which his friend took 
it, he treated Saint-Preux to an old-fashioned blessing out: 
"You merit neither my friendship nor my esteem. . . . if I 
had given to my lackey a quarter of the attention that I 
have given you, I would have made a man; but you are 
nothing." Saint-Preux agrees that he is nothing, but 
because he will never see Julie again— and Julie is the 
source of all that is good in him. Bomston smiled, embraced 
Saint-Preux, and soon had them in a coach headed back to 
Clarens, so that Saint-Preux could see for himself that 
Julie still lived. "Do not come back," Bomston tells him
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when they have reached the gate of the estate, "until you 
have torn that fatal veil in your brain." (617)
The next page or so must contain the key to the success 
of the cure to Saint-Preux's romantic melancholy. 
Approaching the house and worrying just how he is to present 
himself, he heard the gate of Elysium open and close. He 
writes that he heard both her (he is writing to Claire) and 
Julie talking; "without being able to distinguish a sole 
word, I found in the sound of your voice I do not know what 
of the languishing and the tender, that stirred my emotions, 
and in [Julie's voice] an accent affectionate and sweet as 
is ordinary with her, but peaceful and serene, which brought 
me back to the present and which was the true awakening from 
my dream." (618) Exactly what wakens him from his dream 
(constituting the "cure"?) is still not totally clear. It 
would seem that it was the peaceful and serene voice of 
Julie, but could it not also have been Claire's voice that 
was described in a more charged and mysterious way?18
Whatever the truth of the matter, Saint-Preux declares 
in the very next sentence that "Then and there I felt myself 
so changed that I made fun of myself and my false alarms." 
And, as a show of his new-found strength and confidence, 
Saint-Preux decided not even to seek a look at Julie. He
18Claire was confessing her love for Saint-Preux at this 
very moment, but the reader and Claire are led to believe 
that he heard not a word of it. (See OC II 618, n. 1)
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left having only heard her voice. He felt entirely cured, 
and he felt that he had finally raised "that veil by which 
my reason was for a long time dazzled (offusquee)." His 
ecstacies are extinguished, and he sees and loves his duty—  
a clear sign of his entry into the public realm. "Both of 
you," he expresses to Claire, "are dearer to me than ever; 
but my heart no longer distinguishes one from the other and 
does not separate the inseparables." (619)
Why does he no longer distinguish between Julie and 
Claire? What in fact lifted the veil? What cured him, if 
not the realization that he loved Claire as well as Julie, 
or that they loved each other? If this is the case, if love 
of Julie is displaced, so to speak, by love of Claire, then 
Wolmar's cure, which called for new memories of Julie to 
replaced old memories of Julie, was not operative here; 
instead, nature healed itself: It replaced or at least
neutralized one love by another. Of course, this is no 
marvelously new revelation on lovesickness, but, within the 
context of this philosophical novel, its importance cannot 
be over-estimated, for it confirms Rousseau's faith in 
nature over reason (Wolmar).
Because Saint-Preux might not understand the meaning of 
events he himself lived through only means that the valid 
interpretation is not in the mouth of any one character (not 
even Julie's), but between the lines of the text. As Allan 
Bloom remarked and as we quoted early on, Rousseau's
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characters do not always possess a high degree of self-
awareness. That Saint-Preux never satisfactorily explains
just what it was that freed him leaves it to the reader to
discover within the text. That our interpretation reaffirms
a long-standing naturalistic interpretation of Rousseau's
thought as a whole lends it a sort of validation that the
creative interpretation of one brief text could not give.
But the interpretation of this brief text also supports the
former unfavorable interpretation of Wolmar and his
rationalist philosophy and method. The surface reflects the
depths, as Leo Strauss has written, and this "romantic
novel"— paradoxically enough and as far as it can go— offers
a philosophical justification of what later became known as
Romanticism. Love cannot be the object of any scientific
method, however astute; rather, it has its own laws, one of
which seems to be that only varying degrees of love or
despair can replace or neutralize love. It is a sort of
naturalism, if not a strict romanticism.
In her response to Saint-Preux, Claire is equally
puzzled by what moved Saint-Preux to have such a disturbing
experience and by what all of a sudden reassured him. "You
were alarmed without reason; you are reassured in like
manner." (620) In a post scriptum, Claire, covering all
possibilities, admonishes:
Moreover, if it is true that you heard nothing of 
our conversation in the Elysium, it is all the 
better for you; for you know that I am alert
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enough to see people before they perceive me, and 
clever enough to nock the eavesdroppers. (621)
Perhaps Claire, like this interpreter, surmises that the
otherwise unexplainable recovery of Saint-Preux was due to
his overhearing Claire's profession of love for him.
Wolmar's reaction to Saint-Preux's dream is perfectly
rationalistic: If you were not thinking of your former
lover during the day, you would not be dreaming of her at
night. Not only does this understanding beg the question,
but Wolmar, though he mocks philosophical system builders in
this Letter XI, is a Newtonian through and through.
Saint-Preux writes not so much in reply to Wolmar as to
inform him of the pitiable state of Edouard's love life. He
speaks of Bomston's misplaced love for Lauretta Pisana (a
reformed prostitute) in much the same way as one might have
been speaking of him, Saint-Preux, some eight years before.
Saint-Preux vows to save his noble friend from his own
passions. We learn that Bomston's lovesickness is faked in
order to test Saint-Preux's resolve and maturity. He passes
with flying colors— even to the point of an independence
that, for the first time in his life, allows him to keep a
secret from the two Cousins. It is almost as if to say:
Saint-Preux is now a man; he is no longer in love.
The story of Saint-Preux and Claire does not formally
begin until Letter XII (from Julie to Claire), in which
Julie not only urges Claire to marry Saint-Preux, but in
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which she indirectly divulges her own feelings for him. She
tells Claire that she can discern that Claire has been
•'taken” by Saint-Preux; and she compares Claire's present
situation to hers of old. (V,XIII,625) The danger of living
in close proximity (at Clarens, that is) to "a cherished
object" cannot be over-estimated.
It is my turn, now, my sweet friend, and I have 
moreover the sad authority of experience to make 
me listened to. Listen then to me while there is 
still time, out of fear that after having passed 
half of your life deploring my faults, you do not 
pass the other half deploring yours. (628)
Returning to Claire's expressed preference for friendship
over love, Julie speaks to the heart of that position: "No,
my child, the soul has no sex; but its affections do
distinguish them." (629) Julie goes so far as to tell
Claire that Claire would have fallen in love with Saint-
Preux, if Julie had not done so first. And this newly
kindled love could well help cure her, says Julie! (631)
But it must be avowed and openly acted upon, Julie presses.
Alluding to one of Saint-Preux's "speeches" from early in
Part I of the novel— the context of which was one of the
rare references to Heloise and Abelard— Julie insists that
"One must honor oneself in order to be honored; how can one
merit the respect of others without having any for oneself;
and where will she stop when the first step on the road to
vice is taken without fear?" (632) Yours is an upright
feeling, Julie tells Claire, that only needs to be declared
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to be made innocent. "[IJs it shameful to marry him whom
you love or to love him without marrying him?"
It is toward the end of the letter that Julie defines
a situation which resembles one expressed by Saint-Preux
when he said he could no longer distinguish the inseparable
Cousins from each other.
Ah Cousin! how charming for me to reunite forever 
two hearts so well made one for the other, and 
which have merged for a long time in mine. May 
they merge even more so, if it is possible; be no 
longer but one for each other and for me. Yes, 
my Claire, you will continue to be of service to 
your friend by crowning your love, and I will be 
surer of my own feelings when I will no longer be 
able to distinguish them between you. (634)
At least two observations need to be made: 1) Whereas we
hypothesized that it was Claire's love of Saint-Preux that
neutralized his passion for Julie, here Claire's love for
Saint-Preux— when seen under the prospect of marriage—
neutralizes Julie's love of him. In neither case is the
memory tricked into falling out of love, as was Wolmar's
proposed cure for love; rather, in both cases, it is a third
party to the love that softens or, say, tames the love (It
might thus be said that Julie/Saint-Preux/Claire better
represent a true "menage a trois" than do the traditional
trinity of Julie/Saint-Preux/Wolmar.). 2) It seems that it
is only in a menage a trois that the soul— and even its
affections— cannot be distinguished. Saint-Preux said that
he could not distinguish Julie and Claire, and from that
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moment he was cured; Julie says that if Claire and Saint- 
Preux marry, she will not be able to distinguish them. 
Asceticism does not seem to be Rousseau's road to Platonic 
or spiritual love; it seems rather a sort of sublimation 
made possible by a merged friendship in which passions are 
diffused, rarefied, and elevated.
But, if Claire is not agreeable to marriage with Saint- 
Preux, Julie proposes that "we cast away from ourselves this 
dangerous main." (634) The education of their children is 
not as important as the virtue of their mothers. Julie all 
but professes a continuing passion for Saint-Preux, 
controllable only by Claire's marriage to him. And we learn 
from a letter by Claire's young daughter Henriette that 
Julie exits from the room where she has been writing the 
subject letter, showing every evidence that she has been 
crying.
So, we end Part V with Saint-Preux claiming to and 
showing some signs of having been cured of his passion, and 
with Julie breaking down into admission that Saint-Preux is 
still for her "a dangerous man." The former has found, and 
the latter seeks, liberation through a sort of "menage a 
trois." It seems to be a relationship existing somewhere 
between the private intensity of romantic love and the 
public sameness of citizenship. Whatever the nature of the 




Claire answers Julie's proposal of her, Claire's,
marriage to Saint-Preux by saying that, whereas friendship
is lavish, love is miserly. In other words, she loves
Saint-Preux because he is Julie's friend.
I think that too close relations are always 
perilous at the age where he and I were; but, 
both of us with hearts full of the same object, 
we would accustom ourselves so to placing it 
between us that, unless we annihilated you, we 
would no longer be able to make contact with each 
other. (VI,II,640)
Claire does not share the ideal of the "menage a trois"
which requires a sort of merging of love and friendship.
For Claire, the champion of pure friendship,
Love wants to make all its progress by itself; it 
does not like friendship to halve the road with 
it.(641)
For Claire, old friends do not become new lovers. But she 
does confess, or rather recapitulates, to Julie how she felt 
an attraction for Saint-Preux and how she admitted in the 
Elysium the attachments that she felt being born within the 
both of them. But marriage to him? Never!
For one, Claire is too independent and too far removed 
from the yoke of marriage. Besides, she does not fear 
having a bachelor Saint-Preux around Clarens as does Julie. 
Also, Claire cannot stand the idea of giving her first 
husband a successor. Add to these reasons the fact that it 
is abhorrent to Claire to marry the former lover of her
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precious Julie and the catalogue of Claire's oppositions to 
that marriage is complete.
What of the other half of this proposed marriage? 
Saint-Preux is in Italy and, according to Bomston, 
conducting himself with surety and not at all like a 
lovesick boy. But it is advice that Saint-Preux gives to 
Bomston, who is embroiled with two women at the same time, 
that relates as much to Saint-Preux as to his friend. He 
tells Bomston, "You were able to break one chain only with 
another." (652) Even though both of Bomston's women were 
thought unworthy of him, and both of Saint-Preux's thought 
worthy, the natural process— call it that of assisted 
"elective affinities"— was the same in both cases for cures 
of lovesickness. Saint-Preux had learned from his haphazard 
experience with Julie and Claire just how to cure Bomston. 
Ironically, it was Saint-Preux who employed nature in the 
service of reason (whereas, I contend, Wolmar's attempt at 
the same thing failed).
Saint-Preux announces his definitive cure to Bomston 
when he says to him that "The reign of love is past, that of 
friendship begins." (653) And he swears solemn loyalty to 
Bomston. Bomston says that such a zealous profession of 
friendship made him forget both the Marquise and Laura. 
Friendship replaced love, as affinities within love had 
replaced each other. Bomston announces to Wolmar that 
Saint-Preux is "truly cured" and ready to be returned to
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Clarens. (Bomston seems to imply erroneously, I think, that 
Wolmar is more than indirectly responsible for this cure. 
In fact, in Wolmar's reply to Bomston, he has the pride (of 
philosophy) to say to Bomston that he, Wolmar, did not need 
Bomston's proof of Saint-Preux's cure, because 1) he, 
Wolmar, had his own proof and 2) "I believe I know him as 
well as one man is able to know another." (656) We should 
never forget that, however astute Wolmar is in knowledge 
through intellection, he cannot know by means of his 
sensibilities— which is, of course, the primary mode of 
knowing for Rousseau and his progeny the romantics.)
In her first letter to Saint-Preux since Part III, 
Julie begins with her considerations on how one is cured of 
love: "Great passions are smothered, rarely purified. . .
. The cause which makes one cease to love might be a vice, 
[but?] the cause that changes a tender love into a 
friendship no less lively could not be equivocal." 
(VI,VI,664) Julie is, within herself, negotiating her own 
cure. For Julie, even in the wake of extinguished love, the 
senses survive and everywhere is the occasion of relapse. 
She warns Saint-Preux in litany-like fashion of the dangers 
that must be confronted (e.g., "Do you believe that the 
monuments to be feared exist only at Meillerie?"), but she 
sounds more and more like one hopelessly crying out to 
herself, thinking that her task is to convince others.
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Confuting (unawares?) Wolmar's theory of the cure,
Julie expresses a fundament of later Romanticism:
Ahl you know only too well that a tender soul 
interests the entire universe in its passion and 
that, even after the cure, all the objects of 
nature recall to us still that which we felt 
before in seeing them. (667)
These dangers, even— especially— romantic ones, must be
neutralized if Julie and Saint-Preux are ever to be happy.
And it is, of course, a question of happiness in this
world.19 So she inches toward the issue of marriage to
Claire, which seems Julie's key to happiness, even if not
Saint-Preux's and Claire's. She claims that, in giving
Claire to him, she is giving herself. She sees herself as
owing Saint-Preux an old debt, and Claire is offered as
payment. In so doing, Julie "figures to reunite us without
danger." (671) The sweetest of sentiments will become
legitimate, and there will be no danger between them. They
will love each other "perfectly" and truly taste of
friendship, love, and innocence (the latter of which seems
to be regained by this "menage a trois"). Julie's goal is
none other than "a happiness reserved, beginning with this
world, only for the friends of virtue." (671) It is always
the same question: The reconciliation of love and virtue,
19In Part I, the question was How to find happiness 
within passionate love? In Parts II and III, it was How to 
find happiness within a passionate love that cannot be 
fulfilled? In Parts IV, V, and VI, the question is How to 
find happiness in the wake of passionate love?
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of happiness and virtue. To fulfill the demands of her 
heart, Julie needs Saint-Preux; to fulfill the demands of 
virtue, she needs Wolmar. In short, for Julie to be happy, 
the "menage a trois" must succeed, though, strictly 
speaking, it is a "menage a quatre." Julie, in her attempts 
to negotiate this marriage, is in (or sees herself to be in) 
a fight for her emotional and spiritual life.
Saint-Preux begins his response to this letter from 
Julie in an exuberant fashion, but stops himself as if to 
say But do not worry and continues by saying "I feel well; 
I am no longer the same, or you are no longer the same." 
(674) He tells her that his reason has returned to him, all 
of which makes her even dearer to him. He says that, 
although he has stopped loving, the impressions from the 
time of their romance are eternal and that he will ever be 
"the friend of your person and the lover of your virtues," 
a peculiar merging of love and friendship in a most benign 
fashion. Opposing Wolmar's theory of displaced memories, 
Saint-Preux writes that "The flower of my years will not 
fade in my memory." (675) All of this seems like an 
expression of a sort of ascetic courtly love. He says that, 
although he no longer belongs to her, he has remained "under 
her protection," as if she were his liege lady. Whereas 
this courtly disposition, with him a bachelor, seems to 
satisfy him (for he seems cured), whether or not it would 
give Julie the peace of mind she needs remains dubious.
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Admitting that he has grown more sensitive to Claire's
charms, Saint-Preux nonetheless compares, unfavorably of
course, what he feels for Claire to what he had felt for
Julie. All that he can say for Claire is that she, along
with Julie, make up the entire female population for Saint-
Preux, for his long-suffering has made him forget the rest
of women. He quotes Petrarch (alluding to Dante?) to the
effect: "My career is finished in the middle of my years."
He is, of course, in the midst of his explanation of his
cure, of which he says that
misfortune/unhappiness took the place in my case 
of force for the conquering of nature and the 
triumph over temptations. One has few desires 
when suffering, and you have taught me to 
extinguish them by resisting them. A great 
unhappy passion is a great means of wisdom. My 
heart became, so to speak, the expression 
[organe] of all my needs; I do not have any when 
it is tranquil. Leave it in peace, the one and 
the other, and henceforth it is so for always.
(677)
There is no clearer expression of world weariness than 
the above words of Saint-Preux, just as Julie will have a 
similar pronouncement in Letter XI. But, here, with Saint- 
Preux' s response to the idea of marriage to Claire, Julie's 
last grasp at earthly happiness seems to be fading. 
Everyone— Saint-Preux, Claire, Wolmar— seems settled in 
themselves and in their lives. Saint-Preux, seeming to 
argue for his capability of sustaining a chaste courtly 
love, says to Julie: "the fires in which I burned have
purified me; there is no longer anything of the ordinary man
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in me." (678) It seems that Julie alone is still 
"unpurified" and subject to temptation.20
Like Claire, Saint-Preux catalogues his reasons for not 
marrying. From being a tender and grateful friend to 
Claire, he would become "a vulgar husband"; Julie's presence 
would dominate their marriage and, besides, he cannot bring 
himself to break faith with Julie, even though circumstances 
seem to allow it. Admitting that his feeling of love for 
Claire has helped him bear his love for Julie with less 
pain, he ask that he not be shaken from the nothingness into 
which he has fallen; "from fear that with the sentiment of 
my existence I not rediscover that of my ills, and that a 
violent state not reopen all my wounds." (681) Rather, 
living "peacefully" among Julie and Claire is his idea of 
contentment.
The irony of Saint-Preux's letter is that he chides 
Julie for being overly cautious and fearful of what could 
happen at Clarens, if he and Claire do not marry. Whereas 
he claims that he has no more battles to fight with himself 
(682), he totally overlooks the possibility that Julie might 
be in need of support. And then he goes on to give her a 
lesson in theology— one, we might add, which is hardly 
useful to a person in the grip of passionate love; "[God] 
gives us the reason to know what is good, the conscience to
^ h e  situation of our couple is not unlike that of the 
original Heloise and Abelard.
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love it, and the freedom to choose it." (683) Arguing 
against the efficacy of prayer, he addresses another lesson 
at Julie, a lesson that, like the last one, argues for man's 
self-sufficiency, even if ultimately provided for by God: 
"It is not [God] who changes us, it is we who change 
ourselves by raising ourselves up to Him."21 (684) The 
extension of the argument against the direct efficacy of 
prayer might be taken as an argument against miracles and 
against asceticism.
Whether or not Saint-Preux has intended it, his words 
have told Julie that she can expect no help from him or 
anyone else in overcoming her burdensome passion for him. 
He seems to be describing the nature of the phenomenon, 
there included, his actual inability to marry Claire. 
Julie's letter of reply will reflect her tacit reception of 
that somber message.
Before his cure, Saint-Preux had been called a child by 
Bomston; now, after his cure, he is so called by Julie: 
"Your letter is like your life, sublime and cringing, full 
of strength and puerilities. My dear Philosopher, will you 
never cease to be a child?" (687) She insists that she was 
not trying to lay down any laws for him, but was merely 
trying to foresee any inconveniences they might encounter in 
their life together at Clarens.
21This notion of prayer sounds like that of Peter Abelard.
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She goes further and states that it is in this
"delicatesse" that survives a true love, rather than in the
subtle distinctions of Wolmar, that they must look for the
reason of "this elevation of soul and of this interior
strength that we experience with each other." (688) Julie
does not want to lose Saint-Preux because of what now looks
like a desperate and foolish attempt to marry Claire and
himself. She even tries to bring him closer to her by
expressing openly that her husband does not understand "true
love." She tells him that the last six months have been
"the sweetest of my life."
Then Julie enters into a paradoxical, but ultimately
despairing, picture of life: She has everything around her-
-family and friends; her being is extended by all she has,
without being divided. Everything seems perfect, but
my imagination no longer has anything to do, I 
have nothing to desire; to feel and to enjoy are 
the same thing for me; I live simultaneously in 
all that I love, I am full of happiness and life:
0 death, come when you wish! I no longer fear 
you, I have lived, I wait for you, I have no more 
new feelings to know, you have nothing more to 
take from me. (689)
Julie also fears that the pleasure of living in the presence
of Saint-Preux will be spoiled and demeaned by a necessary
lack of openness. She seems to underestimate the degree to
which the cure has worked on him and speaks to him of his
coming time of surety and even indifference (to her). (690)
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But she again invites him to Clarens, but this time as a
brother, in spite of what she perceives as the dangers.
Having discussed Saint-Preux and his state of mind,
Julie opens a discussion of herself. This Letter VIII
represents a sort of "confessions" of Julie. Having already
summoned death, she here describes her life, since her
marriage, as one— paradoxically— of erotic "happiness" only.
During the reign of the passions, they aid in 
bearing the torments that they give; they keep 
hope next to desire. As long as one desires, one 
can do without being happy; one expects to become 
so; if happiness does not come, hope is 
prolonged, and the spell of illusion lasts as 
long as the passion which causes it. Thus, this 
state is self-sufficient, and the anxiety that it 
causes is a sort of enjoyment which supplements 
reality. (693)
Alluding to her last world-weary speech, she concludes this
one: "Misfortune to whoever has nothing more to desire!"
In a sense, happiness is always outsmarting itself, for "one
is happy only before being happy." Completing this text,
which is the source for many nineteenth-century romantics22,
Julie seems to offer one of the keys for an understanding of
this novel which, we contend, is at least partially within
the tradition of the passion myth.
The country of chimeras is the only one in the 
world worthy to be inhabited, and such is the 
nothingness of human things that, except for the 
Being existing by Himself, there is nothing 
beautiful except that which is not. (693)
^OC II 693, n. 1.
241
Julie defines the human being as the desiring creature. 
(694) To be unable to desire— to live without illusion— *is 
the only unbearable privation of humankind. "My friend, I 
am too happy; happiness bores me."
This may well be the ultimate irony of the story: 
Julie has all that life could possibly give her— among what 
she would take— and still she is not happy after her 
ultimate fashion. Could the marriage of Claire and Saint- 
Preux have restored to her life a renewal of illusive 
passion that could have made life worthwhile? Whatever, she 
says that she desires, but for nothing of this world. For 
lack of a love both noble and passionate enough, Julie looks 
to Heaven. Saint-Preux has, for all passionate purposes, 
abandoned her.23
Perhaps the most meaningful conclusion for our purposes 
to be drawn from the relative estrangement of Julie and 
Saint-Preux is that passionate love and friendship cannot 
exist between the same persons at the same time. The 
"menage a trois" proposed by Julie would have attempted to 
preserve a sort of courtly love along with friendship. It
“The disagreement between Saint-Preux and Julie over 
the nature and power of prayer might be his way of 
expressing to her that she must cure herself of lingering 
lovesickness. It seems, as we noted earlier, that the 
nature of the passion is such that no one can directly 
assist in its cure. It is Julie who quotes Wolmar to the 
effect that prayer is the opium of the soul. Saint-Preux, 
on the other hand, seems to view prayer as a sort of self- fulfilling wish.
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is as if the elements changed their natures and effected the
election of affinities accordingly: A friend does not
compound with a lover.24
Nonetheless, Julie closes her last letter with a
renewal of the invitation to come to Clarens, but, this
time, with the intention of entering into a sort of
conspiracy of Christian example in order to convert Wolmar
from his disbelief.
If the project displeases you or frightens you, 
listen to your conscience; it dictates your duty.
I have nothing more to say to you. (701)
One might say that, just as Julie has discovered that just
as conversion or teaching by example is superior to
philosophic discourse, Rousseau uses the heroes and heroines
of his novel to convert to a manner of expressing and
circumscribing relations of love. Julie's project is a
Christian one; Rousseau's is one of moralistic
sentimentalism.
Julie's death is announced to Saint-Preux by Claire:
"It is done." That note is followed by a long letter from
Wolmar, describing the last days and the death of Julie.
MThe situation is somewhat like the Elective 
Affinities, a later novel by Goethe, in which, as writes 
Irving Singer, The Nature of Love. Vol. II (Chicago: 
University Press of Chicago), pp. 440-41: "Nature appears
as a deterministic mechanism that unites men and women as 
if they were chemical elements bonded to one another 
regardless of marital commitments that si.ek to keep them 
apart...[NJatural destinies are not concerned about the welfare of individuals."
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Though Wolmar, the would-be "living eye," gives a sober 
account of the events, Julie's dying and death reflect an 
assuaged Christian mythology or liturgy: There is a Holy
Week; there is a Last Supper; and there is even the illusion 
of a Resurrection. Julie's dying days are surely meant by 
Rousseau to teach or show the reader how to live, more so 
than how to die. She, we dare say, is the founding goddess 
of a religion of love— on both the humanistic and divine 
levels. As Wolmar, the atheist, writes: "She did not live
like any other: no one that I know has died like her."
(VI,XI,704)
In brief, both her life and her death were exemplary. 
Rousseau, although in the world of the imagination, is 
competing with his beloved Plutarch, in the creation of a 
heroine who will answer the needs of the times. (Whether 
Julie, with her form of benign and loving Christianity, 
answers the needs of all times is questionable— that is, in 
light of Rousseau's rejection in On the Social Contract of 
Christianity as an appropriate civil religion. Perhaps 
Rousseau felt that he had sufficiently redirected the 
attention of Julie's religion to this world and therefore 
made Christianity acceptable as a civil religion.)
Julie asked that they all have dinner in her room, and, 
afterwards, the Minister arrives uninvited and unannounced. 
Julie ends by giving religious instructions to the Minister, 
but in a totally ingenuous manner. One of the things she
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tells him is that she believes "The preparation for death is 
a good life." (715) The Socratic ring of this statement is 
undeniable in a traditional Christian environment
4 ■
represented by the Minister who believes in deathbed 
salvation.
Julie speaks words of love and encouragement to each of
her friends and family, putting them at peace in their
thoughts of her. As she-says to them:
My happiness climbed by degrees to the highest 
point; it could only fall. . . .  Is a permanent 
state made for man? No, when one has acquired 
everything, it is necessary to lose. (726)
But she will not allow them to think that they are losing
her:
I am not leaving you, so to speak; I remain with 
you; by leaving you all united, my spirit, my 
heart dwells with you. You will see me 
incessantly among yourselves. . . .  I was happy,
I am happy, I am going to be so: my happiness is
fixed, I snatch it from fortune; its only borders 
are eternity. (727)
The posture of Julie is that of a spiritual leader who 
is dying. She speaks to them on the state of the soul 
separated from the body and concludes that a pure spirit 
could never communicate with a soul trapped in a body.25 
The message is: Do not expect me to communicate with you
after my death. But a soul can return to earth in order to 
know what others think and feel; this is done by immediate
“But God can make Himself felt by speaking to the heart. (728)
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communication, somewhat like God's. (However, it seems that 
God's communications go both ways; those of separated souls 
only one way.)
Then there is the discovery that one day's worth of 
wine provisions had lasted five days. The incident is not 
made into a miracle, but no certain explanation is sought or 
found. It is hard to tell if such instances during the week 
of Julie's death are meant to be mystifications or 
demystifications. It would seem that their effects would 
operate according to the frame of reference of the 
individual. Nonetheless, the incident of Julie's supposed 
resuscitation is doubtlessly a form of demystification, 
brought on by an active imagination coupled with the 
people's love of the marvelous. (736)
For hours the servants, all of whom were truly devoted 
to Julie, believed that she had come back to life, so to 
speak. Finally, Claire places a veil of pearls over Julie's 
face and dares anyone to lift it and look on the now 
decomposing body. In her own world, Julie was a true 
heroine of almost goddess-like proportions— to the extent 
that her "people" would want to believe or think her capable 
of resurrecting.
Julie's last words to her (former) lover Saint-Preux 
are delivered to him, in the form of a letter of course, by 
Wolmar. She writes that Heaven prevented their reunion and 
that the reunion was not good. She says that she has lived
246
under an illusion for a longtime, and that it dissolves only 
when she no longer has need of it. "You believed me cured, 
and I believed to be." (VI,XII,740) This illusion of being 
cured was salutary, for it might well have kept Julie from 
falling into the abyss, as she says. But the greatest 
sentiment (or love) of her life wakes at the moment when 
there is nothing to fear; it bears her up at the moment of 
death.
Julie does not apologize for her feelings: they are
involuntary and cost nothing to her innocence. In fact, she 
can say: "Virtue is mine without a stain, and love is mine
without remorse." (741) At death— and only at death— is 
Julie able to say that she has reconciled love and virtue. 
But it was not without the help of illusion.26 It is death 
that makes and saves this reconciliation from possible 
dissolution.
Have I not lived enough for happiness and for 
virtue? What of use remained for me to get from 
life? By taking life from me Heaven takes from 
me nothing that is regrettable, and seals my 
honor. (741)
She feels that it is a good time for her to die and she 
leaves joyfully. She exhorts Saint-Preux to live, even in 
his pain and loss, within the community that Julie defined. 
"You lose of Julie only that which you lost long ago." (741) 
She will only die when the last of them dies. And she
26The value given here to illusion seems to disparage Wolmar's rationalistic principle of complete openness.
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describes to him his duties and dispositions vis-a-vis
Claire, Wolmar, and her children.
The very last words of Julie are much like a swan song-
-the free expression of love in the face of death, and
allowed only by death. For one last moment, she allows
herself the luxury of talking to Saint-Preux as her lover.
She ends her life as she "began" it: calling him "sweet
friend." She fears that she is talking too much, when her
heart no longer has a disguise, but she concludes that she
has nothing to fear, because it is no longer herself who
speaks, for she is "already in the arms of death."27
Her last sentences begin with a sort of neo-Platonic
Christian expression of love and death, and end with a most
noble all-to-human gift of love.
When you see this letter, worms will be eating 
the face of your lover, and her heart where you 
will be no more. But would my soul exist without 
you; without you what happiness would I taste?
No, I do not leave you, I am going to wait for 
you. Virtue, which separated us on earth, will 
unite us in our eternal stay. I die in that 
sweet expectation. Only too happy to buy at the 
price of my life the right to love you forever 
without remorse, and to say it to you one more 
time. (743)
Julie's posthumous letter focuses much that has filled 
the novel: its neo-Platonism, its courtly love, its
experimentation with triangular and quartenary love 
relationships, its opposition of love and friendship. It is
^In effect, then, her words become a sort of illusion.
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in death that Julie has found the key to the reconciliation
of love and virtue; only the dead and dying soul is totally
free to express love to whomever and to do it without loss
of honor. Or should it be rephrased?— only he or she who is
dead to the world is free of the world and, thus, able to
love and remain virtuous at the same time, in any
circumstances.
Julie's impending death allows her to express her love
(which, in fact, had been hidden from her by illusion, if
she was truthful in saying so). I contend that it is only
a slight imaginative leap from Julie's last letter to the
realization that the chaste courtly love tradition, outlined
by Denis de Rougement, offers Rousseau's answer to the
dilemma of love and virtue in a imperfect world of contrary
"elective affinities."
The novel actually ends with Claire inviting Saint-
Preux and his friend Bomston to settle at Clarens as Julie
had wished. She speaks of Julie as of a saint (or goddess).
Come then, dear and respectable friends, come 
reunite with all that remains of her. Let's 
reassemble all who were dear to her. May her 
spirit animate us; may her heart join all of 
ours; let's live always in her sight. (744)
Julie was surely not a goddess for Rousseau, but, I think,
he put into her possession, so to speak, the key of how
eighteenth-century European men and women might learn to
manage their out-of-control love affairs. One can say that
it involves primarily asceticism, but, perhaps, a better
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description would be sublimation; for courtly love does not 
suppress the expression of love but rather gives it a 
defined, directed, and circumscribed manner of celebration.
What Julie never attained, others may because of the Julie.
The "menage a trois" Julie/Saint-Preux/Wolmar did not 
last (despite one glorious day in Elysium), because the love 
couple (Julie and Saint-Preux) had no third party into which 
to merge and sublimate their passion for the love object.28 
That possibility was offered, at least Julie hoped, by 
Claire who was loved by both Julie and Saint-Preux. 
Unfortunately for Julie, Claire and Saint-Preux were not 
sufficiently attracted to each other to overcome their
overwhelming attraction for Julie. The chemistry was just
not right; and that is the ironic tragedy of Julie's 
unhappiness. Such an arrangement would have been the basis 
of a courtly love, which haunts the work from beginning to 
end.
Our most general thesis is that Rousseau is concerned 
primarily with individual and collective happiness— that he 
is primarily a eudaemonistic moralist. The subtle proposal, 
as I see it, of something like a courtly love rubric of 
addressing and living with the randomness of amorous
affinities, represents the action of an individual and
public moralist. It is a political act— by a political
28Theoretically, there seems no reason why a "menage a trois" could not work.
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Rousseau's overarching objective was a contribution to 
the happiness of humankind; the overarching obstacle to 
happiness was seen as alienation or division of the soul 
between nature and society, passion and virtue, happiness 
and duty. The Julie deals directly with this complex and 
envisions a synthesis— at least for a limited subset of 
human relationships. There is more than one morpheme of 
happiness, according to Rousseau, and there is no real 
hierarchy among them.
As we saw in Chapter I, there is solitary happiness and 
civic happiness, not to mention the good Emile (neither 
solitary nor civic). The Julie presents the guest of 
happiness of the romantic couple, which ends— in Julie's 
vision, at least— in a partial association or love triangle. 
This is a form of existence between solitude and society. 
Such an association is similar to the political in that 
friendship is its existential foundation and, in that, it is 
spiritually self-sufficient; but it is unlike the political 
in that it is not materially self-sufficient. It is not a 
return to nature; it is a transcendence of it.
The intent of the Julie, then, is to explore whether or 
not there can exist something like communal happiness— that 
is, other than solitary happiness— within the confines and 
horizon of love: that is, beyond love of self. Clarens and
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its idyllic community is, I think, a metaphor of the 
spiritual self-sufficiency envisioned by Julie in the love 
triangle, as opposed to Clarens being some sort of blueprint 
for political well-being.
Love and happiness are inseparable notions and 
experiences throughout the Julie. From Part I, love is in 
fact viewed as the means to happiness, and, though the type 
of love as a means to happiness will change as the story 
develops, the inseparable nature of the two never falls from 
Julie's firmament. And, from the beginning of the novel, 
friendship and courtly love also play a role: the
friendship of Claire and Julie; and the very nick name given 
Saint-Preux (Holy Knight)— not to mention the mock courtly 
love games engaged in by Claire, Julie, and Saint-Preux.
A fascination with an elevated Platonic love is never 
more evident than in Part I— when the lovers are actually in 
physical contact. Is it that even in the early stages of a 
young romance Julie senses that "ordinary" love will never 
satisfy her? It will turn out that she needs a religious 
love or at least a love nuanced with religious symbol (or 
courtly love). She will go to her death in the embrace of 
both these types of love— expressing, I shall conclude, a 
sacramentalizing of courtly love (not unlike what
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de Rougement describes1) . Nonetheless, de Rougement's 
contention that the Julie is a mere expression of the 
passion myth is, it seems to me, inaccurate on two counts: 
1) Rousseau is dealing with much more than passionate love; 
not only is he interested in friendship but also solitude 
and philosophy and civic virtue and happiness in various 
forms; 2) de Rougement concludes his brief analysis of the 
Julie by saying that "Rousseau ends with marriage— that is 
to say, with the triumph of the world as sanctified by 
Christianity;" de Rougement must know this to be an 
oversimplification: Does Julie not, so to speak, dissolve
her marriage at the moment of her death, all the while 
living a sort of Christian death-in-life? It seems clear 
that Rousseau did not believe the social institution of 
marriage to be an effective resolution of the passion myth, 
at least not for everyone (see Bomston and Saint-Preux's 
discussion of marriage as it relates to the few and the 
many).
It seems that Rousseau— even if only through the 
Italian poets like Petrarch— was definitely writing within 
the tradition of Cortezia (courtly love) and the passion 
myth. In Parts II and III of the novel, themes of romantic 
love per se begin to appear in sharp silhouette. It is, 
according to Saint-Preux, as if a "charm" (read: potion)
^e Rougement, Love. "Passion and Mysticism," pp. 149-
79.
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gave birth to their love, just as in the Tristan and Iseult 
myth. And it is in Part II that Saint-Preux abandons 
philosophy for "chaste love and sublime friendship"— or, 
otherwise expressed, for a sort of courtly love of Julie. 
Forsaking philosophy is tantamount to abandoning the ideal 
of solitude and god-like self-sufficiency. The latter is 
now comprised by the one soul of the two lovers, which makes 
their current separation all the more— infinitely more—  
trying. The lovers are, following de Rougement, now 
experiencing a longing of the infinite, or a longing unto 
death.
But, in this ordeal, Claire reminds the lovers— and she 
an outsider to love— that it appears to her that love 
requires such obstacles for its very survival; that left 
alone with itself love would die. Here Claire expresses the 
essential dynamic of the passion myth. And even Julie shows 
an understanding of the needs of passionate love: "in order
for us to love each other forever we must renounce each 
other. Let's forget all the rest and be the lover of my 
soul." (364) The only problem with this resolution is that 
the passion myth is only resolved in death or, as we shall 
see, in a death-in-rlife existence. And it is our ultimate 
contention that Rousseau was attempting to found, within the 
context of the passion myth, a new or at least a newly 
rediscovered resolution to the infinite longing of the 
myth. That resolution would return to the courtly love of
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the Middle Ages, but to a courtly love that was, like de 
Rougement's (as opposed to Singer's), a chaste love. 
Medieval courtly love begins to twine itself about the 
allusive symbol of the Abbess Heloise in spiritual communion 
with her former lover Abelard.
Let us remember that it is Claire, the non-lover, who 
gives the most pertinent expression to the dynamic of love—  
that is, the necessity of obstacles to its survival. Could 
this not be Rousseau's way of saying that you cannot love 
and know love at the same time? This represents an 
extension of Saint-Preux's proposition that one cannot both 
act and know at the same time. But Saint-Preux also seemed 
to say that one had to act in the world in order to know the 
world. The only way out of this conundrum is, perhaps, to 
posit two kinds of knowledge: by intellect and by
sentiment. It is as if, by knowing in one fashion, we 
surrender our ability to know in the other. In other words, 
loving, like acting, is a form of knowledge: necessarily
non-self-reflective. Thus, both forms of knowledge— reason 
and sentiment— are partially blind. As with Rousseau in 
general, we can never embrace the entire pie; it might be 
phrased this way: We cannot know and know we know at the
same time. The heart of the paradox of Rousseau is akin to 
the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle: Man is not God, but,
of necessity, he acts as if he were; he pretends to both act 
and know, when he cannot in deed do both. Rousseau is the
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first romantic in that he finds, in the experience of 
writing, a synthesis of acting and knowing. That Rousseau 
championed sentimental knowledge should not blind us to the 
fact he is often viewed as a rationalist— and that he 
appreciated the limits and horizons of each form of 
knowledge.
Julie is "in love" and does not understand the nature 
of that love nor its sacrifices; so, in Part III, she 
totally alienates herself from herself by attempting to be 
everything to everyone and by becoming nothing! She gives 
herself totally to each force within her life: to Saint-
Preux (love); to her father (virtue); to Claire 
(friendship). Then she enters into the ultimate compromise 
for her: marriage. She alienates herself. And it is after
her marriage that she asks Saint-Preux (again) to be the 
lover of her soul. What is this but a classic situation of 
courtly love! (but a chaste one). If there is to be 
happiness within the confines of this novel, it must be 
found in a form of courtly love, for otherwise the 
resolution would mean adultery— something that would be too 
damaging to the moral sensibilities of a Julie.
The novel in fact moves toward just such a resolution: 
the challenge of the "cure" of lova first tests by 
friendship and then attempts to open up into cortezia. 
Claire and Julie represent the ideal of friendship. And it 
is in the "matinee a l'englaise" that the gestalt of courtly
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love is first configured. But, as we know, the
configurations change; Wolmar, we summarily say (when
compared with Claire as a member of the menage), is an 
unworthy member of the triangle— for in him the other two 
cannot lose and rarefy their love. Though Saint-Preux 
offers himself as the ideal courtly lover— friend of your 
person and lover of your virtues— Julie knows that the 
traditional configuration of the "menage a trois" holds the 
answer, even if Wolmar is not a part of it. It is in Part 
V that the reader first intimates that the key, or at least 
a key to happiness will be some sort of communion of souls—  
more specifically, some sort of love triangle. Some sort of 
courtly love.
Julie has her own "cure" for herself: it would have
been a sort of mystical love triangle, an even higher form
of love than she suffers. Like Saint-Preux, Julie has found 
her own cure, and it is so different from Wolmar's theories 
of replacement of past memories with new memories.
Let us return explicitly to our primary subject: 
happiness.2 Rousseau's test for happiness is being able to 
say: "I will this moment to last forever." This guideline
is enunciated both in the Julie and in the Reveries. Using
^he "stress on morality.. .should not be allowed to 
conceal the essential truth that in each phase of their 
relationship the fundamental psychological purpose is the 
same: the attainment of happiness." (Grimsley, Jean-Jacques. p. 136)
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it as a barometer of the various approaches to happiness in 
the Julie yields consistent and insightful results. The 
happiness of the couple must be a form of courtly love; the 
happiness of the individual must be solitude. And whether 
there is a happiness that extends beyond the "menage a 
trois," whether there is a more extensive or political 
happiness is not a question that Rousseau seems to answer in 
the Julie. The most that can be said is that, if there is 
a political happiness portrayed in the Julie, it is that of 
the peasants at the grape harvest. It is the happiness of 
children at a festival. The "general will", as opposed to 
a small community of belles ames, has not yet been 
introduced as a means of overcoming alienation.
But what of erotic love? What of the love of the 
couple? One might guess that, theoretically, the couple 
would will the moment of coitus to last forever, but it is 
not a moment of stasis, rather a constant longing unto 
death. At all other moments, the couple, one might say, is 
willing or moving toward orgasm. Their life is one of 
motion, not rest. There is no moment that they might will 
to last forever, for there exists no moment of even relative 
rest in their lives (in so far as they exist as a couple). 
We saw in Part I where Julie intermittently made appeals to 
a sort of Platonic love or union of souls, as if she, with 
keener sensibilities than Saint-Preux, knew that happiness
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was more or something different from what they were acting 
out.
But what of the happiness of the family— Julie's second 
mode of life? For a while it seems that family life in 
rustic retreat holds the key to happiness, but Julie's world 
weary speech in Part VI shatters the readers hold on that 
illusion. Again it is a question of motion and rest. As 
Julie explains, happiness of necessity climbs to a peak, 
then declines. She is, of course, speaking of her present 
state of happiness: the family which is naturally an
evolving or moving organism. Children grow up and go away, 
and that is what you will for them, but it is a hard reality 
that robs you of your happiness. In other words, there is 
no moment in the life of the family that you will to last 
forever. After growing children, there are grandchildren, 
and so on. Thus, erotic love and family life are both 
states of motion— so inherently so that in them there is no 
moment that will be willed into eternity.
Rousseau's criteria for happiness is another way of 
demanding the eternal present, another way of asking man to 
imitate God, another way of transcending motion. It is the 
romantic attempt to live the illusion of Zeno's paradox of 
the arrow that never reaches its mark, that is in motion and 
yet is not.
What forms of life— other than religious forms— pass 
Rousseau's happiness test? Within the confines of our
novel, we might say that both solitude and courtly love do. 
It is in Part IV that Saint-Preux spends two hours alone in 
Julie's garden Elysium. He says that he preferred that two 
hours to any time of his life. In Part I he spoke of his 
one hour after love-making with Julie as the preferred time 
of his life; and in Part V he and Julie and Wolmar spent two 
hours together in Elysium in a sort of communion of souls. 
Though sublime, the two hours with Julie and Wolmar are not 
said to rival his two hours of solitude in the same garden. 
When he first entered Elysium, Saint-Preux expressed the 
feeling that the garden affected him like primeval 
wilderness or nature. Is art perfecting nature into an 
ideal prime nature not the closest man can come to 
wholeness? Does the solitary not recreate his own soul? 
This is some evidence that Saint-Preux is at heart a 
solitary and that, after the end of the novel, he will not 
join the others at Clarens. This is, of course, conjecture, 
but that the preferred moment of a man's life is two hours 
of solitude, when he has loved such as Julie, does say 
something of his nature, and it seems to express a 
validation, for Rousseau, of existence in solitude. That 
Saint-Preux prefers solitude to the communion of the "menage 
a trois" seems to prefigure his refusal to wed Claire and 
enter into a chaste triangle at the end of the story. One 
might say that, whereas Saint-Preux's deepest nature is of
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the solitary and Claire's is of the friend, Julie's is 
love.
And how does courtly love pass the test of happiness? 
De Rougement claims that the lovers who are within the 
passion myth actually wish for death, the only resolution to 
their infinite longing. Of course, the passion myth, and 
the courtly love which contains it, are allegorical of a 
religious longing, of a passion to unite with the Godhead, 
of a wish to return to the Universe. I agree with de 
Rougement that Rousseau was well aware of the tradition of 
the passion myth. Of course, he was aware of Heloise and 
Abelard, who, according to de Rougement, were the first 
historical instance of its being lived out. But I do not 
believe, as de Rougement seems to, that Rousseau was simply 
another chronicler of the myth. De Rougement finds 
resolution to the passion of the myth, at least on a totally 
personal level, in Christian marriage. I contend that 
Rousseau offered his own manner of resolution.
Again, it is a question of motion and rest. Briefly, 
Rousseau's answer to the passion was courtly love— chaste 
courtly love: a mode of life in which you love/desire/move
to the fullest, without fear of falling from 
duty/virtue/rest. It is that synthesis of love and virtue 
that Julie discovered that imminent death gave her. Just as 
the life of the solitary is changeless, the life of courtly 
love is changeless, but also imaginative and free. Because
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the imagination is restrained within a person by a death-in- 
life and by the chemistry of the "menage", it does not risk 
setting the love in motion. Yes, death-in-life takes the 
place of "nearness to death"— thus eliminating the 
accidental nature of the occurrence of happiness, as we find 
in the Confessions and the Reveries, not to mention the 
Julie.
It must be clear by now that Rousseau's medieval title 
reflects more than a passing fad of the times, as some 
experts think. Rather, it is an indication that Rousseau's 
paradigm of happiness is somehow Christian, somehow 
medieval. He borrows from Christianity the metaphor of the 
Christ who walks and loves in this world, but who is dead to 
this world. He who would save his life must first lose it. 
Rousseau's lover is the Heloise of the convent, writing to 
her lover Abelard, knowing full well he is no longer an 
ordinary man, but loving him as before. Abelard does not 
seem to understand her abiding love; he silences her. And, 
after their second exchange of letters, there is no longer 
a hint in her words of her love for him. (There are not a 
few parallels between Saint-Preux and Abelard: both lose
sexual power; both somehow reject Heloise; both have a 
similar view of prayer; not to mention the more pedestrian 
comparisons.)
Courtly love passes Rousseau's test of happiness 
because, despite its being love (and thus motion), it wishes
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for or wills nothing that it is not already. But what adds 
the element of stasis, of rest? It is the triangular 
relation that allows for the diffusion and rarefaction of 
the loves. In the case of Saint-Preux and Julie, the 
relationship of each to Claire would have been the element 
of the transmutation of their love into something of both 
motion and rest. Such a communion of love might be compared 
to monastic brotherhood or sisterhood, or to alchemy.
Of course, courtly love had existed centuries before 
and, if we are to believe de Rougement, even within a 
framework of chastity, but Rousseau secularized a Christian 
modus vivendi for love by creating the "menage a trois" in 
place of the convent. So the New Heloise is very much an 
Heloise: She attempts to create her imaginary convent walls
with the mutual love of Claire and Saint-Preux, but finds 
that her friends are ultimately of different natures. 
Claire is the friend; Saint-Preux is the solitary.
Courtly love, and serving one's Lady, puts back 
together something that Kant has since broken: Rousseau
joins desire to duty in the pursuit of happiness. With 
Rousseau, duty and its fulfillment are still linked to the 
sweetness of pleasure. As Saint-Preux says, knowing that 
one has done good is the sweetest of pleasures. And, when 
the duty is performed in the service of one's Lady, the 
happiness is infinitely sweeter. The incident of Saint- 
Preux' s assisting the peasant couple Claude Anet and Fanchon
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seems a foreshadowing of the vassal serving his liege Lady. 
Of course, at the time of the event (Part I), Saint-Preux is 
still absorbed in erotic compulsions, but, even so, he takes 
great pleasure— even happiness— in his knowledge of having 
performed a good act, in spite of its interrupting plans for 
a love tryst.
It is to some extent true that Rousseau was a moralist, 
for he was surely always working on moral problems. For 
him, the best morality was the one that helped to make 
people whole "again"— that turned them inward and away from 
the fragmentation of the passions and the whims of the 
imagination. But the attempt to find the coincidence of 
virtue and happiness, in the Julie or elsewhere, will 
eventually raise the question of and the role of truth in 
the ordering of society. Virtue, even on Rousseau's 
account, is necessary to happiness, but the relation of 
truth to virtue seems problematic in Rousseau. It is the 
unnaturalness in virtue that might prompt us to ask if 
virtue can thus make us happy, for Rousseau strives for a 
natural wholeness of the individual. Or perhaps: "The life
of virtue, for all its moral worth, neglects [the] living 
element of absolute desire and imagination, and so fails to 
satisfy all man's needs."3 Perhaps it is as simple as 
saying that art must improve on nature— especially since
3Grimsley, Jean-Jacquesr p. 149.
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nature is not changeless, but rather perfectible and 
malleable. It might be that, because of the malleability of 
man, the project of constructing happiness for humankind can 
legitimately take different forms.
In the Julie. Saint-Preux the tutor allows Beauty and 
Goodness to preempt Truth; or, rather, Truth becomes a 
composition of Beauty and Goodness. And, when speaking 
individually and not as tutor, Saint-Preux states that, if 
he penetrated the mysteries of the Universe, he believes his 
situation would be less "delicious" than the existing 
"blinding ecstacy." For all of his rationalism in his more 
scientific works, Rousseau, at least in the Julie, humbles 
philosophy and her devotees. Saint-Preux blames philosophy 
for his cowardice and other ills and renounces it for love 
and friendship; Wolmar, on my unorthodox reading, is made to 
appear almost retarded in his understanding of humankind. 
Just as Saint-Preux the philosopher broke, Wolmar the 
philosopher is near conversion to Christianity as the novel 
ends. Can we say that such critiques of philosophy 
represent a philosophic teaching, or do we entertain the 
possibility, as Roger D. Masters seems to believe, that such 
portrayals are mere fodder for the "vulgar" reading 
audience? Such questions always appear in considerations of 
Rousseau, for he was, above almost all things, concerned 
with his usefulness.
Once we accept the fact that Rousseau saw nothing wrong 
with using art to arrive at naturalness, we can accept the 
Julie as consistent with his other writings on happiness. 
In the Confessions and the Reveries. we have seen the role 
played by the nearness-to-death experience in the attainment 
of happiness; and we have seen in the Reveries that Rousseau 
embraces the happiness of the solitary. Both notions are 
validated by the Julie, but the novel deals with the love of 
the couple (and the triangle) and, accordingly, adds to the 
scaffolding of happiness, so to speak. Once love is 
presented with an infinite obstacle, the love itself becomes 
infinite for all practical purposes (or dies). Whereas the 
solitary of the Reveries sees the infinite in a star-studded 
sky over Lake Geneva, the lovers of the Julie could have 
seen the infinite in the communion of the "menage a trois." 
In a sense, Rousseau attempts to show how to create an 
infinite world— not otherworldly, but infinite in its own 
way and for its own purpose. And the purpose of the action 
of the novel, whether or not attained, is the happiness of 
the lovers or, to expand the metaphor, the salvation of the 
lovers.
Julie, it seems, is saved— but at the moment of death 
and because of death. Saint-Preux remains a question, for 
he showed no little callousness to Julie's plight in her 
struggle with her abiding love for him. But both Julie and 
Saint-Preux represent a sort of cursed elect among
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humankind— those who fall into a grand and controlling love. 
And such represents what I would call the loss of public 
innocence, for some people never attain a private state of 
existence, because they are born into and remain in the 
public world of political or conventional virtue and 
sensibilities. Falling into the private world of passionate 
love is tantamount to a loss of innocence of public virtue 
and habits. As ironic as this might sound, it is surely 
more common than a conscious loss of natural innocence. The 
entire role of Wolmar and Bomston is to bring Saint-Preux 
back to his political self, where in fact it is nature or 
natural processes that "cure" him. And it is death, the 
most natural process of all, that cures Julie. Rousseau has 
us consider just what portion of lovers ever come back to 
the political, if any. Of course, this is the reverse side 
of the attempt to return to a quasi-natural wholeness. Loss 
of whatever kind of innocence requires some form of 
convalescence or cure, for wholeness— an essential condition 
for happiness— is not gained by accident, though access to 
it might be.
There is a movement in the sentimental action of the 
Julie, as our whole discussion and division of the novel 
indicates; and Irving Singer has noted a Kierkegaardian-like 
evolution to our story.
As if anticipating Kierkegaard, Rousseau presents
the lovers' progress throughout the novel as
stages of development that correspond to the 
aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious.
Saint-Preux begins as the representative of an 
aesthetic attitude toward love— not promiscuous, 
as Kierkegaard was later to define the aesthetic, 
but responsive to its immediate goodness. Being 
a person in love, he manifests sexual passion as 
a source of vitality and human well-being. He
and Julie move to a condition higher than the
aesthetic when they fall under the influence of 
Wolmar, who represents the ethical stage. Julie 
finally attains the highest level of human 
development in her pantheistic love of nature.
This supplants the aesthetic and the ethical as ultimate values without denying the ideality in 
each.4
The above must be compared with another of Singer's broad 
statements about the Julie; "For Rousseau the principal 
issue was to find the kind of relationship between men and 
women that will satisfy both love and virtue. The novel is
thus an attempt to synthesize the two ideals, as opposed to
leaving them in dialectical conflict."5 For me, an 
important point of the last statement is that it involves a 
relationship or a mutual love, not an individual state of 
synthetic resolution.
Also, there are two problems with the Kierkegaardian 
analogy; 1) It is more Saint-Preux than Julie who worships 
Nature; in fact, I am not sure where to find supporting 
texts for such a statement about Julie; and 2) Whatever 
happened to the relationship between men and women that will




satisfy both love and virtue? Does Julie leave Saint-Preux 
behind in her synthetic rise to the religious? If so, what 
happens to love, as opposed to the two individuals?
I think that Singer asks the pertinent questions, but 
I find slightly differing resolutions. Yes, the lovers go 
through three stages; call them Kierkegaardian for purposes 
of orientation: 1) The stage of engaged erotic love; the
aesthetic level; 2) The stage of what we have called the 
passion myth— when erotic love, because of external 
obstacles, cannot be fulfilled; the moral stage which also 
involves external control, whether physical or persuasive; 
and 3) The ideal or paradigmatic stage approached by Julie 
and Saint-Preux— call it Courtly Love— but never achieved by 
the couple; this stage is "religious" in that it involves 
internal (self-imposed and fully-embraced) obstacles to 
erotic love; in fact, the eros is given another object.
As stated above, my stages break down this way: Part
I; Parts II and III; and Parts IV, V, VI. Singer's stages 
seem to divide the novel in two, but it remains unclear at 
just what point Julie begins her elevation to the religious. 
If you had three stages, it would seem that you needed three 
divisions in which to act them out. Also, Singer conducts 
his analysis as if the personage of Julie foreshadows the 
Rousseau of the Reveries. I do not agree with such a 
reading, if that is in fact the subtext of Singer's line of 
analysis. This is a novel of political import, even if it
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is not a political novel; the Reveries only incidently speak 
to the political. Perhaps, the Julie is about the highest 
that we can attain in society, and the Reveries is about the 
highest we can attain in solitude. Looking at Rousseau's 
personal life, the understatement would be that the Julie 
was a failure; and that the Reveries. in process at 
Rousseau's death, were at least a partial success.
Where is the major political import of this work? One 
is tempted to say that the world weariness of Julie and 
Saint-Preux seems to express the frustration and sadness of 
the political philosopher Rousseau— unable to find a 
solution or resolution of happiness that would be both 
political and human. But Rousseau is not only political 
philosopher— he is poet and creator— and he attempts to be 
good, beautiful, and true in his efforts to be salutary. 
But make no mistake about it: This is not a question of an
exoteric and an esoteric teaching. Rather, because the 
world is perfectible or at least malleable, it can be 
created— and that includes humankind. Rousseau offered in 
his version of courtly love a new mode or order of living— a 
new way of being happy.
Aristotle defined happiness as an activity of the soul 
in conformity with virtue; as a form of self-restraint or 
moderation. The dominant modern view is that happiness is 
the satisfaction of desires. The salutary political nature 
of the ancient view and the naturalism of the modern view
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are blended in Rousseau. And what allows him to ride the 
fence, so to speak, is his romantic belief in the power to 
shape the world. In courtly love, both approaches to 
happiness are being lived simultaneously: a motion that is
rest; and a rest that is motion.
Rousseau, I think, was both rationalist and romantic—  
and that duality constituted his self-proclaimed uniqueness. 
He lived as a romantic and recapitulated that romanticism in 
a form of rationalism. His ability and willingness to allow 
both these opposing natures to grow and prosper with himself 
constitutes his greatness as well as his unique limitations.
Recognizing the claims of Antiquity, he could not 
abandon the promise of Modernity. That promise was and is 
comprised of a true freedom and equality of soul. And what 
does that mean? Within the context of my enquiry, it means 
that there is more than one way (via) to even true 
happiness. There are at least three general ways: 1) the
private or solitary way, which involves love of self; 2) 
the public or civic way, which involves love of country; and 
3) the tertiary way of romantic love. The Julie explores 
the last of these vitae.
Also, there is a tension in Plato/Aristotle of viewing 
the good life (happiness) as attainable through the 
political and of viewing the good life as contemplative or 
as a partial or complete retreat from the political. All 
one has to do is read On the social Contract and the
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Reveries in order to discover the same tension or polarity 
in Rousseau. Perhaps the major difference between these 
ancients and Rousseau is that for Plato/Aristotle virtue was 
natural and eternal verities were contemplated; for 
Rousseau, virtue was artifice and varied, and the grand 
spectacle of Nature was the object of both mind and eye. As 
we have pointed out already, Rousseau's greatest affinity 
with the ancients was, as with Machiavelli, through ancient 
heroes, especially those of Plutarch. And, as Rousseau 
suggests in his Second Preface, the characters of the Julie 
are heroes of the human heart. I would suggest that 
Rousseau elevates Plato so in the Julie, because he regards 
him as a poet.
Just how we think happiness is attained will somewhat 
determine what we expect of the political. If we believe 
that happiness is a state of mind (Stoicism), we are less 
likely to demand much in the way of social programs; if we 
believe happiness to be the maximization of pleasure over 
pain (Utilitarianism), we are more likely to institute 
social programs aimed at the physical well-being of the 
citizens. But what do we do or demand when we believe 
happiness to be found in solitude? If we the citizens also 
believe that man is radically solitary by nature, we would 
probably try to create an over-powering and over-whelming 
political community, for the purpose of protecting the 
integrity and preservation of the collective, the only way
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of life that could ever preserve the species. If we 
believed only a small fraction of people to be solitary, we 
might even help support them in order to control them.
Cast in the most fundamental terms, the conflict that 
Rousseau sees is between the truth of life and the life of 
society. Happiness might be found on each extreme and even 
in the middle. This middle way is that of the Julie— the 
way of the partial association: a private political union.
Let's say, the truth of life brings us to the raw impulses 
of the solitary dreamer, and the life of society takes us to 
a denaturing of life itself. Only in the love of Julie's 
vision— joined with virtue and friendship— is man allowed to 
exist as fully natural and as fully virtuous. Only here is 
there synthesis, as opposed to constant opposition or 
retreat. Of course, whether this love is suitable to more 
than a slight proportion of humankind is another question.
But what do we do as citizens, if we believe that 
happiness might be found in a sort of courtly love? 
Socially and politically, it seems only salutary; it would 
offer, even in its superficial practice, a channel and 
framework within which possibly illicit and disrupting 
affairs might be calmed. But Rousseau knew that such 
institutions were the work of the poet, not the political 
philosopher, in spite of the fact that such institutions and 
mores were of profound political import.
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In the Julie. Rousseau seems more Plutarch than Plato. 
He is a creator of heroes, hopefully, to be imitated, but 
heroes of love, not war or politics. Rousseau writes in the 
Second Preface that, within that little world of the novel, 
he is teaching people to love humanity. His heroine 
resembles a religious leader and founder, especially in her 
death and its aftermath, but, as has been said often, hers 
is a religion of love and humanity, though bolstered by a 
naturalistic Christianity.
The popularity of this book must have been almost 
embarrassing to Rousseau the political philosopher. Whereas 
the young Werther later provoked a rash of suicides, Julie 
only and purely edified. Such a creation is political in 
spite of itself— in spite of its effect on what it intends 
to transcend.
An understanding of Julie: or The New Heloise gives the 
political philosopher a window of insight into Rousseau's 
political aspirations for humankind. Order was no longer 
enough; it had to be order with some semblance of love, 
happiness, and unity of soul.
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